



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

SPURR HOUSE, POLE LANE, BURY
CHANGE OF USE AND REFURBISHMENT TO FORM SCHOOL (1,020sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Bury Council

VERSION A: 16/12/2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0482/CIS/01

Spurr House, Pole Lane, Bury

URN: 2022/0482/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The whole site should be securely enclosed out-of-hours, with secondary fencelines/gates to secure external student/play areas to the sides and rear of the building during operational hours.
- Consideration should be given to defining the car park to the north-west of the site for staff use only with an access-controlled vehicular gate/s, preventing public access to the external doors of the adjacent classrooms during operational hours.
- Control of access into and around the building during operational hours.
- Given the proposal will utilise an existing single-storey building, unauthorised access to the roof should be prevented as much as possible and any new/replacement elements within the proposed scope of works (such as doors, windows/curtain walling/rooflights and glazing) should be to Secured by Design (SBD) standards.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the east side of Pole Lane in the Unsworth area of south Bury.

It is currently occupied by a single-storey building, with a central external courtyard, known as Spurr House – a recently closed short-term respite care centre fronting onto Pole Lane. The south-west portion of the site houses a small surface car park (as well as a detached garage), accessed off Pole Lane. It has grassed landscape areas to its frontage, sides and rear, in addition to woodland/trees to the rear of the site. The sides and rear of the site are currently enclosed with relatively low timber fencing and hedging/trees along the perimeter - meaning the hidden elevations of the building could be vulnerable to unseen unauthorised access.

To the immediate north-west of the site is a pair of semi-detached houses fronting towards Pole Lane, with a detached garage directly in front of them. To the north is a large block of flats named Pole Lane Court, with an access road running along the northern boundary of the site leading to landscaped areas, surface parking areas, bin stores and garage colonies to the rear of the block.


To the north-east of the site is a secondary school and grounds (Unsworth Academy, accessed off Parr Lane), with open space to the east of the site – beyond which is the M66 motorway.

To the south of the site is Unsworth Cricket and Tennis Club with dense hedging along the street frontage and scrub vegetation/trees along the boundary with the site.

When publicly accessible land or routes exist to the rear of sites, they can often leave them vulnerable to unauthorised access (particularly when they benefit from little/no natural surveillance) – as they can provide easy access/escape routes for offenders to utilise unseen.

The land to the west of the site is primarily residential in nature, including some large detached dwellings on the opposite side of Pole Lane, which overlook the site to some degree (albeit some of them have high vegetation along their street frontages, which impedes views of/from them).

The wider area includes a number of educational premises, including Unsworth Academy to the north-east, Mersey Drive Community Primary School to the south-west and Bury and Whitefield Jewish Primary School to the north-west. Pike Fold Golf Club lies to the east, on the opposite side of the M66 motorway.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2021 to 31st October 2022.


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	<5	17	61	5	<5	<5	5	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively low for the Bury division. This may in part be because the study area includes large areas of open space that is not densely populated and typically attracts fewer crime and disorder incidents. The most prevalent types of recorded crime have been less serious wounding, domestic burglary and criminal damage, with incidents concentrated to the north (around/off the main arterial route of Parr Lane) and south (around/off the residential streets of Roch Crescent/Calder Crescent) of the site.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed school, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury educational facilities on Monday and Saturday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the late afternoon and into the evening/early hours of the morning. The opportunities for burglary often rise in the afternoon (at breaks and at the end of the school day), when large numbers of students are entering/leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents/carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target educational buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.
- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** At Bury educational facilities, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently by offenders:
- Offenders have prised open windows, have smashed the glazing within them or have targeted them when left insecure to gain unauthorised access.
 - Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.
 - Shutters have been prised open by offenders.
 - Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements (and gained access through the roof itself or through high level rooflights/windows) or have penetrated through walls.

2.3 Theft (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Bury peaks on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the normal school/college day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and staff leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, bags and coats are the most routinely stolen items, as well as I.T equipment.

2.4 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private space
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups (particularly out-of-hours)
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff/pupil belongings
- Bullying
- Staff and pupil safety

- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Bury education premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders have prised open windows, have smashed the glazing within them or have targeted them when left insecure to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

- Shutters have been prised open by offenders.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (to LPS 1175 SR 1/2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements (and gained access through the roof itself or through high level rooflights/windows) or have penetrated through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any potentially accessible upper floor windows and rooflights should include laminated glazing and be to the same physical security standard as those at ground level. The construction of walls and any potentially accessible roof areas should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use and refurbish the existing building to house the relocation of Spring Lane School - a secondary pupil referral unit for Bury Local Authority.
- 3.1.2 The site will be fenced and will feature parking for 20 no. vehicles to the south-west of the building, accessed via a sliding gate off Pole Lane, and parking for a further 12 no. vehicles and 2 no. minibuses to the north-west of the building, accessed via double gates off Pole Lane. Pedestrian access to the main entrance of the school will be via a pedestrian gate off Pole Lane.
- 3.1.3 The building itself will be refurbished (with the external courtyard enclosed and a small extension) to house an entrance lobby, reception and staff facilities, a sports hall and gym, general classrooms, specific classrooms for Construction Tech, Art, Hair & Beauty, Science and Food, a library, a therapy room, a lifeskills room, offices & stores and plant areas. Many of the classrooms will have new doors onto the external spaces surrounding the building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a vacant building back into use and provide additional activity, overlooking and surveillance to the area during the school day.
- 3.2.2 The proposed school will benefit from natural surveillance from Pole Lane and will be directly overlooked by the dwellings on the opposite side of the street.
- 3.2.3 The site will be enclosed within a secure fenceline, deterring unauthorised access to hidden doors/windows and deterring unauthorised access to the roof of the single-storey structure. The landscape/play areas which surround the building will also be enclosed - protecting the children when they are in use during the day and deterring unauthorised access out-of-hours.
- 3.2.4 The proposed car parks will be laid out in straight rows, with few obstacles to views across them, aiding surveillance opportunities from within the building and from the street.
- 3.2.5 The location of the main entrance to the building provides a clear and direct route for visitors and for parents/guardians dropping off/collecting their children. There will be a staffed reception/office adjacent to the entrance lobby, providing surveillance over everyone entering/leaving the building.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development may provide the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building/site and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Point for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The whole of the site should be enclosed within a 2400mm high perimeter fenceline, in order to prevent unauthorised access to the parking areas, building and landscape/play areas at night or when the school is closed. There should also be secondary fencelines incorporated to either side of the building that secure the external pupil areas to the sides and rear of the building during operational hours - ensuring that no-one can bypass the main entrance reception and gain unauthorised access through any other doors or to external student spaces during operational hours (see Section 4.6 for more information). Care should be taken to ensure any changes in ground levels do not inadvertently leave gaps underneath fencing panels or aid scaling. Care should also be taken to ensure that any existing adjacent trees do not form a climbing aid over the boundaries - low branches should be pruned or removed where possible to prevent scaling. Boundary treatment should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.

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- 3.3.2 As the proposed external doors to the Construction Tech, Art, Hair & Beauty and general classrooms along the northern elevation of the building will be accessible from the vehicle parking area to the north-west of the site, consideration should be given to enclosing this car park and defining it as for staff use only (preventing public access to the external doors during the day), with an access-controlled vehicular gate/s off Pole Lane. The car park to the south-west of the site could be for the use of staff, visitors and parents dropping off students and remain open during operational hours and secured with a gate/s at night (see Section 4.6 for more information).
- 3.3.3 It is appreciated that the number of pupils arriving/leaving at peak times may mean that it may be impractical for them all to use the main entrance of the building. If this is the case, a limited number of student gates/entrances should be opened and supervised at peak times in the morning and in the afternoon only, after/before which the external student/play areas surrounding the building should be secured and all visitors, parents, pupils and staff should use the main entrance. The reception/office adjacent to the main entrance should be staffed at all times when the building is in use, with a high/wide desk allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering and exiting the building. All visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. The entrance lobby should work as an 'air lock' during the day, with internal doors controlled by reception staff (see Sections 4.1/4.5).
- 3.3.4 Accessible roofs of school buildings have often been exploited by criminals across Greater Manchester to gain unauthorised access, particularly where there are single-storey elements, where eaves are lower or where buildings are publicly accessible out-of-hours – making access easier. Ideally, the eaves of single-storey building elements should be as high as possible and designed to discourage climbing (e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc.). However, given the proposal will be utilising an existing building, this may not be possible. Where feasible, there should be no features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids onto the roof (see Section 4.3) and any new rooflights should be to the same physical security standards as any new windows at ground floor level (see Sections 4.2/4.3). The secure enclosure of the whole site out-of-hours (see Section 4.6) will provide an additional layer of security to the building shell and deter unauthorised access to the structure at night/when it is closed.
- 3.3.5 The proposal will utilise an existing building, with existing external doors, windows and glazing that are unlikely to be Secured by Design (SBD) compliant. It is highly recommended that any new doorsets, windows or glazing to be installed, either as part of the proposed scope of works or in the future, are security-certified which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2). Any new ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Such integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security recommendations for the scheme.

4.1 External Doors

- ☐ All new external doors (both single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any new external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ The main entrance to the school should be security-certified to one of the above standards, including a multi-point electronic lock system permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated remotely by reception staff if/when required. The internal doors off the entrance lobby should also be capable of being remotely secured/released by reception staff, to ensure all visitors to the building are vetted before being allowed access.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Any new windows or rooflights should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards)
- ☐ Any opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ If any shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Any new glazing (i.e. to doors, windows/curtain walling or rooflights) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ As much as possible, there should be no features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies below the level of the single storey eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. Any louvres to the building should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach roof areas. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant areas (search for certified products at <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search>).
- ☐ The construction of any new potentially accessible areas of roof should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1 or STS 202 BR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh could be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space. Any rooflights should incorporate laminated glazing/polycarbonate and/or internally fixed security bars/grilles.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover the proposed school, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors to rooms with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Access Controls & Internal Security

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff key-cards/fobs and not numeric key pads (which can be easily observed/shared and are rarely changed). The following doors should operate on access control:
 - The main entrance and the internal doors taken off the entrance lobby (controlled remotely by reception/office staff).
 - Any other external doors for the use of staff-only.
 - Any internal doors needed to provide internal zoning and restrict access to parts of the building not in use (e.g. during evenings/weekends).
 - Any doors to obvious risk areas (e.g. IT suites, kitchens etc.)
- ☐ All internal doors/frames to classrooms, offices, meeting rooms, staff rooms, stores and plant rooms should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Electric locking systems should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Key-cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The whole school site should be enclosed with 2400mm high railings or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and pedestrian/vehicular gates (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers).
- ☐ Secondary fencelines and gates (e.g. 2100mm high) should be incorporated to either side of the building within the site, to prevent anyone bypass the access-controlled main entrance of the building and gaining access to the landscaped/play areas (as well as any external doors) to the sides and rear of the building during operational hours.
- ☐ The parking areas to the north-west and south-west of the building should be secured with 2400mm high vehicular gates out-of-hours. Consideration should be given to defining the car park to the north-west for staff use only, preventing public access to the external doors of the adjacent classrooms during the day. If so, the gate/s should be operated using staff key card/fob with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access, attack the building or parked vehicles and escape. Automatic vehicular gates should preferably be sliding or single-leaf where possible, as they are often easier to secure and operate remotely. If double gates are used, they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible.
- ☐ Any external bin stores should be enclosed with 2100-2400mm high walls or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and lockable gates. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.



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- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *the main entrance and entrance lobby, all external facades of the building and all vehicle/cycle parking areas.*

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

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- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Lockers should be provided for the use of students, ideally in highly visible areas to increase the chances of any offenders attempting to force open lockers being seen. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all students should be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended.
- ☐ Any new cycle parking areas should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the school must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25 th October 2022	Gardiner & Theobald LLP	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
26 th October 2022	Gardiner & Theobald LLP	Quote issued & request for additional info
28 th October 2022	Gardiner & Theobald LLP	Confirmation of instruction/fee
24 th November 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
13 th December 2022	Gardiner & Theobald LLP	Email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SK-026	Site Plan	26/05/22	-
SK-027	Roof Plan	27/05/22	-
SG-10-P-004	Proposed Site Plan Layout	24/10/22	-
SK-021	Floor plan without furniture	25/07/22	1
SK-025	Proposed Elevations	25/05/22	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk