



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

SPURR HOUSE, POLE LANE, BURY  
RESIDENTIAL (60 no. APARTMENTS)

FOR: Watson Homes

VERSION B: 25/07/2025

REFERENCE: 2022/0482/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

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# Spurr House, Pole Lane, Bury

URN: 2022/0482/CIS/02

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Minor design changes/security improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure enclosure of private space to the sides/rears of apartment blocks (post & rail/mesh fencing not considered appropriate), with definition to remaining parking/landscaping areas and pedestrian/vehicular site access/egress points to deter unauthorised access from adjacent open space and funnel pedestrian movement away from parked vehicles.
- Replacement of any external patio doors/terraces to the ground floor apartments along the frontages of the blocks with windows (which would be less vulnerable to being left insecure, being forced open or being damaged) or securely enclosure them within private space if they are to be retained.
- Ideally, each building should be served by a single communal entrance – allowing all activity and security to be focussed in one location. Robust control of access into/around the buildings for visitors, including a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels that does not require access to all floors of the buildings.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



**Bradley Hart** MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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# 1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the east side of Pole Lane in the Unsworth area of south Bury.

It is currently occupied by a single-storey building, with a central external courtyard, known as Spurr House – a former short-term respite care centre fronting onto Pole Lane, which has been closed for some time. The south-west portion of the site houses a small surface car park (as well as a detached garage), accessed off Pole Lane. It has grassed landscape areas to its frontage, sides and rear (currently in a poor state), in addition to woodland/trees to the rear of the site. The sides and rear of the site are currently enclosed with relatively low timber fencing and hedging/trees along the perimeter - meaning the hidden elevations of the building could be vulnerable to unseen unauthorised access. The window and door openings have been secured with metal panels.

Crime and anti-social behaviour are often more likely to occur if an offenders presence does not attract attention and a place feels like it is not under supervision. Such derelict sites can encourage loitering/gathering and foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity. If signs of disorder (such as graffiti, smashed glazing etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse and trigger a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality - giving the impression that such sites are not owned or cared for by anybody and that crime and disorder is tolerated.

To the immediate north-west of the site is a pair of semi-detached houses fronting towards Pole Lane, with a detached garage directly in front of them. To the north is a large block of flats named Pole Lane Court, with an access road running along the northern boundary of the site leading to landscaped areas, surface parking areas, bin stores and garage colonies to the rear of the block.


To the north-east of the site is a secondary school and grounds (Unsworth Academy, accessed off Parr Lane), with open space to the east of the site – beyond which is the M66 motorway.

To the south of the site is Unsworth Cricket and Tennis Club with dense hedging along the street frontage and scrub vegetation/trees along the boundary with the site.

When publicly accessible land or routes exist to the rear of sites, they can often leave them vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when they benefit from little/no natural surveillance) – as they can provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen.

The land to the west of the site is primarily residential in nature, including some large detached dwellings on the opposite side of Pole Lane, which overlook the site to some degree (albeit some of them have high vegetation along their street frontages, which impedes views off from them).

The wider area includes a number of educational premises, including Unsworth Academy to the north-east, Mersey Drive Community Primary School to the south-west and Bury and Whitefield Jewish Primary School to the north-west. Pike Fold Golf Club lies to the east, on the opposite side of the M66 motorway.



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> January 2024 to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2024.





### 2.1 Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site |                       |                 |                       |       |         |                  |                          |                        |               |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| Domestic Burglary                  | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 7                                  | <5                    | <5              | 59                    | <5    | <5      | <5               | <5                       | <5                     | <5            |

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively low for the Bury division. This may in part be because the study area includes large areas of open space that is not densely populated and typically attracts fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent type of recorded crime has been less serious wounding – primarily assaults and public order offences involving disputes between known associates and some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on domestic burglary and vehicle crime.

### 2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



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- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries in the local area (i.e. recorded crime per 1,000 dwellings) is **41% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **42% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **41% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings in the local area is **48% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **52% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **8% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage in the local area is **90% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **91% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **89% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime in the local area is **56% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **60% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **52% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

## 2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.*

- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** There have been relatively few recorded domestic burglary crimes over the last 12 months in the study area. When analysing those that have occurred, the risk is greater on Friday during the week and in the evening/early hours of the morning during the day. At these times, it is dark, streets tend to be quieter and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks.
  - Doors have been forced open with implements/bodily pressure, or have been targeted when left insecure by residents (particularly front doors).
  - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

## 2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*

- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** Again, there have been relatively few vehicle crimes within the study area. The risk peaks on Thursday/Friday and late at night – when offenders perceive a lower risk of being identified.
- 2.4.2 Vehicles parked within open, communal areas or on street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on the driveways of individual properties or within secure garages/parking facilities.

## 2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
  - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
  - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
  - Anti-social behaviour
  - Theft of/from parked vehicles
  - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
  - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
  - Neighbour disputes
  - Poor maintenance of access control systems
  - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

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## 2.6 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties and vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- There have been a number of incidents where the means of entry was unknown/legitimate – this is likely to have been when offenders have targeted insecure doors or windows unnoticed or have tailgated/posed as legitimate visitors to gain access to apartment blocks.

*Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see below & Section 4.1 for more information). Main communal entrances to blocks should be located in highly visible positions and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.*

*All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Clearly defined defensible space between building frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.*

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with implements/bodily pressure, or have been targeted when left insecure by residents (particularly front doors).

*Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.*

*A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment blocks before allowing them access. The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies/terraces that would be publicly accessible from street level.*

*All private spaces to the sides/rears apartment blocks should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.5), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of the dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.6).*

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

*Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any glazed panels in or around doors should ideally be small and set well-away from locking points.*

- Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

*Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. Any surface communal parking areas serving apartment blocks or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the street or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes in areas clearly in ownership/control of residents themselves. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.*

## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to demolish the existing building and erect 2 no. 3-4 storey residential blocks, totalling 60 no. apartments, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The buildings will occupy the south-western (Block A) and north-eastern (Block B) portions of the site, fronting towards each other and onto communal parking areas between and to the side of them. Vehicular access will be off Pole Lane, along the southern side elevation of Block A. Each of the blocks will be served by 2 no. communal entrances and cycle stores and plant rooms at ground level. The ground floor apartments will have external terraces and the upper floor apartment will have external balconies. There will be enclosed external bin stores to the north and south of the parking area.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The buildings will have habitable room windows to their frontages, providing surveillance opportunities over the parked vehicles, any visitors to the blocks and towards the access route off the street.
- 3.2.3 The footprint of the buildings has been kept relatively simple, with no accessible doors/windows hidden within deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen).
- 3.2.4 Many of the apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of any excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Points for Further Consideration

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Boundary treatments to the apartment blocks are vitally important to secure them, prevent unauthorised access to private spaces (where hidden doors/windows could be attacked unseen) and define defensible space to building frontages. The communal landscaped garden areas to the sides and rears of the apartment buildings should be enclosed as private space to prevent unauthorised access with 2100mm high railings and gates (or 1800mm high along the street frontage – see illustration above and Section 4.5 for more information). The proposed



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post & rail/mesh fencing with hedging is not considered appropriate to enclose and define private space. Care should be taken to ensure that any level changes or existing trees/branches do not inadvertently form climbing aids over boundaries to private space. The remaining landscaped/parking areas should also be enclosed with 1500-1800mm high railings and dense/mature hedging to prevent unauthorised access and egress to/from adjacent land.

- 3.3.2 Ideally all vehicular and pedestrian access to and from the site should be located to the south of Block A – in order to concentrate all movement in one well-overlooked location. If there is to be pedestrian access to the site to the north of Block A, it must be separated from adjacent parking areas and building façade by low-level railings and planting, in order to deter casual pedestrian around/between parked vehicles (where damage can easily occur – both accidental and malicious) – again, see opposite for illustration and Section 4.5 for more information. There should be a symbolic barrier at the vehicular entrance to the site (see above for illustration), formed by brick pillars and a change of road surface texture/colour etc, to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents - psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- 3.3.3 As proposed, the ground floor apartments along the frontages of the blocks will have publicly accessible external patio doors providing access to individual terrace areas, which could be vulnerable to damage, being forced open or being left insecure. If attacked or left insecure, they could be used by offenders to gain unauthorised access to both the apartments themselves, as well as the whole building (by circumnavigating the access-controlled communal entrance). Ideally, any such patio doors along the frontages of the buildings should be removed from the scheme and replaced with security-certified windows fitted with opening restrictors (see Section 4.2), which would be less vulnerable to forced unauthorised access, damage or being left insecure. If the ground floor terraces and doors must be provided, the doors themselves must be security-certified (see Section 4.1), incorporate laminated glazing (see Section 4.3) and enclosed within private terrace areas securely enclosed by railings or a balustrades to a minimum height of 1800mm. However, if the patio doors are replaced with windows, the building frontages should be defined by low-level railings and planting (see illustration opposite & Section 4.5 for more information).
- 3.3.4 Ideally, each building should be served by a single communal entrance – allowing all activity and security to be focussed in one location. The communal entrances to each block should be formed by a hinged single-leaf, self-closing/locking, security-certified doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system (see Section 4.1). In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of the buildings is not required (again, see Section 4.1 for more information). Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks), it is recommended that there is also a secure system for depositing parcels incorporated within a secure postal lobby.
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

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## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorsets to each block must be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. They should be single-leaf, self-closing/locking and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the buildings before allowing them access.
- ☐ Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If this is not possible, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). Consideration should also be given to a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobbies, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any ground and first floor external patio doors to individual apartments must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The external entrances to the cycle stores should be for the use of residents only. They should also be security-certified to one of the above standards and should be self-closing and operated by resident key-fob only (on access and egress). External doorsets to plant rooms should also be security-certified to one of the above standards. Internal doors to cycle stores or plant rooms should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob.

### 4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the buildings (such as projecting canopies/window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes, projecting brickwork/cladding features etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows or balconies.

## 4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should ideally have an intruder alarm to comply with BS EN 50131. Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.
- ☐ If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each apartment, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

## 4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The sides and rear of Block B should be enclosed as private amenity space for the use/access of residents only by 2100mm high walls and/or railings and gates. The sides and rear of Block A should be similarly enclosed with walls/railing to a minimum height of 1800mm. The proposed post & rail/mesh fencing with hedging is not considered appropriate to enclose and define private space. Care should be taken to ensure level changes do not inadvertently aid scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath railing panels or gates. Any retaining structures should not have features that may aid climbing (such as sloping, terracing or footholds etc.) and any boundaries formed by a combination of retaining walls and fencing/railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
  - ☐ Any pedestrian gates to the private space of Blocks A & B should also be 1800/2100mm high, self-closing and self-locking. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. All gates should have no centrally located horizontal bars that would aid climbing and they should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
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- ☐ The remaining landscaping/parking areas within the site should be enclosed and separated from the adjacent open land to the east and south by 1500-1800mm high railings and dense vegetation, to prevent unseen access/egress from any direction other than Pole Lane. Ideally, all pedestrian and vehicular movement should be funnelled along the well-overlooked, formalised single site entrance off Pole Lane (to the south of Block A). If a separate pedestrian access point is to be provided to the north of Block A, it must be separated from adjacent parking areas by low-level railings (e.g. 1200mm high) and low-level planting to deter casual movement around/between parked vehicles – see Section 3.3 for illustration.
  - ☐ Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. Any existing dense vegetation/hedging to the perimeter of the site should be retained as much as possible, in order to deter scaling or and damage to boundaries.
  - ☐ If the external patio doors/terraces to the ground floor apartments along the frontages of the buildings are to be retained, they should be enclosed within private terraces by railings or balustrades to a height of 1800mm. If they are replaced with windows (fitted with opening restrictors), the frontages of the apartment blocks should be protected by some defensible space, defined by low-level railings (to an approximate height of 1200mm) and planting. The design or any low walls or railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
  - ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

## 4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

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- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
  - ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

#### 4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around building entrances and parking areas, any low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and any tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

#### 4.8 Other

- ☐ The communal cycle stores serving the apartment blocks should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: [www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/](http://www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/).
- ☐ The external bin stores should also be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and a self-closing and 'slam-to-lock' gates, which cannot be left unlocked when shut. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

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## 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
  - Repair to communal areas (such as access-controls, fencelines/gates, lighting, signage etc.)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas.

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact Register

| Date                                              | Contact With            | Summary of Contact                                                              |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2 <sup>nd</sup> January 2025                      | TADW                    | Receipt of CIS instruction & plans                                              |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> January 2025                      | TADW                    | Quote issued & request for additional info                                      |
| 6 <sup>th</sup> January 2025                      | TADW & Watson Homes     | Confirmation of instruction & fee. Additional info to follow. Payment link sent |
| 16 <sup>th</sup> January 2025                     | TADW & Watson Homes     | Email sent re: report completion & issue upon payment. Payment link re-sent     |
| 28 <sup>th</sup> to 29 <sup>th</sup> January 2025 | Watson Homes            | Email correspondence re: payment link not received. Re-sent                     |
| 31 <sup>st</sup> January 2025                     | GMP Finance Dept & TADW | Confirmation of payment & issue of Version A of CIS                             |
| 16 <sup>th</sup> July 2025                        | TADW                    | Receipt of amended plans & request to update CIS                                |
| 23 <sup>rd</sup> July 2025                        | TADW                    | Receipt of further amended plans                                                |
| 24 <sup>th</sup> July 2025                        | TADW                    | Receipt of further amended plans                                                |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.                     | Drawing Title                                      | Date     | Rev |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------|-----|
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0001-P-1 | Location Plan (SUPERSEDED)                         | 22.11.24 | P1  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0001-P-2 | Location Plan                                      | 28.01.25 | P2  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0002-P-2 | Existing Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)                    | 02.01.25 | P2  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0002-P-3 | Existing Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)                    | 28.01.25 | P3  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0002-P-4 | Existing Site Plan                                 | 24.07.25 | P4  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0010-P-3 | Proposed Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)                    | 02.01.25 | P3  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0010-P-6 | Proposed Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)                    | 28.01.25 | P6  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0010-P-7 | Proposed Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)                    | 23.07.25 | P7  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0010-P-8 | Proposed Site Plan                                 | 24.07.25 | P8  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0011-P-3 | Proposed Site Plan Showing Roof Plans (SUPERSEDED) | 28.01.25 | P3  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0011-P-3 | Proposed Site Plan Showing Roof Plans (SUPERSEDED) | 23.07.25 | P4  |
| 241352-TADW-00-XX-DR-A-0011-P-5 | Proposed Site Plan Showing Roof Plans              | 24.07.25 | P5  |
| 241352-TADW-00-00-DR-A-0050-P-3 | Proposed Ground Floor Plan GA (SUPERSEDED)         | 02.01.24 | P3  |
| 241352-TADW-00-00-DR-A-0050-P-6 | Proposed Ground Floor Plan GA                      | 28.01.25 | P6  |
| 241352-TADW-00-01-DR-A-0051-P-3 | Proposed First Floor Plan GA (SUPERSEDED)          | 02.01.24 | P3  |
| 241352-TADW-00-01-DR-A-0051-P-3 | Proposed First Floor Plan GA                       | 24.01.25 | P5  |
| 241352-TADW-00-02-DR-A-0052-P-3 | Proposed Second Floor Plan GA (SUPERSEDED)         | 02.01.24 | P3  |
| 241352-TADW-00-02-DR-A-0052-P-5 | Proposed Second Floor Plan GA                      | 24.01.25 | P5  |
| 241352-TADW-00-03-DR-A-0053-P-3 | Proposed Third Floor - Roof Plan GA (SUPERSEDED)   | 02.01.24 | P3  |
| 241352-TADW-00-03-DR-A-0053-P-5 | Proposed Third Floor - Roof Plan GA                | 24.01.25 | P5  |
| 241352-TADW-00-04-DR-A-0054-P-3 | Proposed Roof Plan GA - Block B (SUPERSEDED)       | 02.01.24 | P3  |

|                                 |                                                                |          |    |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----|
| 241352-TADW-00-04-DR-A-0054-P-4 | Proposed Roof Plan GA - Block B                                | 24.01.25 | P4 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0060-P-3 | Proposed Elevations - Block A (SUPERSEDED)                     | 02.01.24 | P3 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0060-P-6 | Proposed Elevations - Block A (SUPERSEDED)                     | 24.01.25 | P6 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0060-P-6 | Proposed Elevations - Block A                                  | 23.07.25 | P7 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0065-P-3 | Proposed Elevations - Block B Sheet 1 (SUPERSEDED)             | 02.01.24 | P3 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0065-P-6 | Proposed Elevations - Block B Sheet 1 (SUPERSEDED)             | 24.01.25 | P6 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0065-P-6 | Proposed Elevations - Block B Sheet 1                          | 23.07.25 | P7 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0066-P-3 | Proposed Elevations - Block B Sheet 2 (SUPERSEDED)             | 02.01.24 | P3 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0066-P-6 | Proposed Elevations - Block B Sheet 2 (SUPERSEDED)             | 24.01.25 | P6 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0066-P-6 | Proposed Elevations - Block B Sheet 2                          | 23.07.25 | P7 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0067-P-4 | Proposed Site Section and Street Scene Elevations (SUPERSEDED) | 24.01.24 | P4 |
| 241352-TADW-00-ZZ-DR-A-0067-P-4 | Proposed Site Section and Street Scene Elevations              | 23.07.25 | P5 |

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made                                    | Date     |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------|----------|
| A       |                                                   |          |
| B       | CIS updated to reflect minor amendments to scheme | 25/07/25 |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

#### STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

### BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

*Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).*

#### CPTED

*Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*

#### CRS

*Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)*

#### INPT

*Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.*

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

*A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.*

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

*A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.*

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

*The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.*

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)