



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT: PRELIMINARY

LAND AT ROSEWOOD AVENUE/BROWNHILLS CLOSE, TOTTINGTON, BURY
 OUTLINE SCHEME FOR 8 NO. HOUSES AND NEW/IMPROVED FORMAL & INFORMAL
 COMMUNITY OPEN SPACE/PLAY SPACE, REPLACEMENT/IMPROVED FOOTPATH
 CONNECTIONS & WIDER GREENSPACE ENHANCEMENTS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

For: Barnaby Properties Ltd. & Dial-a-Skip UK Ltd.

Version A: 16/07/21

Reference: 2021/0161/CIS/01

Land at Rosewood Avenue/Brownhills Close, Tottington, Bury

URN: 2021/0161/CIS/01

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' has been created to accompany outline planning applications where layout is not considered (i.e. the proposal is only at the 'red line' stage). This part of the process will provide your design team with the contextual crime information, and site-specific design considerations needed to develop the layout and appearance of the proposal.

Reserved Matters Applications

Reserved matters applications, where layout is to be considered, will require a full Crime Impact Statement, which will appraise the design and layout of the developed proposals. Please contact us when work commences on the layout of the scheme for us to develop your preliminary report into a full Crime Impact Statement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The considerations and general recommendations within this report should be addressed when the design team develop more detailed proposals. Particular consideration should be given to the following matters, which are discussed in more detail within Section 3.2 of this report:

- Dwellings should front towards access roads/pedestrian routes and play areas, in order to maximise surveillance opportunities. Routes to the side/rear of dwellings should be avoided.
- Exposed side/rear boundaries of properties accessible from publicly accessible spaces should be robustly defined and protected to deter damage, penetration and scaling.
- Treatment of narrow, poorly overlooked access route off Bury Road, in order to maximise surveillance opportunities and protect pedestrians and dwellings.
- Prevention of unauthorised vehicular/motorcycle access along pedestrian routes.
- Treatment of proposed play areas to clearly define/enclose them without impeding surveillance opportunities of/from them.

A full CIS report should be prepared when the design of the scheme has progressed and an assessment of the details and specifications can be made. This is most productive well in advance of any future full/reserved matters planning application, so that any subsequent alterations do not cause delay to the submissions.

Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies to the south-east of Brownhills Close and Rosewood Avenue, in the Tottington area of north-west Bury.

The site is currently formed by undulating open space with informal footpath links to Brownhills Close to the north-west, Bury Road (B6213) to the south-west and the Kirklees Trail to the north-east.

The western portion of the site is formed by open grassland, with an informal pedestrian route taken off Brownhills Close (secured with bollards to prevent unauthorised vehicular access).


The southern and central portions of the site are formed by undulating open space densely vegetated with scrub vegetation and mature trees. There is an uneven, semi-surfaced pedestrian route off Bury Road running between the rear garden boundaries of the properties fronting onto Bury Road and Royds Close (some of which are damaged), which continues to meet the Kirklees trail to the north-east. The route off Brownhills Close drops down to meet the route off Bury Road approximately in the centre of the site.

The eastern portion of the site is formed by steep, densely vegetated banks with a brook at the base.

The surrounding area is primarily residential in nature, with large areas of open space to the north-east (surrounding Kirklees Brook). The side and rear boundaries of residential properties fronting onto Rosewood Avenue/Brownhills Close/Royds Close/Bury Road/Cedar Fold back onto the north-western, western, and southern perimeter of the site. Running to the north of the site is a former railway line linking Bury town centre to Greenmount, which has been redeveloped into a formalised footpath and cycleway serving the wider area (known as Kirklees Trail).

The informal pedestrian routes running through the site are narrow and uneven, making them unsuitable for cyclists and those with mobility issues. The routes undulate and are surrounded by unkempt/dense vegetation, resulting in blind spots, potential hiding/loitering spaces and a general lack of passive surveillance opportunities. The site also benefits from very limited levels of direct overlooking.

Open land/routes adjacent to (and particularly to the rear of) buildings and dwellings can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and secluded routes can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark. Adjacent properties can also often be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking. Such areas can also experience issues with motorcycle nuisance and unauthorised vehicle access/mis-use.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
6	<5	12	31	6	8	<5	8	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the area is relatively low (38% lower than average for Bury as a whole) - with the most prevalent type of crime being less serious wounding. Incidents of crime are concentrated around/off Bury Road and Sycamore Road. The study area includes large areas of open space to the north and south that are not densely populated and, therefore, attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 As this Preliminary Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed outline residential scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparisons

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.

- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **57% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **66% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **51% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **34% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **43% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **39% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **48% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **59% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **39% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **15% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **36% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **12% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Monday/Tuesday and during the late evening/early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties at night, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or identified.
- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors (particularly to the rear of properties) have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or they have been targeted when left insecure.
 - Offenders have gained access to rear gardens to force open doors to sheds.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Monday. During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning and late at night. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when it is dark and streets are generally quieter, resulting in a lower perceived risk of being observed.
- 2.4.2 Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages.

2.5 Criminal Damage (Bury Parks & Playgrounds): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to criminal damage offences within/against parks and playgrounds, recorded in the Bury area.

- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of criminal damage taking place within parks and playgrounds in the Bury areas peaks on Monday and during the evening - when activity and footfall levels are likely to be lower. Offenders have caused damage to the following features:
- Graffiti on park statues and walls.
 - Set fire to bins in public spaces.
 - Damage to walls/doors/glazing of park buildings.
 - Damage to parked vehicles.

2.6 Theft (Bury Parks & Playgrounds): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against parks and playgrounds, recorded in the Bury area.

Day/Time Range: The risk of theft within Bury parks and playgrounds peaks on Wednesday and during the afternoon/evening. Offenders have targeted buildings located within parks, climbing on roofs and removing lead flashing. Bikes and scooters have also been stolen, particularly when left unattended and insecure.

2.7 General Risk Factors

- 2.7.1 **Residential:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Domestic burglary
 - Bogus callers and distraction burglary
 - Criminal damage to property and vehicles
 - Anti-social behaviour
 - Theft of/from parked vehicles
 - Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
 - Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
 - Neighbour disputes
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- 2.7.2 **Parks/Playgrounds:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:
- Theft from premises
 - Theft of/from parked cars
 - Unauthorised access to non-public areas

- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Personal robbery
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Safety of children
- Loitering groups
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.8 Crime Summary

2.8.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** Doors (particularly to the rear of properties) have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or they have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (i.e. to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

All private spaces to the sides/rear of dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

- **Local Residential:** Offenders have gained access to rear gardens to force open doors to sheds.

Possible Solution – Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible.

Any sheds should be of robust construction (i.e. minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door), with coach-bolted hinges, two hasp and staples to meet 'Sold Secure' Silver and two padlocks to meet 'Solid Secure' Silver or LPS 1654 SR1.

Garage doors to any integral/attached garages (if there is a connecting internal door with the dwelling) must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR1. Alternatively, the internal connecting door must be to the same burglary resistant specification as the front door (normally BS PAS 24). If there is to be no internal connecting door or the garage is detached, the garage door should be of robust construction, with a multi-point locking mechanism.

- **Local Vehicle Crime:** Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Design Considerations

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is for an outline scheme, consisting of 8 no. residential dwelling houses (split into two zones, each containing 4 dwellings, connected by stepped/accessible footpath links) to be accessed via both Brownhills Road and Bury Road, with a range of public open space provision and enhancements.
- 3.1.2 Although an illustrative masterplan site plan has been prepared, approval for the layout of the development is not being sought at this stage - only access is to be determined and all other matters are reserved. The indicative layout plan includes 4 no. dwellings will front onto a short private drive accessed off the turning head at the end of Brownhills Close (Plots U1 to U4). Each will have enclosed private gardens and will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking spaces and/or garages. A pedestrian route will run between the side boundaries of U3 and No. 28 Brownhills Close, leading to a new community orchard and a stepped/accessible pedestrian routes linking to the new dwellings to the south.
- 3.1.3 4 no. dwellings are proposed to the south-west (Plots U5 to U8), accessed off Bury Road between the rear boundaries of Nos. 34-40 Royds Close and the rear gardens/garages/off-road parking spaces to the rear of the terraced properties fronting onto Bury Road (Nos. 333-351). The properties will also have enclosed private gardens and will be served by in-curtilage off-road parking spaces. They will front towards a proposed play area and a new informal 'kick-about' area.
- 3.1.4 In addition to the stepped/accessible pedestrian routes linking the proposed dwellings, there is an improved pedestrian access to the Kirklees Trail proposed, designed to facilitate use by cyclists and those with wheelchairs and prams.
- 3.1.5 Some tree/woodland and ecological management measures and eradication of invasive species are also proposed.

3.2 Recommendations

The following issues are highlighted at this stage and should be addressed in the detailed design of the scheme.

Plots U1 to U4 (accessed off Brownhills Close)

- 3.2.1 As proposed, Plots U3 & U4 front towards the turning head at the end of Brownhills Close. As a result, the proposed pedestrian route runs to the side/rear of the dwellings and the proposed community orchard will lie to the rear of the dwellings. Routes directly to the side and rear of dwellings, where they would benefit from little/no overlooking or natural surveillance and may leave the dwellings themselves vulnerable to unauthorised rear access unseen, should be avoided. Where at all possible, Plots U3 & U4 should front towards the pedestrian route, in order to maximise surveillance opportunities over anyone using it and to deter it from being exploited by offenders unseen (to gain access to rear garden spaces). It would also be beneficial to the community orchard to be overlooked from nearby dwellings as much as possible.
- 3.2.2 The side/rear boundaries of the proposed dwellings will directly abut the publicly accessible bank to the south - leaving them exposed and potentially vulnerable unseen, unauthorised rear access. Such boundary treatments exposed to publicly accessible open space must be particularly robust and should be protected by the existing/additional defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) where possible, in order to provide some protection to the boundaries from damage, penetration and scaling unseen. Care should also be taken to ensure that any changes in ground levels or adjacent trees do not inadvertently form climbing aids over the boundaries to private space or leave large gaps underneath the fencing panels/gates.

Plots U5 to U8 (accessed off Bury Road)

- 3.2.3 The proposed dwellings to the south-west of the site are some distance off Bury Road, to the rear of existing dwellings/garden spaces fronting onto Bury Road, Royds Close and Cedar Fold. This will leave the proposed dwellings somewhat remote/isolated from the nearest streets, served by a narrow access route that will benefit from limited levels of activity and surveillance opportunities - leaving any pedestrians travelling to/from the scheme potentially isolated and vulnerable (particularly at night) and the dwellings themselves potentially vulnerable to attack unseen. At the very least, the site access road off Bury Road should be as wide as possible, evenly tarmacked and lit to adoptable standards, to maximise surveillance opportunities and allow unimpeded views along it. Plot U5 should be dual-fronted, with habitable room windows overlooking the access road to the west and north. Given the isolated nature of the dwellings (leaving them potentially vulnerable to attack unseen), it is considered essential that they are designed and constructed to Secured by Design (SBD) standards - see Section 4 for more details.
- 3.2.4 As described above, any exposed side/rear boundaries of the proposed dwellings must be particularly robust and should be protected by defensive planting where possible. Any hidden space/route between the side/rear of the proposed dwellings and the existing garden boundaries of the dwellings fronting onto Bury Road and Cedar Fold should be secured with gates, to prevent unauthorised to hidden areas where dwellings could be attacked unseen.
- 3.2.5 The access road/private drive serving the proposed dwellings should be defined as entirely separate from the adjacent play area/kick-about areas by low-level railings and low/dense defensive planting, in order to deter nuisance and anti-social behaviour close to dwellings and deter playing around/between parked vehicles (where damage could easily occur - both accidentally and maliciously) without impeding views of or from the play areas.

Physical Security of Houses

- 3.2.6 The dwellings should front directly onto the access roads/private driveways/pedestrian routes, in order to create 'active frontages' and maximize surveillance over other dwellings, parked vehicles, visitors and external spaces. The proposed dwellings should all have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level) and their design should be kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.7 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the dwellings should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space (see above). The front elevations of dwellings should be protected by some defensible space (defined/segregated by low-level walls, railings or picket fencing and dense hedging/planting), creating garden areas/driveways that are clearly defined as separate from the adjacent access routes and each other, in ownership/control of the residents themselves. Encouraging residents/legitimate users to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for their surroundings can make an important contribution to community safety and crime prevention. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged.
- 3.2.8 It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. All of the proposed houses should either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Access road/private drives should be defined as entirely separate from adjacent areas of open space of play areas.
- 3.2.9 Physical protection measures should be incorporated into the constructed of the dwellings (including Secured by Design compliant doors, windows, glazing etc.) in order to make it harder for an offender to commit a crime and raising the risk of detection (see Section 4 for more information).
- 3.2.10 A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive and evenly distributed. Lighting should be provided to the access roads/private drives off Brownhills Close and Bury Road serving the properties, all parking areas and to the front/rear of all dwellings.

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- 3.2.11 Any proposed landscaping features (hard or soft) in front of dwellings/buildings or around parking areas should not impede natural surveillance off/from the buildings/spaces or create climbing aids over any boundaries. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage.

Footpaths & P.O.S. Enhancements

- 3.2.12 Measures should be incorporated to prevent unauthorised vehicular access along the pedestrian-only routes between the dwellings to the north-west and south-west of the site, as well as linking to the Kirklees Trail to the north-east. Although the access routes/private drives serving the proposed properties off Bury Road and Brownhills Close should be lit to adoptable standards, the remaining pedestrian routes should remain unlit to discourage use at night (when isolated legitimate users may be vulnerable).
- 3.2.13 The proposed pedestrian routes should be as wide and as straight as possible, with any vegetation on either side maintained, in order to maximise views off and along them, encourage legitimate use and illuminate hiding places that could be exploited by offenders. Consideration should also be given to the deterring unauthorised motorcycle access without impeding wheelchair or pram use.
- 3.2.14 Any seating areas should be positioned away from the principle circulation routes and dwellings, so that any gathering groups are less likely to cause nuisance to or intimidate passers-by and residents. The design of any street furniture, such as any steps/ramps or benches, should be designed to withstand and discourage potential mistreatment and damage. Where there are numerous benches in isolated locations or within very close proximity of dwellings, they can often attract and foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour problems.
- 3.2.15 Any play areas should be enclosed and well-overlooked from nearby residential properties. There should be clear signage to any proposed play areas stating the age range of children who are allowed to use the play equipment. However, the equipment to be installed should be robust enough to withstand abuse by older children. The proposed play areas will abut the rear boundaries of the existing dwellings fronting onto Cedar Fold. As such, these boundaries should be robust defined (e.g. with acoustic timber fencing) and protected by dense, defensive planting to deter nuisance, damage and scaling.
- 3.2.16 Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme (particularly close to properties/parked vehicles) should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- 3.2.17 Trees and planting should be avoided that may aid climbing over any boundary treatments or up to upper floor windows. The security of fences and properties can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- 3.2.18 The robust management of landscaped areas, footpaths and play areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. If signs of disorder (such as criminal damage, graffiti, littering etc.) are not repaired/removed immediately, they can often attract further abuse.

Phasing

- 3.2.19 The phasing of building works and bringing into use parts of the site while others are undeveloped or under construction can significantly affect security. Uncompleted access roads/footpaths should be secured until such time as they are completed and surveillance opportunities are maximised from occupied dwellings. Care should also be taken to ensure that any hoardings erected around development sites do not create secluded passageways and blind spots, or become targets for criminal damage.

4 Useful References

4.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
18 th March 2021	Roman Summer	Receipt of CIS instruction & plans
23 rd March 2021	Roman Summer	Quote issued & request for additional info
29 th March 2021	Dickens Property Group	Confirmation of instruction/fee
20 th to 21 st April 2021	Roman Summer	Email correspondence with Agent requesting additional info - final layout being prepared by Landscape Architect to follow. Also awaiting clarification on if a prelim CIS or a full CIS is required
28 th May 2021	Roman Summer	Email sent re: final layout plan & clarification on if a prelim CIS or a full CIS is required
29 th June to 1 st July 2021	Roman Summer	Email correspondence re: planning submission, CIS requirements & payment, plus receipt of revised location plan, masterplan & planning covering letter
4 th July 2021	Roman Summer	Updated information & plans/documents received
5 th to 6 th July 2021	Roman Summer	Email correspondence re: progress update & payment reminder sent to Agent. New set of plans to be issued later this week. Payment made.
8 th July 2021	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment cleared
14 th July 2021	Roman Summer	Receipt of finalised set of plans & email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
YD2_20_16 YD2_BC_SP001	Site Location Plan Red Line Boundary (SUPERSEDED)	12/10/20	-
YD2_20_16 YD2_BC_SP001	Site Location Plan	14/07/21	A
YD2_20_16 YD2_BC_SP002	Land Ownership Plan	13/07/21	-
YD2_20_16 YD2_BC_SP100	Development Boundary Plan Site Edge Red and Blue (SUPERSEDED)	29/06/21	B
YD2_20_16 YD2_BC_SP100	Development Boundary Plan Site Edge Red and Blue	13/07/21	C
MJ/RG/G315/L001	Letter to LPA requesting Pre-App Meeting (SUPERSEDED)	22/10/20	-
YD2_BH_RP_SK001	Landscape Concept Report (SUPERSEDED)	11/10/20	-
YD2_21_20 YD2_BH_LP001	Site Masterplan Development Layout (SUPERSEDED)	APR 21	A
YD2_21_20 YD2_BH_LP001	Site Masterplan Illustrative Development Layout	JULY 2021	-
-	Draft Planning Application Form (SUPERSEDED)	30/06/21	-
-	Planning Application Form	30/06/21	-
MJ/RG/G315/L001	Planning Covering Letter	30/06/21	-
J1215/TS	Transport Statement	June 2021	-
BTC2060	Arboricultural Constraints Appraisal	02/07/21	1

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Status	Revisions Made
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk