



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Bury Metrolink Station, Haymarket Street, Bury

Refurbishment Existing Platform, New Footbridge, Infill of
the Subway Under the Track & Temporary Access Route

FOR: WILLMOTT DIXON

16012-DFS-BRY-XXX-T-RK-000001

Crime Impact Statement

rev P02

20th January 2025

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Haymarket Street, Bury

2024/0223/CIS/01

Version B: 24th March 2025

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed development is acceptable in general the introduction of a secondary access/egress point will make the station safer for legitimate users; however, there are a number of points that should be considered to improve the security of the proposed development.

- There should be a high level of illumination and CCTV coverage. Existing lighting and CCTV should be upgraded where necessary.
- Building materials should be carefully considered to avoid defacement.

More details can be found in section 3.3 where there are a number of recommendations made which would enhance the security of the development and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



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
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1 Visual Audit

The Metrolink site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red, and in the surrounding photos. Bury Metrolink station is located in the town centre area of Bury, and is accessed from the main interchange building.

The interchange is roughly bound by Kay Gardens to the North, Princess Parade/Bury Market to the East, to the South by Angouleme Way (A58), and to the West by Haymarket Street, with the Metrolink platform located to the South of the interchange between Pyramid Park and Knowsley Place. The first phase of the development (this planning application) is the Metrolink station/platform, edged in red. The redevelopment of the interchange building is the second phase of the development.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2018 to 31st January 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
7	31	95	619	96	37	14	10	12	37

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of town and city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Violence has taken place throughout the surrounding area, with a particular concentration to the east (around/off Bolton Street and Market Place), where there is a high concentration of licensed premises and late night takeaways. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded violent offences, often taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning at the weekend, when such premises are at their busiest.
- 2.1.3 The Rock is the main shopping area of Bury, with a high volume of retail and entertainment/licenced premises located along it. Theft offences have mostly occurred in/around retail and entertainment/licenced premises within the town centre, where offenders have primarily stolen personal items belonging to customers, patrons and staff (such as bags and mobile phones), as well as items belonging to the businesses.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage offences have primarily been concentrated to the north and east of the site, with offenders targeting businesses and vehicles (particularly smashing glazing).

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

Possible Solution – Any glazing should be protected with shutters to prevent glazing from being damaged when the station is closed. All easily accessible glazing should be laminated to prevent it from being easily smashed.

- 2.2.2 Criminal damage carried out against buildings, structures and landmarks by means of graffiti and smashed glazing.

Possible Solution – An anti-graffiti surface coating should be used on any vulnerable areas to allow any graffiti to be easily cleaned.

- 2.2.3 Theft of personal property.

Possible Solution – The station and platform should have ample room for the number of passengers to prevent overcrowding which can allow offenders to operate with greater ease. Ticket barriers should restrict access to legitimate passengers.

2.3 General Risk Factors



- 2.3.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Theft of cycles
- Theft from users
- Theft from premises
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Robbery of staff or users


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- Controlled access (staff/users only)
 - Criminal damage to property
 - Loitering groups/anti-social behaviour
 - Vandalism and graffiti
 - Arson
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Crimes Recorded at GM Railway/Tram Stations: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to offences within/against railway/tram stations, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of crime at Greater Manchester railway/tram stations is generally higher during the working week (particularly Monday, Tuesday and Thursday) than at the weekend. This is when stations are generally used more frequently by commuters, meaning the opportunities for crime are greater. During the day, the risk rises in the afternoon and into the early evening – during peak travels times. When it gets dark, offenders often perceive a lower risk of being detected or identified.





- 2.4.2 **Types of Recorded Crimes:** At Greater Manchester railway/trams stations, the following crimes have been experienced most frequently:

- Theft of pedal cycles (with offenders often cutting locks to steal them) – offenders know that cycles are often left unattended and poorly overlooked for long periods of time, meaning they can target them without fear of being witnessed.
- Theft of/from and damage to motor vehicles – again, offenders know that vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time.
- Theft of personal property belonging to passengers (such as bags, wallets/purses, mobile phones etc.) and other railway property.

- Verbal abuse of staff and other train travellers.
- Criminal damage to railway equipment/buildings, including obstruction of railway lines

2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Wednesday and Friday during the late evening. Offenders often target vehicles during this time as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 The proposed development includes the following:

- A new footbridge connecting Union Square and Pyramid Park, providing access to the Metrolink top from the South.
- Infill of the subway under the track and associated access stair from Union Square, and infill of associated ramp from Pyramid Park.
- Refurbishment of platform and associated Metrolink canopy.
- Temporary access / emergency egress to the north of the Metrolink platform for the duration of two years (to allow Metrolink independent operation).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The route of the bridge is relatively linear with smooth corners, allowing for good sightlines for those using the bridge to access the platform, or Pyramid Park in the future, reducing the risk to legitimate users if they can assess any risks before proceeding to use this route.
- 3.2.2 The route to the bridge, from Union Square, is well overlooked by the offices and hotels, allowing for high levels of natural surveillance.
- 3.2.3 The bridge will generate legitimate activity which will deter offenders from operating.
- 3.2.4 The footpath and bridge will be illuminated to a high standard which will allow it to be used safely when it is dark and potentially deter offenders, or those antisocially minded, from operating.
- 3.2.5 The proposals will introduce a secondary access/egress point to the Metrolink platform at Bury station. This provides an alternative escape route in the event of an emergency or for legitimate users of the platform if they feel unsafe or in danger of criminality.
- 3.2.6 Access from the bridge, to Pyramid Park, will be restricted to prevent access to Pyramid Park until it is developed.
- 3.2.7 The station was tidy and free of litter on the day visiting the site. There were no obvious signs of antisocial behaviour or criminality.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 At platform level the lift opens under the bridge/stairs area and cannot readily be seen from the main platform area, which could potentially leave lift users vulnerable. To reduce the risk to legitimate users, the lift waiting area should be illuminated to a high standard, covered with monitored CCTV which can be viewed within the security office within the interchange building, and a panic button/emergency intercom should be positioned in this area.
- 3.3.2 The proposed temporary access to the station should be illuminated to a high standard and covered by monitored CCTV, allowing security staff to easily monitor this route. Lighting levels of the route from street level should be evaluated and temporary lighting might be necessary to facilitate safe use when it is dark.
- 3.3.3 The bridge and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high standard to facilitate safe use when it is dark. A variety of lighting sources should be employed to provide good illuminance levels and to avoid pooling/shadowing.
- 3.3.4 The areas under the stairs, where accessible, should be illuminated to deter loitering.

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- 3.3.5 There should be a review of lighting levels on the platform any it should be improved where necessary to provide a safe environment for users.
 - 3.3.6 The materials used in the construction of the bridge should be carefully chosen so that they cannot easily be damaged or defaced. Any large blank surfaces should be treated with an anti-graffiti coating so that any graffiti can be easily removed and reduce the potential or further defacement.
 - 3.3.7 CCTV coverage should be extended to the bridge, access and egress points, lift waiting area, and at platform level where existing coverage might be blocked by new structures.
 - 3.3.8 Existing CCTV coverage of the platform should be evaluated and upgraded where possible it is likely that if the existing system is replaced where the quality is not of a good standard and providing identification standard images (i.e. 125px/m). Facial recognition cameras can be used to alert security staff of any individuals who are banned from the station/interchange.
 - 3.3.9 Litter should be regularly removed from both the proposed bridge and temporary access, with regular litter picks taking place. An accumulation of litter can generate higher levels of littering and potentially generate misuse if those antisocially minded feel that the area is not looked after.
 - 3.3.10 Mutual security arrangements should be explored with the Premier Inn and Knowsley Place to allow for information sharing which could benefit all parties.
 - 3.3.11 There should be regular checks and maintenance of lighting, help points, and CCTV systems.

4 Construction

- 4.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 4.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
15/11/2024	Joanne Cebrat	Meeting
27/11/2024	Joanne Cebrat	CIS instruction received
20/12/2024	Joanne Cebrat	Draft issued
10/02/2025	Joanne Cebrat	Version A issued
10/02/2025	Joanne Cebrat	Version B issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
16012-HBA-01-01-DR-A-000003_S3-P08	INTERCHANGE AND RESI MARK UP		
16012-HBA-BRY-ZZZ-T-AR-000001	(PHASE 1 50% RIBA STAGE 3)		
16012-HBA-XX-XX-RP-A-000004_S3-P01	(Phase 2 BURY INTERCHANGE STAGE 2 REPORT - WITH NO RESIDENTIAL)		
16012-OOB-XXX-XXX-T-LA-005301_P01	(PHASE 1 50% RIBA STAGE 3)		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor revisions & updated site red edge	24/03/2025