



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

REMMETS HOUSE, LORD STREET, BURY
CHANGE OF USE OF GROUND FLOOR TO FORM
SECONDARY SCHOOL FOR 120 PUPILS

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: Bury Defence Academy
VERSION A: 20/06/2024
REFERENCE: 2024/0182/CIS/01

Remmets House, Lord Street, Bury

URN: 2024/0182/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The ground floor school entrance and the entrance to the first floor BDA premises must remain entirely separate. There should be no internal linkages between the uses and the walls between them at ground floor level should be robustly constructed, in order to maintain security and eliminate opportunities that offenders could exploit.
- Secure system to control access into and around the school during operational hours.
- Secure enclosure of car park out-of-hours. During the school day, all access to and egress from the site should be via Parker Street – where surveillance opportunities are maximised from the school reception/office.
- Given the proposal will utilise an existing building, it is highly recommended that any new/replacement elements within the proposed scope of works (such as doors, windows, glazing and shutters) should be to Secured by Design (SBD) standards.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	5
	2.1 Crime Summary	
	2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Theft (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis	
	2.4 General Risk Factors	
	2.5 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	9
	3.1 Proposed Development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Point for Further Consideration	
4	Physical Security	11
	4.1 Any External Alterations	
	4.2 Access Controls & Internal Security	
	4.3 Alarm	
	4.4 Boundaries	
	4.5 Lighting	
	4.6 CCTV	
	4.7 Landscaping	
	4.8 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	15
6	Construction	15
7	Useful References	15
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact Register.....	16
B	Associated Documents.....	16
C	CIS Version History	16
D	Glossary	17

1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the east side of Lord Street, between the junctions with Mason Street to the north and Parker Street to the south, on the eastern edge of Bury town centre.

The eastern portion of the site itself is occupied by a two-storey commercial building – the northern, western and southern elevations of which directly abut the back edge of pavement. To the east of the building is a surface car park/servicing area (comprising of 13 no. spaces and a cycle shelter) enclosed with walls, Palisade fencing and vehicles gates off Mason Street and Parker Street.


The ground floor of the building was formerly in commercial use, but has been vacant since 2017. The first floor of the building is occupied by the Bury Defence Academy, which provides self-defence, fitness and training classes in the evenings Monday to Friday and during the day at weekends.

The ground floor windows openings have been secured with external mesh grilles and the door openings have been secured with external galvanised steel shutters.

To the north (on the opposite side of Mason Street), west (on the opposite side of Lord Street) and south (on the opposite side of Parker Street) of the site are similar commercial/industrial premises, with enclosed parking and servicing areas, which offer little in the way of activity/direct overlooking over the streets and the site itself.

To the immediate east of the site is the Jamira Khizra Mosque and Islamic Centre, with surface car park enclosed with walls/railings and vehicular gates off Parker Street and Mason Street.

Given the uses in the immediate vicinity, the surrounding streets are unlikely to benefit from good levels of footfall, activity, direct overlooking or natural surveillance late at night/outside of operational hours.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2023 to 30th April 2024.

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site



Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
24	26	84	426	67	16	9	16	13	22

- 2.1.1 The general volume of recorded crime in the local area is high for the Bury division, with less serious wounding criminal damage and theft being the most prevalent. These offences are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres - where there is often a higher concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher number of crime and disorder issues. There are particularly concentrations of recorded offences around the main town centre area to the north-west, as well as around/off the terraced, primarily residential, streets to the south, east and north-east.
- 2.1.2 Recorded less serious wounding crimes in the local area have primarily included assaults, harassment and public order offences. The majority of incidents have involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence. Criminal damage against vehicles and properties has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area. Offenders have primarily targeted vehicles parked on streets – smashing windows and damaging bodywork. There have also been instances of smashing front windows of dwellings and retail/commercial premises. The majority of theft offences have occurred around the main town centre area, where there is a higher footfall and more opportunities for offenders. Offenders have primarily targeted insecure items on tabletops and benches in public spaces or at restaurants/cafes, as well as having used pickpocketing and distraction techniques to commit thefts from person (such as stealing mobile phones, wallets and purses).

As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed school, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury educational facilities on Monday and Saturday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the late afternoon and into the evening/early hours of the morning. The opportunities for burglary often rise in the afternoon (at breaks and at the end of the school day), when large numbers of students are entering/leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents/carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target

educational buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

Bury Education Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** At Bury educational facilities, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently by offenders:

- Offenders have prised open windows, have smashed the glazing within them or have targeted them when left insecure to gain unauthorised access.
- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.
- Shutters have been prised open by offenders.
- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements (and gained access through the roof itself or through high level rooflights/windows) or have penetrated through walls.


2.3 Theft (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.

Bury Educational Theft – Day Range



Bury Educational Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Bury peaks on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the normal school/college day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and staff leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, bags and coats are the most routinely stolen items, as well as I.T equipment.

2.4 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private space
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups (particularly out-of-hours)
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff/pupil belongings
- Bullying
- Staff and pupil safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Bury education premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders have prised open windows, have smashed the glazing within them or have targeted them when left insecure to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.1). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

- Shutters have been prised open by offenders.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.1) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

-
- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements (and gained access through the roof itself or through high level rooflights/windows) or have penetrated through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any potentially accessible upper floor windows and rooflights should include laminated glazing and be to the same physical security standard as those at ground level. The construction of walls and any potentially accessible roof areas should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to convert the ground floor of the building to form an independent Islamic Girls High School for 120 no. pupils. The school will operate on Monday to Friday 8am - 4pm and the existing first floor BDA will continue to operate on Monday to Friday 6pm onwards, as well as during the day on Saturday and Sunday.
- 3.1.2 The existing car park (providing 12 no. parking spaces) and the existing cycle shelter will be retained, which will be used by the proposed school during the day and by BDA in the evening and during the weekend. The main entrance to the school will front onto the car park, with a reception/office area, meeting room and W/C accessed off the entrance lobby area. The remainder of the school will incorporate 5 no. classrooms, a multi-purpose room, a dining area/kitchen, a staff room, a headteachers office, W/Cs and ablutions area and a plant/storage area.
- 3.1.3 No external alterations and no external pupil space are proposed. It is intended to utilise the nearby Openshaw Park to provide outdoor recreation and learning. The existing external entrance off Lord Street will continue to serve the first floor BDA premises.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring the vacant ground floor of the building back into use and provide additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area during the school day.
- 3.2.2 The proposed school will benefit from some natural surveillance from the surrounding streets – particularly during the day.
- 3.2.3 The car park serving the building is enclosed/secured at night (after the BDA use has finished), deterring unauthorised access to the hidden doors/windows out-of-hours.
- 3.2.4 The car park is laid out in a straight row, allowing clear views over parked vehicles from routinely occupied rooms within the school during the day.
- 3.2.5 The location of the main entrance to the building provides a clear and direct route for visitors and for any parents/guardians dropping off/collecting their children. There will be a staffed reception/office adjacent to the entrance, providing surveillance over everyone entering/leaving the building.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development may provide the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building/site and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Point for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The proposed ground floor school and the existing first floor BDA premises must be entirely separate, with no internal linkages between them, in order to maintain security and eliminate opportunities that offenders could exploit. The existing entrance to the first floor BDA, accessed directly off Lord Street, should be retained – ensuring it is entirely separate from the school entrance. There should be no internal doorways allowing for access between the two uses and the internal walls between the BDA entrance lobby/stairwell and the school should be robustly constructed to prevent penetration (see illustration opposite and Section 4.2 for more information).



-
- 3.3.2 The reception/office adjacent to the main entrance of the school should be staffed at all times during operational hours, with a high/wide desk allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. The entrance lobby should work as an 'air lock' during the day, with internal doors controlled by reception staff (see Sections 4.1/4.2).
- 3.3.3 The car park to the rear of the building should be enclosed with 2400mm high walls/railings/welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (see Section 4.4 for more information) in order to allow the site to be secured at night/when not in use. During the school day, the gates along Mason Street should be secured (or removed entirely) to prevent casual access through the site (between Mason Street and Parker Street) and ensure all access to and egress from the site is via Parker Street – where surveillance opportunities are maximised from the school reception/office.
- 3.3.4 The proposal will utilise an existing building, with existing external doors, windows, glazing and external grilles/shutters that are unlikely to be Secured by Design (SBD) compliant. It is highly recommended that any new physical security elements to be installed, either as part of the proposed scope of works or in the future, are security-certified - which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection (see Section 4.1) and incorporate Any new glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (also see Section 4.1). Such integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security recommendations for the scheme.

4.1 Any External Alterations

It is highly recommended that any external alterations to the building, either carried out as part of the proposed scope of works or in the future, incorporate the following physical security specifications:

4.1.1 New External Doors

- ☐ The main entrance to the school should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock system permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated remotely by reception staff if/when required. There should be internal doors off the entrance lobby that should also be capable of being remotely secured/released by reception staff, to ensure all visitors to the school are vetted before being allowed further access into the building.
- ☐ Any other new external doors (including single leaf, double leaf and sliding doorsets) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any new external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.1.2 New Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Any new windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any new shutters to be installed should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Given many of the windows will front directly onto the street, consideration could also be given to the installation of perforated protective panels/anti-vandal screens instead of shutters (e.g. [Vandal Protection | Security doors | Vandal screens \(securitycare.co.uk\)](#)), which allow light through while protecting the glazing from damage at all times of the day and night.

4.1.3 New Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Any new glazing (i.e. to doors, windows or curtain walling) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ As much as possible, there should be no features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills or brickwork features, low-level canopies, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to high level windows, onto roof area or over boundaries. Any louvres to the building should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required to plant areas (search for certified products at <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search>).

4.2 Access Controls & Internal Security

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff key-cards/fobs and not numeric key pads (which can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The vehicular gates along Parker Street, if required to be secured during operational hours (controlled remotely by reception/office staff via an audio/visual access control system or by staff key-card/fob).
 - The main entrance and the internal doors taken off the entrance lobby (controlled remotely by reception/office staff).
 - Any other external doors for the use of staff-only.
 - Any doors to obvious risk areas (e.g. IT suites, kitchens etc.)
- ☐ All internal doors/frames to classrooms, multi-purpose rooms, meeting rooms, staff rooms, offices, stores and plant rooms should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Electric locking systems should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Key-cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.
- ☐ The internal walls between the BDA entrance lobby/stairwell at ground floor level and the school (see illustration within Section 3.3) should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

4.3 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the proposed school, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors to rooms with accessible windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ The car park to the rear of the building should be enclosed with 2400mm high walls, railings or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and vehicular gates (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of low walls and railing/welded-wire mesh should have fencing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that the gates onto Mason Street are removed or are secured during operational hours – ensuring all access to and egress from the site is via Parker Street – which can be clearly overlooked from the staff office/reception. If the gates off Parker Street are required to be access-controlled, they should be self-closing/locking and controlled via staff key-card/fob and via an audio/visual access-control system linked to the reception/office on access and egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out', so that criminals cannot gain access, attack the building or parked vehicles and escape). Automatic vehicular gates should preferably be sliding or single-leaf where possible, as they are often easier to secure and operate remotely. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open.

- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



- ☐ Bin/recycling enclosures should be formed by 2100mm high walls or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and lockable gates. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that the condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **overview** and **recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

-
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance and entrance lobby, all external facades of the building and all vehicle/cycle parking areas.](#)

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, any low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and any tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Ideally, lockers should be provided for the use of students in highly visible areas to increase the chances of any offenders attempting to force open lockers being seen. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all students should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended.
- ☐ The cycle store should be located where it can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the school must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
21 st May 2024	WSA Projects	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
22 nd May 2024	WSA Projects	Quote issued & request for additional info
22 nd May 2024	WSA Projects	Email correspondence re: scheme and confirmation of instruction/fee
3 rd June 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
18 th June 2024	WSA Projects	Request for additional info – receipt of annotated plan shown BDA entrance

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
066/WSA/2023 03	Existing Site Location Plan	03/05/2024	-
066/WSA/2023 03	Block Plan	03/05/2024	-
066/2023/WSA 01	Existing Ground Floor Plan	03/05/2024	-
066/2023/WSA 02	Proposed Ground Floor Plan	03/05/2024	-
70730	Invalid planning application letter from Bury Planning Department	13/05/2024	-
-	Planning Statement	April 2024	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk