



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

**DEVELOPMENT OF 8 NO. BEDROOM HMO
1-3 HASLAM STREET, BURY**

For: SMS Architecture
Version A: 28th January 2026
Reference: 2025/0127/CIS/01

designforsecurity

Haslam Street

URN: 2025/0127/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

Experience suggests that houses in multiple occupation tend to attract a more transient group of residents who, if not sensitively managed, can both generate and attract crime and disorder problems that may directly impact on the amenity of neighbouring residents. It is therefore essential that robust security measures and a suitable management plan have been developed and then designed into the scheme from the outset, in order to clearly demonstrate that crime and disorder issues have been considered and reasonable measures implemented to ensure that the development provides a safe and secure place for future residents.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of works where appropriate, we would be happy to support the development.

Matthew Granelli

Design for Security Consultant

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
1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located north of the Chesham Industrial Centre in Bury. The building is currently vacant but secure.

The site is bound by Haslam Street and Back Haslam Street with these roads forming the East, South and West boundaries respectively. The North boundary is shared by a residential dwelling.

The surrounding buildings are mixture of commercial, retail and residential developments, it benefits from good levels of natural surveillance.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2025 to 31st December 2025 within 500m of the site.

2.1 Local Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	<5	36	134	9	<5	<5	14	15	6

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime has been above average for the Bury division, with less serious wounding and theft having been the most reported offences taking place. These offences have occurred throughout the local area in the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site. Assaults and public order offences have been the most reported. The majority of less serious woundings incidents involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as cases of domestic violence and altercations between customers in retail outlets. In cases of theft offenders have targeted insecure items, bags or coats on tabletops and benches in public spaces, retail outlets and restaurants, as well as parcels left on doorsteps and in communal areas of apartment buildings.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 General Risk Factors

- 2.2.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds, or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.3.1 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such

boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All private spaces to the sides/rear of dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.7).

2.3.2 Smashed glazing in windows or doors.





Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

2.3.3 Posing as legitimate residents and gaining access to communal areas of buildings by tailgating residents and insecure doors.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the building before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.




2.4 Local Crime Rate Comparisons

The graphs below compare the local rates of crime (i.e. crimes per 1,000 dwellings) with the average rates for Bury, Greater Manchester and England & Wales.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **42% lower** than Bury as a whole, **43% lower** than Greater Manchester and **42% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **41% lower** than Bury as a whole, **46% lower** than Greater Manchester and **3% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **15% lower** than Bury as a whole, **23% lower** than Greater Manchester and **6% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **24% higher** than Bury as a whole, **12% higher** than Greater Manchester and **36% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Monday and Sunday in the early hours of the morning (01:00-02:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point is recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure doors.
- Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Sunday in the early morning (01:00-02:00) and is also high throughout the working week in the morning (08:00-09:00). Offenders tend to target vehicles late at night and in the morning during the working week when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 Change of use from 2 no. Class E units to 8 bedrooms House in Multiple Occupation (Class Sui Generis) together with alteration to front elevations and change of roof style from hip to gable.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The re-use of the property is welcomed. Properties that remain vacant for some months are often targeted by thieves and vandals. The resulting visible signs of decay can attract further abuse, which is then likely to affect the neighbouring residents and nearby properties.
- 3.2.2 The internal layout of the building has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.3 Although modest, some communal space can help build relationships between residents and develop 'social capital' within a development. There is often a more 'stable' resident base in socially cohesive developments, that is, there is less of a turnover of residents. HMOs with a high turnover of residents are more likely to generate crime and disorder.
- 3.2.4 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.2 Access into the building should be controlled by an intercom phone system (so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- 3.3.3 How post is delivered into the HMO should be carefully considered to prevent access to non-residents into the residential areas of the building.
- 3.3.4 All bedroom entrance doors should be of robust construction (FD30 or higher) and be fitted with a door chain and spyhole.
- 3.3.5 All ground floor and easily accessible windows should be certified to BS PAS 24. Restrictors should be installed to ground floor windows to prevent them from being left insecure if unlocked, it is recommended that opening is restricted to 100mm.
- 3.3.6 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation in addition to the layout issues highlighted within Section 3.3.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All new external doorsets (including bi-folding doors) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should be compliant with and certified to one of the standards above, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be self-closing/locking and capable of being controlled by means of an audio phone system linked to each bedroom, so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to the building. Postboxes should be located externally adjacent to the main entrance. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to the residents via the access control system.
- ☐ The internal doorsets to each of the bedroom units should be of robust construction (FD30 or higher), with hinge-bolts and a lock certified to BS 8621 or PAS 8621, to allow the residents to secure their own bedroom/possessions.
- ☐ Given the likely transient nature of the residents of the scheme, any resident fob/key-cards should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled by the landlord to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Any keys should be collected by the landlord (and accounted for at all times) when residents move on.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All new or accessible windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ All new ground floor glazing (to doors and windows) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 CCTV

- ☐ If a CCTV system is installed, suitable locations for cameras would be: all external doors and all parking/cycle storage areas. Images should be recorded, with recording equipment located in a secure room within the building or recorded off-site.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 Other

- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

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- ☐ Ideally, any meter cupboards should be capable of being read remotely or should be located to the front of the property only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority (SIA) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. Please see [Secured by Design - Secured by Design](#) for more information. To apply for the SBD Award for your development in Greater Manchester, please visit [Apply for Secured by Design – Design For Security](#).

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
01/01/2026	SMS Architecture	CIS Application
05/01/2026	DfS	CIS Fee Proposal
13/01/2026	SMS Architecture	CIS Confirmation
22/01/2026	DfS	Site Visit

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	1 – 3 Haslan St – Rev D		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Date	Revisions
A		