



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

5-9 THE ROCK, BURY

CONVERSION OF UPPER FLOORS TO FORM 12 no. RESIDENTIAL APARTMENTS

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Landa Corporation Ltd.

VERSION C: 15/11/21

REFERENCE: 2021/0476/CIS/01

5-9 The Rock, Bury

URN: 2021/0476/CIS/01


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Design changes not required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The proposed scheme has been amended to relocate the single-leaf main entrance onto The Rock (where opportunities for natural surveillance and direct overlooking are maximised), create a secure postal lobby that does not require access to all floors of the building and remove a recess to the rear of the building (that could have been vulnerable to fostering nuisance, anti-social behaviour and criminal activity). The proposed scheme is now considered acceptable and, as long as the physical security measures contained within Section 4 are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies to the north of The Rock and to the south of North Back Rock, in Bury town centre.

The site is currently formed by a part 2 storey, part 5 storey building comprising of a vacant ground floor bank and offices at first to fourth floor levels.

The vacant bank fronts onto The Rock - a busy vehicular and pedestrian route within the town centre occupied primarily by retail units, commercial premises, financial institutions and food & drink establishments. Just to the east of the site, the route becomes a pedestrianised shopping precinct.

Such routes are very busy during the day and into the evening, but are likely to benefit from lower levels of activity late at night when commercial premises are closed.


The Church of St. Mary the Virgin lies just to the west and to the rear of the site are the walled gardens of the Rectory and Church House.

The existing building backs onto North Back Rock - a very narrow, short rear access alleyway running between the rear of the premises fronting onto The Rock and the approximately 3m high wall to the gardens to the north.

The buildings along the route feature blank walls, barred/boarded-up window openings and door openings secured with solid steel/palisade gates - indicating that issues with damage/unauthorised access have previously been experienced. There is also evidence of disorder along the alleyway, including graffiti, littering and evidence of drug taking.

There are no active frontages along the cul-de-sac alleyway and, as a result of this and the oppressive high wall on the other side of the route, it benefits from little/no natural surveillance and direct overlooking, as well as activity and pedestrian footfall. This leaves the adjacent buildings potentially vulnerable to unauthorised rear access or damage unseen, as well as leaving any pedestrians using the route particularly remote/isolated.

There were vehicles parked along the route at the time of the site visit (leaving little room for pedestrians to pass). Parked vehicles along such hidden routes can also be vulnerable to damage (both accidental and malicious) and attack unseen.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st July 2018 to 30th June 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
7	81	135	526	225	53	24	31	19	37

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of town and city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Violence has taken place throughout the surrounding area, with a particular concentration to the south-west (around/off Haymarket Street and Market Street), where there is a high concentration of licensed premises and late night takeaways. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of violence in the area, often taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning at the weekend, when such premises are at their busiest. The Rock is the main shopping area of Bury, with a high volume of retail and entertainment/licenced premises located along it. Theft offences have mostly occurred in/around these types of premises, where offenders have stolen insecure personal items (such as bags and mobile phones) and items belonging to the businesses. Criminal damage offences have also been concentrated to the south-west of the site, with offenders primarily targeting businesses and vehicles (particularly smashing glazing).
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **26% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **42% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **17% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **1,663% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **1,433% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **1,542% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Bury and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Bury and Greater Manchester



- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **751% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **564% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **887% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **598% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **430% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **824% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.



2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** There have been relatively few incidents of domestic burglary within the study area, which lies within the town centre and is primarily commercial in nature. Of those that have occurred, the majority have taken place on Wednesday and in the evening - when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure - common MOs when apartments are targeted.
 - Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.
 - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



-
- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Friday.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk rises during normal working hours. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people park on streets and in car parks in the area for long periods of time, while working in the town centre, shopping or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within pay & display car parks within and around the edges of the town centre, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure car parks/basement parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft off/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure - common MOs when apartments are targeted.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to convert the upper floors of the existing building to form 12 no. residential apartments. The existing use at ground floor level will be retained.
- 3.1.2 As proposed, the upper floor apartments will be accessed through a double-leaf entrance door off The Rock to the front of the building. A ground floor cycle store and bin store is also proposed, accessed through the entrance lobby and through recessed double doors off North Back Rock to the rear of the building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring the vacant upper floors of the building back into use and will provide additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The main entrance to the apartment block will be well-overlooked from The Rock and capable of being robustly controlled to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.2.3 There will be clearly-defined, entirely separate entrances serving the commercial and residential uses proposed, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities for criminals to exploit.
- 3.2.4 The apartments will be provided well-above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the scheme can ensure it is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The scheme has been redesigned to have a single-leaf main entrance serving the upper floor apartments fronting onto The Rock, where opportunities for natural surveillance and direct overlooking are maximised - both over the entrance itself and any residents/visitors coming to/from it. Secondary internal doors have also been added to create a secure entrance lobby, ensuring access to all floors of the building is not required (see Section 4.1 for more information). The rear double doors off North Back Rock serving the bin store have also been brought forward to the building line to remove a potentially vulnerable recess.
- 3.3.2 Although it is noted that the rear alleyway may be outside of the ownership/control of the developers, residents should be encouraged not to use North Back Rock to park their vehicles - particularly overnight, where they would be very vulnerable to damage/theft unseen. Where at all possible, signage/enforcement measures should be in place to prevent parking along the rear of the units, or at least to define them as for short-term use only during the day (to ensure they are not be used on a long-term basis/overnight by any residents).
- 3.3.3 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve the Secured by Design award.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required to the bin store (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products). Given it's vulnerable location, the external doors to the bin store should be of steel construction.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should front onto The Rock and should be security-certified (see above), single-leaf (which is easier to secure and operate remotely than double doors), self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The entrance should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Where possible, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. Where this is not practical, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries within a postal lobby without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ All internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any internal doorsets providing access to the bin and cycle stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and self-closing/locking, with 3 hinges and an electrically operated multi-point lock (e.g. Winkhaus AV2-E) controlled by resident key-fob. Further information relating to the cycle store can be found within Section 4.6.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any ground floor/accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 and should be non-opening. Any curtain walling panels should be securely fixed.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor glazing (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Internal walls between the residential and commercial portions of the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 Other

- ☐ The residential cycle store should include stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Repairs to communal areas (access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
- Litter/graffiti removal

Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22 nd September 2021	Tang Associates	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
24 th September 2021	Tang Associates	Quote issued
29 th September 2021	Tang Associates	Email correspondence re: ground floor bank will remain as commercial space and is not part of the scheme. Will come back on instruction
29 th September 2021	Tang Associates	Confirmation of instruction/fee
4 th to 5 th October 2021	Tang Associates	Email correspondence re: timescales
19 th October 2021	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
22 nd October 2021	Tang Associates	Version A of CIS issued
22 nd October 2021	Tang Associates	Receipt of revised plans & request for revised CIS
2 nd November 2021	Tang Associates	Version B of CIS report issued
2 nd to 3 rd November 2021	Tang Associates	Email correspondence & receipt of amended plans

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
9694/001	Location Plan	28/07/21	A
9694/110	Existing and Proposed Site Plans (SUPERSEDED)	30/07/21	A
9694/110	Existing and Proposed Site Plans (SUPERSEDED)	22/10/21	B
9694/110	Existing and Proposed Site Plans	02/11/21	C
9694/111	Existing and Proposed GF-2F Plans (SUPERSEDED)	02/08/21	B
9694/111	Existing and Proposed GF-2F Plans (SUPERSEDED)	22/10/21	C
9694/111	Existing and Proposed GF-2F Plans	03/11/21	E
9694/112	Existing and Proposed 3F-Roof Plans (SUPERSEDED)	02/08/21	B
9694/112	Existing and Proposed 3F-Roof Plans	12/10/21	C
9694/121	Existing and Proposed Front and Side Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	20/07/21	A
9694/121	Existing and Proposed Front and Side Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	22/10/21	D
9694/121	Existing and Proposed Front and Side Elevations	02/11/21	E
9694/122	Existing and Proposed Rear and Side Elevations (SUPERSEDED)	29/07/21	A
9694/122	Existing and Proposed Rear and Side Elevations	22/10/21	C
9694	Design and Access Statement	July 21	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		
B	Main entrance relocated to front onto The Rock	02/11/2021
C	Single-leaf entrance door, secure postal lobby added & vulnerable recess removed to rear bin store doors	15/11/2021

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk