



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Fernhill Gypsy and Traveller Site Redevelopment of the travellers' site

for: Bury Council

version A: 29th July 2021

URN: 2021/0061/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Fernhill Gypsy and Traveller Site, Every Street, Bury

2021/0061/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, but further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, lies in an industrial area about 1km north of Bury town centre. A landscape buffer along the western side of the site separates it from a waste disposal site, which is open for domestic users. The eastern boundary adjoins commercial / industrial premises, and another caravan park lies to the south. To the north, the neighbourhood becomes more residential in character and includes a primary school, but there is no direct access to this area from Every Street.

The section of Every Street outside the site is un-adopted, and relatively busy with private cars, vans and larger commercial vehicles gaining access to the adjacent waste disposal site.

The site is currently enclosed with boundary fencing of mixed condition and a gate off Every Street, currently inoperative. Some of the features within the site have not been maintained and are in poor condition, pending redevelopment.



Every Street showing entrance to site



Site entrance showing existing gates



Run down structures on the site



Residents' vehicles within the site



Every Street showing entrance to adjacent waste disposal site



Weakness in fencing along western boundary

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
25	8	68	149	18	14	<5	14	12	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is slightly elevated for the Bury district with the majority of crime taking place along the streets located to the east of the proposed site, just off Walmersley Road. Less serious wounding and criminal damage have been the highest recorded offences, which are common crime types in residential areas.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have mostly involved assaults and public order offences, with a hotspot of offences occurring directly to the east of the proposed site, around Back Canning Street and Back Vernon Street. Offences have mostly involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates, with offences often taking place within the dwelling.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have mostly involved offences against vehicles and dwellings, occurring in the same areas as the violence. Glazing has mostly been targeted, with incidents often occurring during the commissioning of a domestic incident.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. The addition of shutters may be required on high-risk premises.

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure boundary fencing and gaining access to outhouses / sheds using bodily pressure and implements.

Possible Solution – All boundary fencing and gates should be checked regularly to identify any defects or damage with any necessary repairs carried out promptly. Fencing should be protected from potential damage from vehicle movements, using kerbing or crash barriers. There should be no climbing aids that could provide a step over the fence line, either insider or outside the site boundary. Overhanging vegetation should be cut back away from the fence line.

- 2.2.3 Criminal damage to vehicles, by means of smashed glazing and scratched paint work.

Possible Solution – Parking spaces for vehicles within the site should be located away from main pedestrian routes or communal space. Parking spaces should be capable of being overlooked from properties, and covered by any CCTV on the site. Individual plots should be well defined, with implicit territorial statements to divide communal and more private space, with adequate parking space provided within the plot. Avoid any on-site storage of loose materials that could be used to cause criminal damage.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Travellers Site): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against travellers sites, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary on traveller's sites in Greater Manchester is low, peaking over the weekend period with a small increase in the morning (10am-11am). Offenders often target properties during the day when they are unattended for long periods of time, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Entering the outdoor grounds and using bodily pressure and implements gain access to sheds/ outhouses.
- Forcing open shutters using implements and gaining access to the property.

2.5 Theft (Travellers Site): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against travellers sites, recorded in the Greater Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft increases on a Thursday during the afternoon (12pm - 4pm). Offenders have targeted items stored within the grounds of the site, with trailers mostly targeted. Offenders have also removed animals who are housed on the site and insecure bags/ mobile phones.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday and Friday during the morning (8am - 12pm) and late afternoon (3pm - 6:30pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the day as they are left unattended for long periods of time whilst owners attend work, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be seen or caught.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises demolition of the existing structures on the site and construction of new facilities to accommodate 12 plots with individual utility blocks and associated communal services and amenities, together with a site office and replacement boundary fencing / entrance gate.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site has a single entrance / exit point off Every Street, which allows security measures to be concentrated on this location.
- 3.2.2 The site office is located close to entrance, potentially giving staff a view of people arriving or leaving.
- 3.2.3 The proposed development will involve removal of redundant features and structures which have provided cover for antisocial behaviour and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.2.4 A fob-activated sliding gate will be provided at the entrance to the site. Visitors will need to make themselves known to site staff or residents before being admitted to the site.
- 3.2.5 Individual plots will be defined with low fencing to provide obvious distinction between communal areas and private space around the living quarters.
- 3.2.6 The office and utility buildings will have a relatively simple footprint which provides little opportunity for an offender to conceal themselves within the site. The buildings should include design features that will minimise the risk of unwanted access to the roof, for example: avoidance of footholds on window ledges; rounded roof edges; widened eaves; an absence of balustrades; careful placement of pipework, bins, storage boxes or electrical boxes that might assist climbing. The position of adjacent features such as fencing, equipment and storage containers should not provide a potential step up.
- 3.2.7 The site managers have experience of operating the facility for a number of years and have established security protocols which have been largely successful at controlling disorder at the development.
- 3.2.8 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Boundary Fencing. Evaluation of the security capability of the existing boundary should be undertaken, to ensure that any potential weakness in the boundary fencing is identified and appropriately addressed to provide a consistent level of security around the site. The proximity of bushes and trees to fence lines can undermine the security of a boundary by creating cover for an intruder, or providing potential climbing aids. Overhanging branches and dense vegetation should be removed where it could be exploited in this way. Care must be taken to ensure the landscaping to the perimeter of the site is maintained at an appropriate height, in order to prevent it impeding views to and from the site, and avoid the creation of hiding places that could be exploited by offenders. Any new boundary fencing should be a minimum of 3m high.
- 3.3.2 Boundary protection from potential vehicle damage. In parts of the site where the secure boundary fence line is close or immediately adjacent to the vehicle movement zones and parking spaces, fencing in these locations can be susceptible to accidental damage which can undermine the security of the site perimeter, and damage can also be masked by stationary trailers. In vulnerable locations the fencing should be protected with high kerbing or crash barriers.
- 3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme as a whole. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or

surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following recommendations should apply to all new installations. Where the identified security risks will not be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the site and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management.

4.1 Doors

- All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage).

4.3 Glazing

- Any ground floor glazing to the office should incorporate a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- Any glazing in the amenity blocks should include laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Building Fabric

- Where a lightweight wall construction is being considered a reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh will need to be incorporated. Alternatively, there should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- Lightweight roofing systems must be certified to a minimum of:
 - LPS 1175: issue 5 or above, SR1
 - STS 202: Issue 1 or above, BR1
- Roof material. The roofing should use a system approved by Secured by Design (see www.securedbydesign.com) or alternatively include reinforcement such as expanded metal mesh. A tiled system is not recommended due to potential for abuse / criminal damage. Any roof-lights should use a system approved by Secured by Design, or include an internal grille.
- Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the building. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

4.5 Alarms

- A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the office building, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor rooms, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.6 Boundaries

- Secure boundary treatments should generally be 3000mm high with rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and gates, minimum height of 3m. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels / gates.
- There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.
- Where exposed, the perimeter fencing should be protected from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for damage / attack.
- The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for damage / attack.

4.7 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places.
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- Use of loose surface materials in communal / publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

4.8 Lighting

- External lighting should be provided to communal routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors on office and utility units.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8.1 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to complement the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

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- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
 - Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
 - **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
 - **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
 - The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances to site](#), [entrance to office building](#).

4.9 Other

- All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, portable sports equipment, tools etc.) should be property-marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- Cash handling. Consideration for movements of cash in / around the site should be devised, to allow delivery / collections to be made without exposing staff to potential attack. Parking for security vehicles should be specifically allocated and located where the distance between the vehicle and collection point is minimised.
- Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
 - Procedures for collection and transport of cash
- 5.1.3 Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.4 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20/05/2021	Paddock Johnson	CIS instruction received
11/06/2021	Paddock Johnson	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
16/07/2021	Bury Council	Site visit
29/07/2021	Paddock Johnson	Progress update

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
19144	Design and Access Statement	Feb 21	
19144-101	Proposed Site Layout	20/10/20	D
19144-102	Utility Block	01/12/20	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door / window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French / double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk