



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

St Joseph's RC Church Presbytery, Peter Street

Day centre community cafe

For: **CARITAS SALFORD**

Version D: **10/12/25**

Ref: **2011/0178/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

St Joseph's RC Church Presbytery, Peter Street

2011/0178/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - security additions highly advised.

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

The redevelopment of the site for the use as a community space is welcomed. The proposed building is well located and presents no significant issues from a crime prevention perspective. To improve the overall security of the building and wider site, a number of recommendations are included, as follows:

- Security rated external doors, window frames and laminate glazing should be used.
- CCTV and intruder alarm systems.
- Cycle storage.
- Security measures to Back Peter St. elevation.
- Lobby arrangement to main entrance.
- Garden store robustly secured

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to meet Secured by Design accreditation is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Café/Restaurants): Risk Analysis	
	2.5 Theft (Bury Restaurants/Cafes): Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.6 Alarms	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	13
6	Construction	14
7	Useful References	14
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	15
B	Associated Documents.....	15
C	CIS Version History	15
D	Glossary	16

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies to the north west of The Rock in Bury town centre.

The site is currently formed by car parking for the adjacent church.

Site boundaries consist of a brick wall structure retaining an onsite level change. Vehicle entry is restricted by a manual drop-down bollard accessed of Back Moorgate West. An alternative vehicle entry point is from Bold St.

The site backs onto Badger St. which incorporates a row of terraced houses.


The immediate area contains a mix of residential, industrial, commercial, retail and ecclesiastical uses.

The site is well connected to the public transport system. Bury bus station and tram stop are approx. 800m southwest of the site. There are a number of car parks and in close proximity.

The site is in close proximity to the busy and popular district of the town centre. The night-time economy within this area is a popular destination across the week & weekend.

Over the last decade the town centre has undergone significant redevelopment as a retail destination with new purpose developments and the urban environment.

The neighbouring streets around the site contain large amounts of street litter and numerous examples of fly-tipping and abandoned vehicles.




1 – Existing site, from Bold St.



2 – View south towards Bury town centre.



3 – View north along Bold St.



7 – Evidence of vehicle crime & prominent street litter.



6 – Fly-tipping on Peter St.



5 – Abandoned & vandalised vehicles.



4 – View along Back Peter St.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2023 to 30th June 2024.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	22	66	313	53	12	<5	21	17	20

- 2.1.1 The rate of crime in the local area over the past 12 months has been above average for the Bury division, whereby less serious wounding, criminal damage and theft have been most commonly reported. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. These offences are occurring throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences within the Rock shopping centre to the southwest of the site.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place all throughout the local area, particularly at the hotspot mentioned above and at locations along and close to Rochdale Road. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings occurring, with the majority of incidents have involved disputes between both known and unknown associates as well as some cases of domestic violence with alcohol consumption often being a factor,
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against vehicles and retail outlets have accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place. In most cases offenders have targeted vehicles parked on streets and in parking facilities by using objects or implements to smash the glazing and damage the bodywork of cars and vans. Offenders have also used objects to smash the glazing in the front windows and damage external doors to properties. There have also been a number of arson offences, whereby offenders have set bins and items alight.
- 2.1.4 Theft offences have mostly occurred within retail outlets or public spaces, whereby offenders have targeted insecure items on tabletops and benches in public spaces or restaurants, as well as used pickpocketing and distraction techniques to remove items stored on the person such as mobile phones, wallets and purses.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements / tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.**

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor / accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.2 **Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.**

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example with the use of high-level / overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard / soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured

with internally fixed grilles / bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration.

2.2.3 Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed/observed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the community space. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Visitors should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely, with signage included to remind pupils and staff to remain vigilant.

2.2.4 Theft of insecure property belonging to users and staff, as well as equipment.

Possible Solution – As above, areas restricted to staff and officials should operate using an access control system to restrict entry. Codes / fobs should be regularly updated so that only those currently with legitimate purpose should be able to gain entry to these areas. Legitimate users should be encouraged not to allow strangers to tailgate them into restricted areas of the buildings. Facilities should be provided for pupils and staff to store their belongings securely whilst at the premises.

2.2.5 Posing as legitimate visitors enter restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – here should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open, and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the college. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Visitors should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely.

2.2.6 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure storerooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Café/Restaurants): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurant/café premises, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury café/restaurant premises is greater over the weekend (Saturday to Monday) than during the rest of the week.



2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are closed and the areas in which cafes/restaurants are typically based are quiet – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected.

2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders when targeting Wigan restaurants/cafes:

- Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure, tools and implements.
- Windows have also been prised open by offenders to gain entry.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to force entry.
- Offenders have penetrated through walls to access unauthorised access.

2.5 Theft (Bury Restaurants/Cafes): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurant/cafe, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at cafes/restaurants in the Bury area peaks at weekend, when premises are likely to be at their busiest.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft at Bury cafes/restaurants rises in the afternoon and into the evening/early hours of the morning. Offenders are likely to target premises to commit theft during these periods, when they are often busier and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Theft of property belonging to staff has also occurred, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to back-of-house areas unnoticed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Wednesday and Friday in the evening (18:00-19:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity of offenders.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Single storey day centre (Use Class F1) with kitchen and accessible wash areas, meeting and activity rooms, staff offices, cycle and car parking, landscaping and associated works.
- 3.1.2 Single-storey, purpose-built day centre of approximately 207 m² comprising:
- Kitchen, laundry and accessible wash areas;
 - Meeting and activity rooms;
 - Staff offices and storage;
 - Landscaping and new tree planting to improve the local environment; and
 - 2no. car parking spaces (1no. of which accessible) and 6no. cycle parking.
- 3.1.3 The centre will house the Red Door Day Centre which currently runs from the former St Joseph's Presbytery on the same site. The service will be operating Monday to Friday during working hours and would replicate the existing service with the same number/type of people attending for the same use/events in a more efficient and accessible building. The building provides services for people who are homeless, at risk of homelessness, or living in poverty.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site will have an access point in regular use, which allows security measures and monitoring to be focused on this location.
- 3.2.2 The proposed building has a relatively simple footprint which reduces potential hiding places and allows for easy monitoring of activity around them. The relationship between the new and existing buildings must not establish any deep recesses, narrow passageways, or places of potential concealment / entrapment.
- 3.2.3 The elevation of the building facing the public realm is generally free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity.
- 3.2.4 The main pedestrian entrance to the building is located on the front of the property facing Bold Road and is readily apparent on approaching the building from the public road.
- 3.2.5 The internal layout appears to be free of any potential pinch points or spaces where visitors could be cornered. The corridors should provide sufficient circulation space to cope with the anticipated numbers of visitors, avoiding potential for bumps and collisions that can lead to more serious behavioural issues.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoids the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The communal entrance must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to the office required by the end user/management team, so that staff can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.2 The main entrance doors to the community hub should be fitted with access controls so that, outside of normal opening hours, staff can vet visitors prior to opening the doors.
- 3.3.3 It is highly recommended that a lobby arrangement to the main entrance is created to deter criminal opportunists which is already a M.O within the area.

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- 3.3.4 The elevation to Back Peter Street has very limited natural surveillance from the neighbouring building. It is highly recommended that additional security measures are considered within this area and elevation: CCTV / security screens (visually aesthetic screens similar to the main entrance), PIR lighting.
 - 3.3.5 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns for the parking court should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for vehicles.
 - 3.3.6 Arrangements for collection of refuse should not allow further access within the building, nor require bins to be left outside for prolonged periods.
 - 3.3.7 The external communal area benefits from limited levels of natural surveillance and overlooking, particularly at night. As such, it could foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues across the day & night. It is also highly recommended that the area is covered by CCTV cameras, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded.
 - 3.3.8 The back-of-house areas should only be accessible to staff.
 - 3.3.9 Consider the creation of a '*Friends of*' and '*Local business*' groups, to support the management and maintenance of the public realm.
 - 3.3.10 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters to protect ground floor openings must integrally mounted and be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Roof construction

- ☐ Lightweight roofing systems must be certified to a minimum of:
 - LPS 1175: issue 5 or above, SR1
 - STS 202: Issue 1 or above, BR1

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - Main entrance doors
 - Internal doors off entrance lobby
 - Doors separating internal zones within the buildings

4.6 Alarms

- ☐ The intruder alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

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- ☐ It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ CCTV Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances & lobbies](#), [building perimeter](#), [cycle parking](#).

4.10 Other

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the building. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- ☐ Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- ☐ Car parking - Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 5.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
 - Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
 - Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
11/06/24	Client	Application submitted
09/07/24	Client	Client confirmed CIS report
09/07/24	DfS	Invoice issued
09/07/24	DfS	Invoice paid
07/08/24	DfS	Site visit
07/08/24	DfS	CIS complete
21/08/24	DfS	CIS updated and issued
10/12/25	DfS	CIS updated and issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
L0001-	LOCATION PLAN	20/11/25	
L0002-	EXISTING SITE PLAN	20/11/25	
L0003.B-	PROPOSED SITE PLAN	20/11/25	
L1000.B-	PROPOSED LEVEL 00 PLAN	20/11/25	
L1001.B-	PROPOSED ROOF PLAN	20/11/25	
	L1005-PROPOSED LANDSCAPE PLAN	20/11/25	
	L1005-PROPOSED LANDSCAPE PLAN	20/11/25	
	L6000-PROPOSED EAST ELEVATION	20/11/25	
	L6001-PROPOSED SOUTH ELEVATION	20/11/25	
	L6002-PROPOSED WEST ELEVATION	20/11/25	
	L6003-PROPOSED NORTH ELEVATION	20/11/25	
	SK001-EXTERNAL VISUAL	20/11/25	
	SK002-AERIAL VIEW SKETCH	20/11/25	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Minor amendments to text updated and issued	21/08/24
C	Minor amendments to text updated and issued	21/08/24

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk