



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

FORMER TEXACO GARAGE, BURY OLD ROAD, PRESTWICH
KOSHER FOODSTORE & SYNAGOGUE

Greater Manchester Police
designforsecurity

FOR: RPS Consulting Ltd.

VERSION A: 17/11/2023

REFERENCE: 2013/0404/CIS/02

Former Texaco Garage, Bury Old Road, Prestwich

URN: 2013/0404/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor design changes/security additions required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The retail and Synagogue elements of the building should be entirely separate, in order to avoid opportunities that offenders could exploit. Ideally, the Synagogue should be served by its own dedicated staircore and lift. If the proposed arrangement must remain, the internal doors providing access to the retail storage rooms at basement and first floor level and the retail office must be security-certified and accessible to staff only, to ensure unauthorised access is prevented. The main external entrance to the Synagogue should be capable of being access-controlled to ensure unauthorised access to the retail back-of-house areas is prevented. The lifts should only be operated by staff and any disabled worshippers should be met and escorted.
- The external lift doors along the southern elevation of the building could be vulnerable to damage and unauthorised access/being forced open. The lifts should either be served by a ground floor lobby (secured with a security-certified doorset) or they should be secured with a security-certified shutter out-of-hours/when access is not required.
- The narrow area to the north side of the building should be gated along the front building line, to prevent unauthorised access to the external stair/rear first floor doors.
- Definition/enclosure of car park and prevention of vehicular access out-of-hours.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the west side of Bury Old Road (A665) in Prestwich. It was the site of a former petrol station and car wash, which has been cleared to leave an area of hard standing to the front (east) of the site, enclosed with Palisade fencing and timber hoardings, and an excavated area to the rear (west) enclosed with concrete retaining walls and herras fencing.


The site sits within a parade of retail and commercial units along Bury Old Road, which include a chemist, offices, estate agents, hairdressers, foodstores, newsagents and restaurants/hot food takeaways. While such commercial parades can provide legitimate activity and surveillance opportunities to an area, they can also often be a focal point for nuisance/anti-social behaviour issues, particularly late at night.

There is an open parking/servicing area to the rear of the parade (accessed via a route along the southern boundary of the site), which includes a number of out-buildings and storage containers. The publicly accessible rear elevations of the commercial units are heavily fortified with shutters and bars/grilles – indicating that they may have experienced issues with criminal damage and unauthorised access in the past.

Bury Old Road is a wide route busy, with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall, meaning the frontage of the site benefits from good levels of passive surveillance. On the opposite side of Bury Old Road from the site is a Synagogue and some large detached properties, which have high/dense vegetation and mature tree along the street frontage, meaning they provide little in the way of direct overlooking over the site.

Part of the northern boundary of the site directly abuts the rear gardens of the residential properties fronting onto Albert Avenue.

To the west of the site (and the adjoining parade) is a wooded area and allotments to the rear of the residential properties fronting onto Albert Avenue to the north and Cavendish Road to the south.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2022 to 31st October 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
11	<5	18	91	7	<5	<5	10	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively low for the Bury division, with less serious wounding being the most prevalent type of recorded crime. These offences have occurred throughout the local area, with particular concentrations to the south of the site (around/off Bury Old Road/Singleton Road and Singleton Road/Upper Park Road) and to the north-west (around/off King's Road). The majority of less serious wounding offences have involved disputes between known associates, as well as some cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.2 As this CIS related to a proposed retail store and Synagogue, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail premises, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury retail premises peaks on Thursday and Friday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks late and night/during the early hours of the morning - when premises are closed, it is dark and there is little street activity, meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being witnessed.

Bury Retail Burglary - Point of Entry



2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently by offenders when targeting Bury retail premises:

- Front and rear doors have been forced open using bodily pressure or implements/tools.
- Shutters protecting doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements.
- Glazed panels in doors/shopfronts have been smashed to gain entry.
- Offenders have posed as legitimate customers to access premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors of stockrooms or offices or tailgating staff into restricted areas.

2.1 Theft (Bury Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail premises, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.





2.1.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Bury retail premises peaks on Wednesday and Thursday.

2.1.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or personal property stolen from customers (e.g. purses/wallets, handbags, mobile phones etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at places of worship in Greater Manchester is greatest on Friday and Tuesday.

2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders frequently target buildings at these times, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they are likely to be unoccupied, resulting in them perceiving a lower risk of being observed or identified than during daylight hours.





2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently, both to the front and rear of buildings, and have been either forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Windows (particularly to the rear of buildings) have also been prised open or exploited when left insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- In cases where access has been recorded as 'unknown' or 'legitimate', it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate users while buildings are open to access restricted/non-public areas unnoticed.

2.3 Theft (GM Places of Worship): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against places of worship, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Greater Manchester places of worship is greatest on Thursday, Friday and Sunday.

2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft is greatest during the afternoon and into the early evening. During the day, when the majority of places of worship are open to the public, there are more opportunities for offenders to access buildings and private areas/rooms anonymously, before targeting both personal property (such as laptops, purses, bags etc.) and property belong to the place of worship. Offenders have also targeted building materials, particularly lead flashing, copper piping and paving slabs.

2.4 General Risk Factors

2.4.1 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4.2 **Places of worship:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles

- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Bury retail premises and Greater Manchester places of worship are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Bury Retail:** Front and rear doors have been forced open using bodily pressure or implements/tools.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by (see Sections 4.5, 4.7 & 4.8).

- **Bury Retail:** Shutters protecting doors and windows have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Bury Retail:** Glazed panels in doors/shopfronts have been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Glazed shopfront areas should be protected by bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features to prevent ramming and secured with shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.3).

- **Bury Retail:** Offenders have posed as legitimate customers to access premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors of stockrooms or offices or tailgating staff into restricted areas.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.1).

- **GM Places of Worship:** Doors have been targeted most frequently, both to the front and rear of buildings, and have been either forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure. Windows (particularly to the rear of buildings) have also been prised open or exploited when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. It may be necessary for more vulnerable doors or windows to be fitted with security-certified shutters, bars, grilles or perforated metal/polycarbonate panels, in order to provide some additional protection (see Section 4.1/4.2). Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 4.5, lighting (see Section 4.7) and CCTV (see Section 4.8) can deter criminals from attempting entry by discouraging access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

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- **GM Places of Worship:** The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Any particularly vulnerable glazed windows or doors should also be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours (see Section 4.2).

- **GM Places of Worship:** In cases where access has been recorded as 'unknown' or 'legitimate', it is likely that offenders have posed as legitimate users while buildings are open to access restricted/non-public areas unnoticed.

Possible Solution – The main entrance to the Synagogue and all internal areas/rooms restricted to staff and officials should operate on an access control system, to restrict unauthorised entry. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be a secure area for staff/officials to store their belongings while at the premises.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 2 storey building to form a ground floor Kosher foodstore (with ancillary basement and first floor storage areas) and a first floor Synagogue, with associated parking and landscaping. The scheme was granted planning permission in 2019, which has subsequently lapsed.
- 3.1.2 The frontage of the site will be enclosed and will include 15 no. vehicle parking spaces, 5 no. cycle spaces and a retained electricity substation. There will be 2 no. entrances off the car park serving the ground floor retail unit, with 2 no. lifts with external access (serving the basement and first floor retail storage areas) along the southern elevation. The first floor of the building will house a large retail storage area, as well as an office, W/Cs and a Synagogue for 20-30 worshippers – served by a dedicated external entrance to the frontage of the building. There will be an external plant deck area to the rear of the building at first floor level, leading to an external escape stair down to ground level along the northern side elevation of the building. The basement of the building will be entirely used for retail storage, with an excavated external area at basement level for staff access (enclosed at ground level by timber fencing).
- 3.1.3 The proposed hours of opening of the retail unit will be 08:00 to 23:00 Monday to Friday, 08:00 to 16:00 Sunday and closed on Saturday. The Synagogue will be used 06:30 to 09:00 and 18:00 to 22:30 Monday to Friday/Sunday and 06:30 to 22:30 on Saturday.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area at all times of the day and, possibly, into the evening.
- 3.2.2 The proposed building will have a relatively simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and facilitate efficient surveillance of external areas.
- 3.2.3 The proposed customer parking area will be visible from the street, increasing natural surveillance opportunities. The parking areas will also be laid out in straight rows, with relatively few obstacles to views across them, further aiding surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.4 The main entrances to the store and Synagogue will be located in prominent positions, where they can be easily seen from the car park as well as the street.
- 3.2.5 There will be separate external entrances serving the retail and Synagogue uses proposed, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities for criminals to exploit.
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the scheme can ensure it is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration


The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The retail and Synagogue elements of the building should be entirely separate, in order to avoid opportunities that offenders could exploit. As proposed, the Synagogue will be served by a dedicated external entrance to the front of the building. However, the entrance leads to a staircore that also provides access to the basement retail storage area, as well as the first floor of the building – which includes the proposed Synagogue and an additional retail storage area and office. If disabled access is required to the first floor Synagogue, it presumably must be via the lifts to the south side of the building that serve the retail unit and its basement/first floor storage areas. Ideally, the Synagogue should be served by its own dedicated staircore and lift, preventing unauthorised access between the uses. If the proposed arrangement must remain, the internal doors providing access to the retail storage rooms at

basement and first floor level and the retail office must be security-certified (see Section 4.1) and accessible to staff only, to ensure unauthorised access is prevented. The main external entrance to the Synagogue should be capable of being access-controlled to allow Synagogue staff/officials to vet/manage access and ensure unauthorised access to the retail back-of-house areas is prevented. The lifts should only be operated by staff and any disabled worshippers should be met and escorted.

3.3.2 As proposed, the lifts will be directly accessible from the external southern elevation of the building. The lift doors are not attack-tested (as security-certified doorsets or shutters are) and could be vulnerable to damage and unauthorised access/being forced open. It is highly recommended that the lifts are accessed via a ground floor lobby area secured with an access-controlled, security-certified doorset (see Section 4.1), in order to prevent unauthorised access. If the proposed arrangement must remain, at the very least, the external lift doors should be secured with a security-certified shutter out-of-hours or when access is not required (also see Section 4.1).

3.3.3 The external stair to the north side of the building could provide unauthorised access to the hidden rear first floor doors of the building and could foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues if left publicly accessible. The north side of the building must be securely enclosed/gated to prevent unauthorised access to all but staff (see opposite for illustration and Section 4.5 for more information). The gate should be fitted with escape hardware if required that cannot be reached/operated from the public side of the gate. The landscaped area to the rear of the building should also be securely enclosed to prevent unauthorised access. The potentially accessible doors, windows and glazing at basement and first floor levels of the building should be to the same security specification as those at ground floor level (see Sections 4.1, 4.2 & 4.3).



3.3.4 The proposed car park should be defined by low-level railings and the vehicular access/egress point should be secured with a vehicle arm barrier or retractable bollards when the store and Synagogue is closed, to prevent unauthorised vehicles getting close to the building and prevent mis-use of the car park out-of-hours (see above for illustration and Section 4.5 for more information).

3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doorsets (both single and double leaf) at basement, ground and first floor levels should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The external entrance to the Synagogue should be a security-certified (see above), single-leaf, self-closing/locking doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. Synagogue staff/officials should be able to remotely secure and control access through the entrance door if/when required (via an audio or visual access control system), in order to prevent unseen unauthorised access to back-of-house retail areas. Ideally, there should be a dedicated lift to serve the Synagogue. If not, when disabled access is required, Synagogue staff/officials should operate the lift (i.e. it should not be possible for members of the public to freely access/operate the lift).
- ☐ Ideally, the lifts should not have external doors themselves and should be served by an internal lobby at ground floor, with an external security-certified doorset (see above). If the current arrangement must remain, the external lift doors must be secured with a shutter compliant with and certified to LPS 1175 SR2, which should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Consideration should be given to having the shutter box and guides built into the fabric of the building, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage or being forced open. The lifts themselves should only be operable by staff key-card.
- ☐ The internal doorsets to the basement retail storage area, the first floor retail storage area and the first floor office should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, secured with an electronic locking system (controlled by staff proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured a manual locking system operated by staff keys. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified doorset. The internal doors to the first floor Synagogue should be solid-core (FD30 or higher), with 3 hinges and a multi-point lock to allow it to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ Any electric locking system to be used throughout the premises should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Key-coded locks are not recommended as they can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All basement, ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).
- ☐ Any potentially accessible opening lights should be key-lockable (escape requirements permitting) and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

- ☐ Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), which should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Consideration should be given to any external shutters having shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage or being forced open.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing at basement and ground floor level, as well as any potentially accessible first floor glazing (i.e. to the external plant deck), must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any areas of external cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, low walls/planters, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows. Any fully glazed elevations to the building should be protected by anti-ram bollards or hard landscaping features.
- ☐ It is advisable that internal walls between retail and Synagogue uses should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to an anti-graffiti coating to any large expanses of blank walls (e.g. such as 'easy-on' protective coating, please see www.urbanhygiene.com for more information) that prevent it from adhering to the surface. If the surface is defaced, it can then be easily and quickly removed.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the foodstore and the Synagogue, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors to rooms with accessible windows. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder or a security patrol team).

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The excavated landscaped area to the rear of the building and northern side of the building should be enclosed with close-boarded timber fencing to a height of 2100mm, with a masonry (or other hardwearing) base where publicly accessible.
- ☐ The narrow area to the north of the building (including the external stair and refuse store) should be secured with a 2100-2400mm high metal gate along the front building line to prevent unauthorised access. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and exposed hinges/large sliding bolt apertures or locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of the gate should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. If the pedestrian gate is required to provide emergency egress, the release mechanism on the internal side of the gate should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fenceline/gate.
- ☐ The car park at the front of the building should be defined by low-level railings (e.g. 1200mm high), with the vehicular access/egress point secured with vehicle arm barriers or retractable bollards when the store/Synagogue is closed.



4.6 Car Park

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the car park should be even concrete/tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ The car park should be capable of being closed-off at night/when the premises are not operational to prevent mis-use (see Section 4.5 above).

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all building facades (including all external doors), all parking areas, the main entrances to the retail unit and the Synagogue, stair/lift lobbies at each level and all sales counters/till positions.*

4.9 Other

- ☐ Any shopping trolleys should be secured at night/when the store is closed to prevent theft/mis-use.
- ☐ It is also preferable to have cycle lockers for customers to use. If not, there should be 'sheffield' style racks (or similar) provided in a highly visible location. Cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ Any external bin stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development and servicing activities should also not require any service doors or gates to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

5 Retail Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of the retail unit should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. Design for Security understands that the designers and client may not always know who will be occupying their units once complete, and therefore, the end-users requirements. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

- 5.1.1 Clear views should also remain from the premises through to the public realm, i.e. large promotional signs should not obstruct views.
- 5.1.2 Careful consideration should be given to the location of paypoints to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrances to the unit.
- 5.1.3 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 5.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.1.5 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.1) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the Synagogue and foodstore must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the premises. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
 - Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Any cash management within the premises - consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any counter/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of any stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 6.1.2 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only areas.
- 6.1.4 Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19 th to 30 th October 2023	RPS	Email correspondence re: previous CIS put on hold & new CIS instruction
31 st October 2023	RPS	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
31 st October 2023	RPS	Quote issued & request for additional info
1 st November 2023	RPS	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional info
2 nd November 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
DA14079.2.001	Site – Location Plan	14/03/23	5
DA14079.2.006	Existing Site Plan	16/03/23	3
DA14079.2.003	Proposed GA Plans	17/02/23	14
DA14079.2.004	Proposed Elevations	16/03/23	14
DA14079.2.083	Landscape Plan – Level 0	16/03/23	10
DA14079.2.084	Landscape Plan – Level B1	14/03/23	4
JBM0030	Planning Statement	06/12/22	1

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk