



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Kay Street

Development of 17 Apartments

For: Kingsley Properties

Version A: 03/01/19

Ref: 2018/0999/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Kay Street

2018/0999/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Boundary treatment to the side and rear of properties
- Effective street lighting
- Designated boundary treatment

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



David Maher *Dip Arch*
Consultant

e: david.maher@designforsecurity.org

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
	2.3 Risk Factors	
	2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Bury and Greater Manchester	
	2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	10
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.6 Boundaries	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Lighting	
	4.10 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	14
6	Construction	14
7	Useful References	15
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	16
B	Associated Documents.....	16
C	CIS Version History	16
D	Glossary	17

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The proposed site is located in the Summerseat district to the North of Bury, approx. 5km from the town centre.

The former Waterside pub which straddled the River Irwell; now demolished, was partially washed away in 2015 due to heavy floods and a swollen river.


The site formed the car park for the Waterside public house, which is now fenced off.

The area is set within the valley alongside the banks of the River Irwell. The surrounding area contains a small collection of residential estates; a mixture of historic terrace, semi and detached houses alongside properties from the latter half of the 20th Century. Beyond the immediate residential streets the area is surrounded by woodland and farmland.

On the opposite side of the River Irwell is the Grade II listed Brooksbottom Mill, a former cotton mill now a residential apartment development.

Public transport links are limited to a local bus service to Ramsbottom & Bury. The main vehicle routes are the nearby A56 or the M66.

Ramsbottom is approx. 2km north of the site.



7 – Nearby residential houses on Hill St.



6 – View down towards the River Irwell.



5 – Residential properties on Waterside Rd.



1 – View of proposed site & existing road bridge.



2 – View of existing site.



3 – View of existing site towards south.



4 – The Spinning residential apartment development.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2017 to 31st December 2018.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
6	<5	7	10	<5	<5	<5	6	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The level of crime recorded in the local area over the last 12 months has been low for Bury, Greater Manchester and England & Wales. A slight exception to this is vehicle crime, mostly theft from motor vehicle, which has occurred at an above average rate for Bury.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 The exploitation of insecure doors, in particular rear doors, to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution - A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access to the building. The main communal entrance should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

- 2.2.2 Opening of secured doors using bodily force or implements.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All private spaces to the sides/rears of the building should be robustly enclosed (see Section 4.6), particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Lighting to the front and rear of the building can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.7).

- 2.2.3 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain access.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.4 Rear windows have been prised open by offenders.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to the rear.

2.3 Risk Factors





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles

-
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Unauthorised access to private spaces
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Bury and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **42% lower** than Bury as a whole, **47% lower** than Greater Manchester and **9% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **82% lower** than Bury as a whole, **84% lower** than Greater Manchester and **74% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **53% lower** than Bury as a whole, **64% lower** than Greater Manchester and **46% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **15% higher** than Bury as a whole, **19% lower** than Greater Manchester and **24% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning and late at night.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- The exploitation of insecure doors, in particular rear doors, to gain entry to the property.
- Opening of secured doors using bodily force or implements.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest in the early hours of the morning during the week and during the day at weekends.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development seeks to construct a new build apartment scheme providing 17 units adjacent to the River Irwell.
- 3.1.2 As part of the new development the scheme will provide 28 car parking spaces within the site boundary. Vehicle and pedestrian access will be formed via a new road access off Kay Street.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a currently vacant site into use and provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The development will help add to the general activity throughout the day and at weekends.
- 3.2.3 The apartments should have habitable room windows to their front elevations, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The building will be served by on-site parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.5 Amenity spaces provide opportunities for residents to meet and foster community relations within the development. Schemes which have good social communities are less likely to tolerate inappropriate behaviour and are more willing to challenge unfamiliar faces in the development.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 A secure lockable bicycle storage unit to provide sufficient space for all residents to keep bikes in a safe place. Providing space for all residents will reduce the need for residents to carry bikes through to apartments or locking bikes to railings outside the development. Bicycles which are locked externally can become a target for vandalism and theft. Currently a cycle store area has not been identified.
- 3.3.2 The communal entrances must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.3 Access in to the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
- 3.3.4 The boundary treatments to the proposed apartment building are vitally important to secure it and to preventing unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides and rear of the building, including the amenity areas, should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access. Care should be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Defensive planting (incorporating densely branched, thorny shrubs) can be used to great effect on the public side of publicly accessible boundaries to deter scaling and damage.
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that there is a symbolic barrier at the vehicular entrance to the site (e.g. defined by a change of road surface texture/colour, brick pillars etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.

-
- 3.3.6 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for vehicles.
 - 3.3.7 To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, the secondary doors into lobby entrance, residents' courtyard should also include access controls. Access controls will need to be used at the communal entrance to restrict entry into the development to residents and their authorised visitors.
 - 3.3.8 Residential post - Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal staff to have access to internal areas of the residential blocks beyond the reception space. Mail boxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.
 - 3.3.9 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
 - 3.3.10 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post-boxes themselves should be of robust construction, with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access-controlled main entrance.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Any letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Any external french/double doors or sliding doors to ground floor/easily accessible balconies or terraces should also be certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2 and should include laminated glazing (see below).

-
- ☐ The doors to the cycle store should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, or be steel gates within steel frames. These doors/gates should both be self-closing and lock securely upon closure and be accessible by a programmable fob

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment and townhouse should have either an alarm, or a dedicated non-switched fuse spur to allow for the installation of an alarm. If alarms are installed, they should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor.accessible rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main Entrance doors
 - Video entry system for apartments
 - Secondary entrance doors off internal post lobbies
 - Bin stores
 - Cycle stores
 - Communal roof garden

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ Secure boundaries should be formed of 2100mm high walls/railings (with no mid-rails that could aid climbing). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have railing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ The vehicular access to the site should be secured with a 2100mm high automatic vehicular sliding gate, operated using a key fob/proximity reader system with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out'), so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles or the building and escape. If double gates must be used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open.
- ☐ The pedestrian entrance gate to the site should be self-closing and self-locking, operated as described within Section 4.1. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should

be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. They should also be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street furniture, lighting columns, trees etc. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.

- ☐ There should be secondary fence lines, which may be lower (i.e. 1500-1800mm high), to either side of the building (as illustrated within Section 3.3) to prevent unauthorised access to resident-only private space and the rear entrance of the building. Any pedestrian gates to these fence lines should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Inward opening automatic gates to provide access to the courtyard area must be certified to one of the following standards:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR2
 - STS 202: Issue 3, BR2
 - Sold Secure Gold
 - PAS 68: 2013

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ New planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.8 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors (manual override is also permissible).
- ☐ Lighting in the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.10 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is

also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
17/12/18	Barton Willmore	Application submitted
19/12/18	Barton Willmore	CIS confirmation
28/12/18	DfS	Site visit
21/12/18	DfS	Invoice issued
03/01/19	DfS	CIS complete

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
18/518.SLP	Site location plan		
18-518-14	Proposed site plan		
18-518-12	Proposed Plans		
18-518-13	Proposed Elevations		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk