



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

BURY MARKET, 1 MURRAY ROAD, BURY
FLEXIHALL (1,829sqm.), NEW MARKET CANOPIES
& 6 no. NEW MARKET KIOSKS

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Bury Council
VERSION A: 04/03/2022
REFERENCE: 2022/0034/CIS/01

Bury Market, 1 Murray Road, Bury

URN: 2022/0034/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Given the multi-use nature of the proposed flexihall (which is likely to be used by a number of different users groups at all times of the day and night), it is essential that the building is capable of being 'zoned', so that each area is capable of being secured while other areas are in use. Access to the first floor market office/bookable meeting rooms should be capable of being access-controlled, to prevent unauthorised access.
- It is highly recommended that the external service yard (including the refuse/recycling stores) is securely enclosed, in order to prevent unauthorised access/mis-use and allow servicing activities to be carried out from within a secure area.
- Design/treatment of the proposed market canopies to deter scaling/access to roof.
- Robust design/construction of the proposed market kiosks to prevent scaling and unauthorised access, including extension of the existing high railings/gates enclosing the outdoor market to prevent access to the rear of the kiosks out-of-hours.
- Secure design and layout of proposed public realm, including measures to define the proposed external seating area and prevent unauthorised vehicular access.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the north side of Angouleme Way (A58) in Bury town centre.


The eastern portion of the site is formed by Bury Market outdoor stalls and kiosks. The western portion of the site is formed by retail/commercial units fronting onto Princess Parade, a two-storey building housing a casino and a fast food restaurant and a single storey building providing administrative space for the market.

The casino and retail units to the west of the site front onto the pedestrianised route of Princess Parade, leading to Mill Gate shopping centre to the north-east of the site. To their rear are parking/service areas accessed off Hilton Road, beyond which is a single-storey building fronting onto Murray Road providing management offices and a reception for the markets. There is a turning circle/bus stop area to the south-west of the site and a bus station to the immediate west.

The outdoor market areas to the east are formed by stalls/kiosks secured with steel shutters out-of-hours. The kiosks and the walkways between them are covered by two areas of polycarbonate canopies, with a wide pedestrianised/servicing route between them. The covered area to the west is secured with high gates out-of-hours, while the area to the east remains publicly accessible. The area benefits from limited levels of activity, footfall, overlooking and passive surveillance at night/out-of-hours and publicly accessible narrow, sheltered routes or areas have the potential to foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and crime/anti-social behaviour.

To the immediate north of the outdoor market is a large Indoor Market Hall and a large Fish & Meat Hall, beyond which is Mill Gate Shopping Centre. The market area is served by a large surface car park on the opposite side of Angouleme Way - connected to it by two subways underneath the busy dual-carriageway.

The retail/commercial units along the norther boundary of the site have their primary frontages along Princess Parade. Some also have entrances onto Murray Road to the rear, in addition to a number of shuttered frontages and service entrances. There are currently shuttered steel containers on the opposite side of Murray Road from the units, providing storage of the market kiosks. As a result, the route benefits from limited active frontages along it.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2021 to 31st December 2021. It is accurate to a margin of +/- 8%, due to recent updates to GMP IT systems.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	26	123	626	137	45	23	31	33	23

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of town and city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Violence has taken place throughout the surrounding area, with a particular concentration to the north-west (around/off Bolton Street and Market Place), where there is a high concentration of licensed premises and late night takeaways. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded violent offences, often taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning at the weekend, when such premises are at their busiest. The Rock is the main shopping area of Bury, with a high volume of retail and entertainment/licenced premises located along it. Theft offences have mostly occurred in/around retail and entertainment/licenced premises within the town centre, where offenders have primarily stolen personal items belonging to customers, patrons and staff (such as bags and mobile phones), as well as items belonging to the businesses. Criminal damage offences have primarily been concentrated to the north and south-west of the site, with offenders targeting businesses and vehicles (particularly smashing glazing).
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed mixed-use scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail premises, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury retail premises peaks on Thursday and Friday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks late and night/during the early hours of the morning - when premises are closed, it is dark and there is little street activity, meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.

Bury Retail Burglary - Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently by offenders when targeting Bury retail premises:

- Front and rear doors have been forced open using bodily pressure or implements/tools.
- Shutters protecting doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements.
- Glazed panels in doors/shopfronts have been smashed to gain entry.
- Offenders have posed as legitimate customers to access premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors of stockrooms or offices or tailgating staff into restricted areas.

2.1 Theft (Bury Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail premises, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.




2.1.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Bury retail premises peaks on Wednesday and Thursday.

2.1.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or personal property stolen from customers (e.g. purses/wallets, handbags, mobile phones etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against office, recorded in the Bury area.



2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at office premises in Bury peaks on Friday.



2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified. Offenders also target office buildings during the day, when they are busy, as employees are likely to be distracted and offenders can often go about their business unnoticed/unchallenged.

2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** At Bury offices, the following entry points and MOs have been the occurred most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.3 Theft (Bury Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against office, recorded in the Bury area.



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Bury offices is greatest on Wednesday and Thursday and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking in the afternoon. During these times, many office workers will take breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Bags, purses/wallets and mobile phones were the most frequently stolen items.


2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Café/Restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurant/café premises, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury café/restaurant premises is greater over the weekend (Saturday to Monday) than during the rest of the week.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are closed and the areas in which cafes/restaurants are typically based are quiet – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected.

Bury Café/Restaurant Burglary – Point of Entry




2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders when targeting Bury restaurants/cafes:

- Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure, tools and implements.
- Windows have also been prised open by offenders to gain entry.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to force entry.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls to access unauthorised access.


2.5 Theft (Bury Restaurants/Cafes): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurant/cafe, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.

Bury Restaurant/Café Theft – Day Range



Bury Restaurant/Café Theft – Time Range




2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at cafes/restaurants in the Bury area peaks at weekend, when premises are likely to be at their busiest.

2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft at Bury cafes/restaurants rises in the afternoon and into the evening/early hours of the morning. Offenders are likely to target premises to commit theft during these periods, when they are often busier and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Theft of property belonging to staff has also occurred, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to back-of-house areas unnoticed.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Greater Manchester Event Spaces): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against event spaces, recorded in the Greater Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at event spaces in the Greater Manchester area is relatively low, with offences peaking on Monday and Sunday and during the evening. Offenders have likely targeted venues during these times when they are more likely to be closed, meaning they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting Greater Manchester event spaces:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, mostly by forcing them open with bodily pressure or implements.
- Shutters have been forced open to target doors behind them.

2.7 Theft (Greater Manchester Event Spaces): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against event spaces, recorded in the Greater Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at event spaces within Greater Manchester peaks on a Wednesday and Saturday and during the late evening. Offenders have mostly targeted insecure bags (removing cash and mobile phones) and coats hung on the backs of chairs (removing items from the pockets).


2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (Greater Manchester Markets): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against Markets, recorded in the Greater Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary at Greater Manchester market premises peaks on a Saturday/Sunday and during the early hours of the morning - when they are more likely to be closed, with no staff presence and limited levels of activity/footfall in the areas in which they are typically located.

GM Markets Burglary – Point of Entry




2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** At Greater Manchester markets, the following entry points and MOs have been the occurred most frequently:

- Shutters to market stalls/kiosk have been forced open by offenders most frequently.
- Unknown/legitimate entry points are likely to be where offenders have posed as legitimate customers and have gained access to storage/staff-only areas to steal items.
- Offenders have gained unauthorised access to roof areas and have penetrated through them to gain entry.


2.9 Theft (Greater Manchester Markets): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against Markets, recorded in the Greater Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

GM Markets Theft – Day Range



GM Markets Theft – Time Range



2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft from market premises in Greater Manchester peaks on Saturday and during the early afternoon. Offenders have removed items belonging to businesses, as well as personal belongings of employees (mostly bags and mobile phones). Offenders have grabbed items and made off from the area, targeting the stalls when they are likely to be at their busiest, when staff are more likely to be distracted. Offenders have also used pick-pocketing techniques to steal mobile phones, purses and cash from customers.

2.10 General Risk Factors

2.10.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings of customers and staff
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.11 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.11.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Bury retail, offices, cafes/restaurants and Greater Manchester event spaces and markets are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Bury Retail, Offices & Cafes/Restaurants and GM Event Spaces:** Front and rear doors have been forced open using bodily pressure or implements/tools.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by (see Sections 4.8 & 4.9).

- **Bury Retail, GM Event Spaces and GM Markets:** Shutters protecting doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Bury Retail, Offices & Cafes/Restaurants:** Glazed panels in doors/shopfronts/windows have been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Glazed shopfront areas should be protected by bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features to prevent ramming and secured with shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.3).

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- **Bury Retail & Offices and GM Markets:** Offenders have posed as legitimate customers to access premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors of stockrooms or offices or tailgating staff into restricted areas.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.1).

- **Bury Cafes/Restaurants:** Windows have also been prised open by offenders to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards where possible (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

- **Bury Cafes/Restaurants and GM Markets:** Offenders have penetrated through walls and roofs to access unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Sections 3.3/4.5).

- **Bury Cafes/Restaurants and GM Event Spaces:** Theft of personal property, particularly from table tops, from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 6). The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a large two-storey multi-use Flexihall and refurbish the existing outdoor market, including 2 no. new canopies above the existing outdoor market, 6 no. new market kiosks, façade improvements to the retail units fronting onto Princess Parade and public realm improvements.
- 3.1.2 The proposed Flexihall will lie to the west of the site and has been designed to accommodate a large number of visitors, with adequate facilities for use as a performance and music venue as well as a permanent café bar facility and back office functions for the market staff. The building consists of a triple height multi-functional hall/events space that can support market stalls, 'pop-up' trading, live performance and community events. There will be a raised area to the south side of the building, which can be used as informal seating or for stalls on market days and as a stage for performances and events. In addition to the hall/events space, the ground floor of the building will include a café bar to the north (with a new external seating area connecting to Market Street) and W/C facilities, storage and plant areas to the south (with an external service yard and refuse/recycling area to the south of the building). At first floor level, the building will incorporate a balcony overlooking the main flexihall, in addition to a market office, a number of bookable meeting rooms (intended for the provision of workshops, co-worker spaces or small business start-ups) and dressing rooms/tech spaces for performance artists.
- 3.1.3 The proposed canopies over the existing outdoor market to the east of the flexihall building have been designed to unify the current mismatch of walkway roofs and polycarbonate canopies into a single overarching structure and allow natural daylight to the walkways between the existing stalls/kiosks. A parade of 6 no. new market kiosks are also proposed fronting onto Murray Road and towards the rear of the retail/commercial units fronting onto Princess Parade, with roller shutters to their frontages and steel doors to their rear.
- 3.1.4 In addition to the elements described above, public realm improvements are proposed - including a new public square adjacent to the flexihall, improved pedestrian routes to the north and east and small areas of landscaping (including benches). As a result, the 'rear' facades of the retail/commercial units fronting onto Princess Parade will become a more prominent features within the townscape and will be improved - featuring new doors, windows, shutters, cladding and a glazed canopy.


3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed mixed-use development will bring additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The flexihall building will present active frontages to the surrounding movement routes, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the public realm.
- 3.2.3 The glazed façades of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.4 The building will include no deep/narrow recesses at ground level that would hide windows/doors, leaving them potentially vulnerable to attack, or features that could aid scaling the structure.
- 3.2.5 The proposed café bar is located directly adjacent to the main entrance/events lobby of the flexihall, providing staff with good views of all people entering/leaving the building, the proposed external seating area and the stair/lift providing access to the first floor facilities/offices.
- 3.2.6 The proposed kiosks and improved retail/commercial unit facades will improve levels of activity, footfall and surveillance along the movement route to the north of the outdoor market when they are operational.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and canopies and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The multi-use nature of the proposed flexihall means that it is likely to be used by a number of different users groups at all times of the day and night. It is essential that the interior of the building is capable of being 'zoned', so that each area is capable of being secured while other areas are in use (e.g. securing the first floor facilities when the events hall is in use during the evening). The main hall/events space should also be capable of being secured when not in use and the lift/staircore providing access to the first floor of the building should be capable of being access-controlled, to prevent unauthorised access to the market office and the bookable meeting rooms when required (see Section 4.1 for more information). All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and all individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied.
- 3.3.2 The proposed external service yard (including the refuge/recycling stores) should ideally be enclosed with 2100-2400mm high walls/railings and vehicular gates to prevent unauthorised access/mis-use and allow servicing activities to be carried out from within a secure area - deterring unauthorised access to the building or any servicing vehicles if left insecure and unattended. Care should be taken to ensure any combination of walls and railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to any boundary treatments or gates, which could aid climbing, and they should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
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- 3.3.3 The sheltered canopy area along the facades of the flexihall could potentially foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night - when the markets are closed and levels of activity and footfall in the area are lower. With that said, the canopy is high and the sheltered areas are immediately adjacent to the glazed facades of the building - limiting the amount of shelter/comfort it provides, discouraging mis-use and avoiding the creation of a dark, enclosed, intimidating area that could raise the fear of crime out-of-hours. The existing railings/gates to the outdoor market area should be retained (and extended where required - see below) to prevent unauthorised access to sheltered market walkways out-of-hours where possible.
- 3.3.4 Care should be taken in the design of the proposed market canopies to deter scaling/unauthorised access to the roof as much as possible. High, overhanging or rounded eaves would help to achieve this and the supports (including the cladding to them) should not include horizontal elements that could form a climbing aid. Care should also be taken to ensure that there are no nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as immediately adjacent low walls/railings/handrails, lighting columns/street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the structures. The construction the canopies themselves should be robust enough to withstand damage or penetration should anyone gain access. It is obviously preferable for the design of the canopies to deter access without the need for the installation of overt, retro-fitted anti-climb measures if problems are experienced once the scheme is complete.
- 3.3.5 The walls and roofs of the proposed market kiosks should also be of robust construction, with security-certified doors and shutters (see Section 4.5 for more information), and should not include features that may aid climbing. The existing high railings/gates that enclose the immediately adjacent outdoor market out-of-hours should be extended to at least enclose the rear of the proposed kiosks - preventing unauthorised access to the hidden, rear service doors of the kiosks when they are closed.
- 3.3.6 The improvements to the 'rear' facades of the retail/commercial units fronting onto Princess Parade should incorporate the appropriate physical security standards included within Section 4.1, 4.2 & 4.3, in order to deter damage and prevent unauthorised access. Care should be taken with dual-fronted retail/commercial units, as they can be difficult to manage and observe all customer access/egress. The staff/pay points should be appropriately located to ensure staff can easily observe both entrance/exit points, with any internal aisles or product displays aligned to assist surveillance and avoid blind-spots. It is also advised that there are no items of high-value displayed close to the entrances of the units.

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- 3.3.7 The design and layout of the proposed public realm should be carefully considered and should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster loitering/gathering, nuisance, anti-social behaviour or mis-use. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.7):
- Any ramps, steps, benches or any other hard landscaping features should be designed to deter and withstand mis-use/mis-treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.
 - There should be bollards or hard/soft landscape features preventing unauthorised vehicular access off Angouleme Way/Market Street to the landscaped public realm adjacent to the proposed flexihall and outdoor market (with systems in place to allow for servicing activities and emergency vehicle access).
 - Any proposed external seating area serving the café bar within the flexihall must be set-out and managed effectively to deter mis-use, crime and anti-social behaviour from occurring (see Section 4.6). It should be fully enclosed and defined as separate from adjacent pedestrian footways/public realm by robust barriers/planters, to ensure that pedestrians cannot pass too close-by to the tables/chairs. The layout of the tables/chairs should be configured so that they are not located directly adjacent to the barriers, where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. Removable items of furniture etc. should be stored internally within the building when not in use.
 - Any cycle parking areas located within the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas within the adjacent buildings. Secure cycle lockers are preferred, but if not, 'Sheffield' stands should be provided that allow both wheels and the crossbar to be locked to them, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle parking guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets (to the proposed flexihall, market kiosks and refurbished retail/commercial units) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ The market office and meeting room facilities at first floor level within the flexihall building should only be accessible to staff and delegates who have been greeted/vetted by staff. The stair core and lift serving the first floor facilities should be capable of either being managed directly by immediately adjacent reception staff or via auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards issued to staff or delegates/authorised users only). All individual meeting rooms and offices at first floor level (as well as the dressing rooms/tech support rooms) should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock to allow them to be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ The internal doors/frames between the flexihall and the café bar/support facilities on the west side of the building should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock to allow them to be secured when the hall/events space is not in use.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. All other internal doors to storage/stock rooms, cloak rooms, plant rooms etc. should be solid-core and capable of being secured when not in use.
- ☐ Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Any electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. Numeric keypad locks are not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All windows (to the proposed flexihall and refurbished retail/commercial units), where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters (to the proposed market kiosks and refurbished retail/commercial units) should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Where shutters are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/accessible glazing (to the proposed flexihall and refurbished retail/commercial units) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel or expamet mesh) behind any external cladding to the flexihall building or refurbished retail/commercial units, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ Any louvres to servicing/plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach upper floor windows. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required to plant/servicing areas (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).
- ☐ Where glazed elevations are potentially accessible to vehicles, they should ideally be protected by re-enforced stall risers or bollards (where practical), to deter against ram-raid type attacks.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the flexihall building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

4.5 New Market Kiosks & Canopies

- ☐ The proposed market kiosks should ideally be of steel construction. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded-mesh should be incorporated within the wall and roof construction or behind any cladding, to prevent access through the building fabric with power tools. Doors and shutters should be certified-certified (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2).
- ☐ The narrow route to the rear of the proposed kiosks should be secured out-of-hours (by extending the existing railings/gates enclosing the immediately adjacent outdoor market area), in order to prevent unauthorised access to the hidden, rear doors of the kiosks.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, horizontal cladding features, canopies below the level of the eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. Similarly, the design and construction of the new outdoor market canopies should deter scaling and unauthorised access onto roof areas (see Para 3.3.4).
- ☐ If at all possible, it is highly recommended that the kiosks are fitted with monitored alarm systems, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.
- ☐ No cash should be stored within the proposed kiosks overnight.

4.6 External Seating Area to Café Bar

- ☐ The external seating area should be clearly defined as separate from the pedestrian footways/public realm square by screens, barriers or planters.
- ☐ The overall width of the proposed external seating area (including all tables/chairs and screens/barriers/planters) should be no wider than 50% of the total width of any adjacent pedestrian routes. Tables directly adjacent to the pinch points, such as around lighting columns or signage posts, should be avoided.

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- ☐ Tables and chairs, as well as any removable canopies, heaters or screens/barriers should be stored within the premises out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted out-of-hours.
 - ☐ Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see Section 5) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
 - ☐ The layout of any external tables/chairs should be configured so that, as much as possible, they are not located directly adjacent to barriers where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. All external seating areas should be capable of being clearly overlooked from internal staff positions.
 - ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any advertising A-boards signs do not inadvertently provide additional features that may narrow the footway and funnel pedestrians into close proximity of the proposed external seating area.
 - ☐ The success of the external seating area is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.

4.7 Public Realm & Landscaping

- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to the proposed public realm areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings or reduce the effectiveness of lighting (see Section 4.8) or any CCTV system (see Section 4.9).
- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, building frontages and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ There should be bollards or hard/soft landscape features preventing unauthorised vehicular access off Angouleme Way/Market Street to the landscaped public realm areas. Where occasional vehicular access may be required for authorised vehicles only, such as for maintenance/servicing and emergency access, a system should be incorporated to allow this without allowing uncontrolled vehicular access at all times (e.g. with automatic or collapsible/retractable bollards etc.).
- ☐ The design of any proposed hard landscaping features or street furniture, in particular any steps and benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage the potential for mistreatment or damage (e.g. from vandalism, skateboarding, rough sleeping etc.). Any such features should be reduced in number to the minimum practicable and should be located where surveillance and overlooking opportunities are maximised.
- ☐ The robust management of the public realm is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the exterior of the proposed flexihall, market kiosks and refurbished retail/commercial units, as well as the surrounding public realm, in accordance with BS 5489. Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.

- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Light fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows or onto the roof of structures. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.9 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all public realm circulation spaces, all flexihall/commercial unit/kiosk facades, the main entrances to the flexihall and all internal circulation areas (including the hall/events space itself), all sales counters/till positions and the café bar internal/external seating areas.*

4.10 Other

- ☐ Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the flexihall building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.
- ☐ Staff should have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use. Public toilets themselves can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour issues and the following issues should be considered:
 - Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons. Opaque panels can be used to great effect to ensure no persons are collapsed inside, whilst preserving privacy. This measure discourages drug taking and facilitates staff checks. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 20 centimetres from the floor and to reduce the top height.

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- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the café bar and the main hall/events space should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.


5.1.1 Café bars and event spaces can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 5.1.2 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 5.1.3 Customers entering/leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.1.4 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.5 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 5.1.6 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

- 5.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the flexihall must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc;
 - Refuse collection arrangements; and
 - Public realm maintenance (such as rectifying any criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc. as soon as possible).
- 6.1.2 The opening hours of café bar/events space should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 6.1.3 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21 st January 2022	Just H Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & area schedule
24 th January 2022	Just H Architects	Quote issued
27 th January 2022	Just H Architects	Confirmation of instruction & fee. Receipt of plans & elevations
4 th February 2022	Just H Architects	Email sent re: report completion & payment
17 th March 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
BURMAR-JHA-00-XX-DR-A-0001	Existing Site Plan	05.10.21	P1
BURMAR-JHA-00-ZZ-SA-A-0001	Schedule of Accommodation	08.12.21	P05
BURMAR-JHA-V6-XX-DR-A-0003	Proposed Site Plan	17.01.22	P03
BURMAR-JHA-V2-00-DR-A-0004	Flexihall Ground Floor Plan	22.11.21	P5
BURMAR-JHA-V2-00-DR-A-0005	Flexihall First Floor Plan	22.11.21	P03
BURMAR-JHA-V2-ZZ-DR-A-0007	Flexihall West Elevation	30.11.21	P02
BURMAR-JHA-V2-ZZ-DR-A-0008	Flexihall East Elevation	30.11.21	P02
BURMAR-JHA-V2-ZZ-DR-A-0009	Flexihall North Elevation	30.11.21	P02
BURMAR-JHA-V2-ZZ-DR-A-0010	Flexihall South Elevation	30.11.21	P02
BURMAR-JHA-V2-02-DR-A-0013	Proposed Canopy Ground Level Plan	07.12.21	P02
BURMAR-JHA-V5-02-XX-A-0017	Market Canopy Roof Plan	07.12.21	P01
BURMAR-JHA-XX-02-DR-A-0034	Proposed Market Canopy Roof 1 Elevations	15.12.21	P01
BURMAR-JHA-XX-DR-A-0035	Proposed Market Canopy Roof 2 Elevations	15.12.21	P01
BURMAR-JHA-00-XX-RP-A-0001	Bury Market Flexihall Development Stage 2 Report	17.01.22	P02

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk