



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND OFF CUNLIFFE STREET, RADCLIFFE, BURY
RESIDENTIAL (20 no. APARTMENTS & 7 no. HOUSES)

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Great Places Housing Association

VERSION A: 22/12/2021

REFERENCE: 2021/0603/CIS/01

Land off Cunliffe Street, Radcliffe, Bury

URN: 2021/0603/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is only considered acceptable if the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The parking spaces serving the dwellings are proposed to their rear, along a rear access route with limited levels of direct overlooking or passive surveillance - leaving them vulnerable. In-curtilage parking to the front of the properties is preferred, but if not, the spaces should be incorporated into the rear curtilages of the dwellings they serve (behind vehicular gates lockable from both sides), to allow residents to secure and overlook their vehicles.
- Treatment/protection of the side boundaries of Plots 1 & 7, which will directly abut the proposed pedestrian routes and areas of landscaped open space to the north and south, in order to discourage access, damage and scaling.
- The proposed parking spaces serving the apartment block will be located within an open parking area (which could be used as a cut-through around/between parked vehicles) and on-street (where they are more accessible to offenders and some are remote from the building). It is highly recommended that all parking spaces are located within a single, enclosed communal parking area in front of the building. If some of them must be provided on-street, they should be treated to distinguish them as separate from the street, define them as in ownership/control of the residents themselves and deter pedestrian movement around/between them.
- All elevations of the apartment building with ground floor residential windows should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level railings and planting, which should be higher along the open space to the north and along Cock Clod Street to the east.
- Secure control of access into/around the apartment building, including a robust system for the delivery of post.
- Treatment of areas of landscaped open space to prevent vehicular access, avoid hiding places, protect adjacent boundaries to private space/parking areas and deter nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site is bounded by Cross Lane to the north, Cock Clod Street/Cunliffe Street/Baybutt Street to the east, Rectory Lane to the south and Howard Street/Pollitt Street and the west, in the Radcliffe area of south-west Bury.

The site is a mixture of brownfield land (previously development associated with East Lancashire Paper Mill, which has now been demolished) and landscaped open space.


The northern portion of the site is formed by an area of scrub vegetation enclosed with Palisade fencing and an area of hard standing. Terraced residential properties overlook the site from the opposite side of Pollitt Street (which is closed off to vehicular traffic where it meets Cross Lane). The wider former mill site (now demolished and cleared) lies on the opposite side of Cock Clod Street and the largely blank gable ends of existing terraced housing lies on the opposite side of Cunliffe Street to the south - meaning the site benefits from limited levels of direct overlooking from these directions.

The central portion of the site is formed by undulating grassland with some mature trees/vegetation and low timber fencing to the perimeter. The area is overlooked by the existing terraced properties fronting onto Howard Street and Baybutt Street and there is a pedestrian footpath linking Howard Street and Cunliffe Street. The western portion of this part of the site abuts the rear access route serving the terraced properties fronting onto Rectory Lane. The narrow route benefits from limited levels of activity and direct overlooking and some of the adjacent existing properties have been heavily fortified with steel panels over door openings, window grilles, shutters and high fencing - indicating that crime and disorder issues have previously been experienced.

The southern portion of the site is formed by hard standing, with concrete blocks along the street frontage to prevent unauthorised vehicular access. There is a high brick retaining wall between this portion of the site and Baybutt Street, which has been heavily graffitied. Again, the land on the opposite side of Rectory Lane is occupied by works buildings and vacant land - providing little in the way of activity, footfall, passive surveillance or direct overlooking.

The wider surrounding area is characterised by vacant/open land (as well as the River Irwell) to the south and east and primarily terraced residential housing to the north and west (as well as Festival Gardens, beyond which is Metrolink Radcliffe Park & Ride).

Terraced residential properties often front directly onto the street, meaning their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space - leaving windows/doors exposed to nuisance, anti-social behaviour, unauthorised access (if left insecure) and attack. Resident's vehicles must be parked on street as they cannot be parked within the curtilage of the dwellings - leaving them exposed to damage/attack. Rear communal alleyways can also leave terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access and many of them across Greater Manchester have been fitted with communal alleygates as a result.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All crime data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2020 to 31st October 2021. It is accurate to a margin of +/- 8%, due to recent updates to GMP IT systems.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	<5	42	175	33	21	<5	15	11	<5



- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively high (52% above the average rate of crime for the Bury District), particular given that the study area includes large areas of vacant/open land to the north, south and east that are not densely populated, which typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents. The majority of crime has taken place around/off the main arterial route of Spring Lane/Cross Lane (A6053), around/off Church Street West/Rectory Lane to the south-west and around/off New Church Street to the west. The most prevalent type of recorded crime has been less serious wounding, which has mostly involved harassment and public order offences (often within a domestic setting).
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local residential burglary and local vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **18% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **7% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **33% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **144% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **112% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **127% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.





2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **43% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **11% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **65% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area **1% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **23% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **34% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Wednesday.

2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks late at night. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry




2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Windows have also been prised open, but to a lesser extent.


2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Tuesday, Friday and Saturday.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks late at night/during the early hours of the morning and during the afternoon. It is likely that offenders target vehicles during the day, when people park on streets and in open car parks in the area for long periods of time. At night, when it is dark and residential streets/communal parking areas are quiet, offenders often perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or identified.

2.4.3 Vehicles parked on streets (as is often the case for terraced properties) or within open communal parking areas/public car parks, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on individual in-curtilage driveways or within secure parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft off/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting local dwellings and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1/4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles (also see Section 4.1), essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Section 4.2). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset, to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.4), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

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- Windows have also been prised open, but to a lesser extent.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.3), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.6). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. Unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries (also see Section 4.6) and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible.

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that any resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 3 storey block of 20 no. apartments and a terrace of 7 no. 3 storey houses, with associated parking, landscaping and public realm.
- 3.1.2 The proposed houses will occupy the eastern portion of the site, fronting towards Baybutt Street/Cunliffe Street, with enclosed front and rear garden spaces. Each of them will be served by 2 no. parking spaces located to their rear, accessed off the existing rear access route linking Howard Street and Rectory Lane.
- 3.1.3 The proposed apartment block will occupy the northern portion of the site, enclosed by Pollitt Street, Cock Clod Street and Cunliffe Street, but with its communal entrance at the junction of Pollitt Street and Howard Street. The building will be served by a small parking area to the east (between Howard Street and Cunliffe Street) comprising of 9 no. spaces, as well as 3 no. on-street spaces along Cunliffe Street and 3 no. on-street spaces along Pollitt Street. The building itself will house an entrance/mail lobby, a cycle store, a refuse store and 6 no. apartments at ground floor level. The first floor of the building will house 7 no. apartments, with a further 7 no. apartments at second floor level.
- 3.1.4 Three communal areas of landscaped open space are also proposed;
 - To the north - adjacent to the apartment block and featuring a pedestrian route linking Cross Lane to Pollitt Street;
 - To the west - adjacent to Plot 1 and the parking area serving the apartments, featuring a pedestrian link between Howard Street and Cunliffe Street/Baybutt Lane; and
 - To the south - along Rectory Lane and adjacent to Plot 7 and Baybutt Lane.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed houses and apartment block will front onto the existing streets, allowing for clear views of/between existing and proposed dwellings.
- 3.2.3 The houses and apartments will have habitable room windows to their street frontages, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The footprint of the buildings has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.5 The majority of the apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Houses

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The private rear garden spaces of the houses should be defined and secured with 2100mm high walls/close-boarded timber fencing (see Section 4.5 for more information), in order to prevent unauthorised access. Care should also be taken to ensure ground level

changes do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the fencing panels/gates. The front elevations of dwellings (as well as the side elevations of Plots 1 & 7) should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level railings and planting, to clearly define them as separate from the adjacent pedestrian/vehicular routes or areas of communal landscaping (again, see Section 4.5 for more information).

- 3.3.2 The parking spaces serving the dwellings are proposed to the rear of the private gardens, where the parked vehicles cannot be easily overlooked by the residents themselves. They will also be along a rear access route to the rear of the existing properties fronting onto Rectory Lane, where they will benefit from limited levels of direct overlooking or passive surveillance and where there are already signs that crime and disorder have taken place in the past (see Section 1). This will leave the parked vehicles exposed and potentially vulnerable to attack unseen. Vehicles parked on in-curtilage driveways directly in front of dwellings tend to be less vulnerable to damage/theft, as they are closer to the houses, can be directly overlooked by the residents themselves and offenders are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny when approaching them. Where possible, in-curtilage parking to the front of the properties is preferred. If this is absolutely unachievable, the driveways to the rear of the properties should be incorporated into the rear curtilages of the dwellings they serve, behind high vehicular gates (lockable from both sides), to allow residents to secure and overlook their vehicles – see Section 4.6 for more information.
- 3.3.3 The single storey elements to the side of Plots 1 & 7 must be incorporated into the front garden enclosures described above, in order to deter public access. The horizontal projecting brickwork features should be also be carefully designed to ensure they do not inadvertently form a climbing aid onto the roof/up to upper floor windows.
- 3.3.4 The side boundaries of Plots 1 and 7 will directly abut the proposed pedestrian routes and areas of landscaped open space to the north and south – leaving them publicly accessible and potentially vulnerable to damage/scaling unseen. It is highly recommended that any pedestrian routes are brought away from being immediately adjacent to such boundaries, which should also be protected by belts of mature defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) to discourage access, damage and scaling.

Apartments

- 3.3.5 As proposed, the parking spaces serving the building will be located within a small car park to the west and along Pollitt Street and Cunliffe Street. When vehicles are parked on-street, they are more accessible to offenders and can be more remote/isolated from the dwellings they serve, meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed/detected. The spaces along Pollitt Street will be particularly remote from the building, where residents are unlikely to be able to directly overlook them. Although they are overlooked from the dwellings of the opposite side of Pollitt Street, this is not as effective as the owners themselves acting as 'capable guardians' overlooking their own immediately adjacent vehicles. The small car park is not proposed to be enclosed and, as such, is likely to be used as a pedestrian (and possible vehicular) cut-through between Baybutt Street/Cunliffe Street and Howard Street if not adequately defined. It is highly recommended that all parking spaces serving the building are located within a single communal parking area in front of the building, enclosed with low-level railings and planting, with a single vehicular access point to deter through-access around/between parked vehicles (where damage can easily occur - both malicious and accidental). If it is absolutely unavoidable to provide some spaces on-street, they must be capable of being directly overlooked from habitable room windows within the building, with treatment to distinguish them as separate from the street (e.g. different surface texture/colour from the street, broken up with areas of soft landscaping that do not impede surveillance, signage to indicate they are for the use of residents only etc.), defining them as in ownership/control of the residents themselves and deterring pedestrian movement around/between them.
- 3.3.6 All elevations of the building with ground floor residential windows should be protected by some defensible space defined by low-level railings and planting. The boundaries to the north (adjacent to the proposed open space) and east (along Cock Clod Street) should be particularly robustly defined as they will be particularly exposed and will benefit from lower levels of passive surveillance. It is highly recommended that the pedestrian route through the landscaped open space to the north is brought away from being immediately adjacent to the boundary of the apartment building, which should also be protected by a belt of mature defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) to discourage access, damage and scaling.

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- 3.3.7 The main communal entrance to the apartment block should be formed by a single-leaf, security-certified doorset that should be self-closing and fitted with secure video access controls. In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of the building is not required (see Section 4.2 for more information).
 - 3.3.8 The horizontal projecting brickwork features should be also be carefully designed to ensure they do not inadvertently form a climbing aid up to upper floor windows.

Landscaped Open Space

- 3.3.9 The layout of the proposed areas of public open space should be free of obstacles to vision, allowing people to see and be seen in the areas. They should be well-overlooked by the proposed dwellings and well-maintained to increase the likelihood of them being legitimately used. Any vegetation surrounding/within the areas should not create potential hiding places for would-be criminals to exploit or impede natural surveillance of and from it. Any properties and communal parking areas immediately adjacent to the areas should be protected by dense, low-level defensive planting beds to discourage unauthorised access/damage to boundaries and deter casual access around/between parked vehicles. Consideration should also be given to deterring vehicles and motorcycles. Any seating areas should be well-overlooked by dwellings, but should not be immediately adjacent to dwellings, parking areas or principle circulation routes, in order to avoid nuisance to or intimidate of passers-by and residents. See Section 4.8 for more information.
- 3.3.10 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors (Houses)

- ☐ Front and rear doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Doors & Access Controls (Apartments)

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Main communal entrance doorset must be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. It should be single-leaf, self-closing and controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Where possible, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. Where this is not practical, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries within a postal lobby without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any internal doors/frames to bin stores, cycle store or plant rooms should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob.

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor windows (i.e. above single-storey elements) should be certificated to BS PAS 24. Any ground floor/accessible curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor opening lights must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor glazing (i.e. above single-storey elements) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting brickwork/cladding features, projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, trees, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows, onto the roof of single-storey elements or over boundaries to private space.
- ☐ Any louvres to plant areas/refuse stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ Each house and apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

4.6 Boundaries

Houses

- ☐ The sides and rears of the houses should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing (with the top 300mm consisting of robust integral trellis if required). Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible open space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.
- ☐ The rear off-road parking spaces serving the dwellings should be incorporated into the rear gardens behind 2100mm high steel-framed vehicular gates (either double-gates or bi-folding gates) that are lockable from both sides (see opposite for example). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railing/timber fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Any side/rear pedestrian gates should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted a key operable deadlock, lockable from both sides.
- ☐ The front gardens of the houses should be enclosed/segregated by low-level railings (to an approximate height of 1200mm) and planting. The design of any low railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.



Apartment Block

- ☐ All elevations of the building with ground floor residential windows should be protected by defensible space defined by low-level railings and planting. The railings along Pollitt Street/the car park to the east and along Cunliffe Street to the south should be approximately 1200mm high. The boundaries to the north (adjacent to the proposed open space) and east (along Cock Clod Street) should be approximately 1500mm high, in order to provide additional definition and protection to the more exposed/vulnerable ground floor windows. The design of any low railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

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- ☐ The car park serving the apartment block should be enclosed with low-level railings and planting (approximately 1200mm high) to define it as separate from the street and the adjacent area of landscaped open space, as well deter pedestrian from cutting-through the car park between Baybutt Street/Cunliffe Street and Howard Street. It is highly recommended that there is a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the car park (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the parking area is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all access roads/footpaths should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489). Lighting to all communal parking areas should display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of all houses and the apartment block, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 Landscaping & Public Realm

- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to the public realm areas surrounding the buildings should not impede natural surveillance of/from the properties or reduce the effectiveness of lighting. Bollards or hard landscaping features (e.g. low-level railings, robust steel/timber knee-rails etc.) should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicular access to the pedestrian-only public realm routes or to areas of public open space.
- ☐ Any proposed pedestrian-only routes should be as wide and as straight as possible, with any vegetation on either side maintained, in order to maximise views off and along them, encourage legitimate use and illuminate hiding places that could be exploited by offenders. Consideration should also be given to the deterring unauthorised motorcycle access without impeding wheelchair or pram use.
- ☐ Any seating areas should be positioned away from the principle circulation routes and dwellings, so that any gathering groups are less likely to cause nuisance to or intimidate passers-by and residents. The design of any street furniture, such as any steps/ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage potential mistreatment and damage. Where there are numerous benches in isolated locations or within very close proximity of dwellings or parking areas, they can often attract and foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour problems.
- ☐ Any play areas should be enclosed and well-overlooked from nearby residential properties. There should be clear signage to any proposed play areas stating the age range of children who are allowed to use the play equipment. However, the equipment to be installed should be robust enough to withstand abuse by older children.
- ☐ Any boundaries to properties immediately adjacent to any such areas should be protected by dense, low-level defensive planting beds to discourage unauthorised access and damage to boundaries. Any immediately adjacent parking areas should also be clearly defined/separated from landscaped areas by low-level railings, in order to deter casual access around/between parked vehicles. Trees and planting should be avoided that may aid climbing over any boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. The security of fences and properties can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme (particularly close to properties/parked vehicles) should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

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- ☐ The robust management of landscaped areas, footpaths and any play areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Ideally, meter cupboards should be remotely read or located to the fronts of houses only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ The secure communal cycle store serving the apartment block should include 'Sheffield' style racks (that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar) or cycle storage lockers. For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as access controls, boundaries, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19 th November 2021	AEW Architects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
22 nd November 2021	AEW Architects	Quote issued
22 nd November 2021	AEW Architects	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Additional info to follow
29 th November 2021	AEW Architects	Receipt of updated plans/documents
15 th December 2021	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0511	Location Plan	18/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0512	Site Layout - Proposed (SUPERSEDED)	18/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0512	Existing Site Plan	18/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0513	Site Plan - Presentation (SUPERSEDED)	18/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0513	Proposed Site Plan	25/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0514	Existing Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	18/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0514	Proposed Site Plan - including Constraints	25/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0515	Street Elevations - Proposed	25/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0516	Proposed Site Plan - Boundary Treatments	25/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0517	Proposed Site Plan - Waste Management	25/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0518	Proposed Site Plan - Amenity Provision	25/11/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-0519	Figure Ground Diagram	25/11/21	P01
12216-AEW-XX-XX-A-DR-0520	House Type 1 - 3B5P (SUPERSEDED)	22/10/21	P02
12216-AEW-XX-XX-A-DR-0520	House Type 1 - 3B5P - Plots 2-6	24/11/21	P03
12216-AEW-XX-XX-A-DR-0521	House Type 2 - 4B6P (SUPERSEDED)	22/10/21	P02
12216-AEW-XX-XX-A-DR-0521	House Type 2 - 4B6P - Plot 1	24/11/21	P03
12216-AEW-XX-XX-A-DR-0522	House Type 3 - 4B6P (SUPERSEDED)	25/10/21	P02
12216-AEW-XX-XX-A-DR-0522	House Type 3 - 4B6P - Plot 7	25/11/21	P03
12216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-2000	Proposed Floor Plans (SUPERSEDED)	25/10/21	P01
12216-AEW-A-2001	Proposed Roof Plan (SUPERSEDED)	25/10/21	P01
12216-AEW-XX-XX-DR-A-3000	GA Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	25/10/21	P01
2216-AEW-XX-XX-A-PP-525-ELPM	Visuals (SUPERSEDED)	-	-
12216-AEW-XX-DD-DR-A-0523	Proposed Ground & First Floor Plans	25/11/21	P02
12216-AEW-XX-DD-DR-A-0524	Proposed Second Floor & Roof Plans	25/11/21	P02
12216-AEW-XX-DD-DR-A-0523	Proposed Apartment Elevations	25/11/21	P02
12216-AEW-XX-XX-PP-503	Draft Design & Access Statement	26/11/21	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk