



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Star Academy Radcliffe

Educational

For: **Morgan Sindall Construction**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **31/08/23**

design**for**security

Ref: **2022/0391/CIS/02**

Star Academy Radcliffe

2022/0391/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with minor security additions advised

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

The redevelopment of the site for the use as a school is welcomed. The proposed building is well located and presents no significant issues from a crime prevention perspective. To improve the overall security of the building and wider site, a number of recommendations are included, as follows:

- Security rated external doors, window frames and laminate glazing should be used.
- All elevations of the building to be illuminated with low intensity lighting from dusk-til-dawn.
- CCTV and intruder alarm systems are installed.
- Review the perimeter fencing, particularly in remote areas to ensure the wider site remains secure.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that Rochdale Planning be minded to approve the application, a condition be included to require the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation, which should be easily achievable.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated off Spring Lane in the Radcliffe district of Bury, approx. 4km south west from Bury town centre.

The area is mixed with a combination of industrial, commercial, retail and residential uses. However, the prominence along Spring Lane in this area is predominately residential. The local residential stock is a mix social housing and private ownership.

The prominent housing type in the area is Edwardian terrace housing.

Within the local estates there are a small number of community facilities; leisure centre, social clubs and places of worship.

Public transport for the area is supported by a local bus service with bus stops on Spring Lane.

Directly opposite the site, to the immediate south of the site is Radcliffe Metrolink tram stop with a large 'Park n' Ride' multi-storey car park.

The tram line embankment runs to the east of the site, connecting M/cr city centre to Bury. An existing palisade fence controls the boundary between the site and the embankment.

To the northwest of the site, beyond the existing recreational boundary are wide expanses of green space and Manchester, Bolton & Bury canal.

Main residential car parking within the area is contained on-road.




1 – View towards development site from Spring Lane.



2 – View towards the Park & Ride MSCP



3 – Nearby off-licence on Spring Lane.



7 – View north along M/cr, Bolton & Bury canal.



6 – View towards development site from the public footpath.



5 View south east along the public footpath.



4 – View towards development site from the public footpath.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2022 to 31st July 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	8	51	304	23	9	5	13	14	7

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime is average for the Bury district with less serious wounding and criminal damage having been the highest recorded offences taking place over the last 12 months. These types of crime are typical for locations situated close to town centres where there is often a concentration of retail and licensed premises leading to a higher frequency of crime and disorder issues. The majority of offences have occurred at a couple of hotspots situated throughout the local area, in the residential neighbourhoods to the south of the proposed site around Haworth Close, at Butterworth Street to the east, and at the junction of Water Street and Spring Lane to the west.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has been the most prevalent offence occurring in the local area, and has primarily taken place at the hotspots above as well as at a smaller hotspot around Radcliffe tram stop. Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious wounding offences occurring in the area, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against properties has accounted for the majority of the criminal damage occurring in the area, with offences against vehicles also occurring. Offenders have mainly used objects to damage the external doors and windows of properties, as well as glazing in vehicle windows. There have also been cases of offenders vandalising walls using graffiti.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements / tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor / accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.2 Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example with the use of high-level / overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard / soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles / bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- 2.2.3 Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely, with signage included to remind pupils and staff to remain vigilant.

- 2.2.4 Theft of insecure property belonging to students and staff, as well as school equipment

Possible Solution – As above, areas restricted to staff and officials should operate using an access control system to restrict entry. Codes / fobs should be regularly updated so that only those currently with legitimate purpose should be able to gain entry to these areas. Legitimate users should be encouraged not to allow strangers to tailgate them into restricted areas of the buildings. Facilities should be provided for pupils and staff to store their belongings securely whilst at the premises.

- 2.2.5 Posing as legitimate students / visitors enter restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – here should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the college. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely.

- 2.2.6 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of aggression
- Criminal damage to property
- Burglary
- Theft of school property, and of pupil and staff personal belongings
- Bicycle theft
- Theft of, and from, vehicles
- Arson
- Antisocial behaviour
- Acts of criminal damage, and theft of plant and machinery, during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary within educational facilities in the Bury area peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the late evening (5pm – 10pm). Offenders often target premises at this time when employees and students are unlikely to be present, it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Broken glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows.
- Posing as a legitimate student/ visitor and entering restricted areas.
- Forcing open shutters in order to access windows and doors located beneath.

2.5 Theft (Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in the Bury area peaks on a Tuesday during the morning and into the evening (9am – 6pm), peaking in the afternoon (12pm – 1:30pm). Offenders have targeted insecure bags, stored under tables, removing mobile phones and headphones. Offenders have also targeted expensive I.T equipment stored within the school.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday at midnight and in the morning. Offenders often target vehicles at night and in the morning when it is dark and they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods time, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 Proposed construction of a permanent three-storey secondary school with attached sports hall, outdoor sports facilities, car parking, landscaping and new access road from Spring Lane. Scheme to be supported by new boundary fencing.
- 3.1.2 The proposals are to include the installation of CCTV coverage, with details to be progressed as a later stage.
- 3.1.3 Full planning permission to be applied for.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site will have an access point in regular use, which allows security measures and monitoring to be focused on this location.
- 3.2.2 The principal entrance to the building is located in an obvious position facing the main access route to the site.
- 3.2.3 The proposed building is located within a defined perimeter, without elevations directly exposed to the public realm, and the building is located in a position which facilitates surveillance of the school grounds as well as the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.4 The building is rectangular in shape, avoiding any problematic, secluded recesses.
- 3.2.5 An “air lock” arrangement at the reception allows visitors to be monitored prior to further admission to the building.
- 3.2.6 The reception office is located where staff will have a good view of everyone entering and leaving the building. Visitors to the school should be contained within a secure lobby area to allow staff to vet them prior to granting further admission inside the building
- 3.2.7 The internal layout appears to be free of any potential pinch points or spaces where pupils could be cornered. The corridors / stairwells should provide sufficient circulation space to cope with the anticipated numbers of pupils, avoiding potential for bumps and collisions that can lead to more serious behavioural issues. The internal layout of the proposed building is generally uncluttered, with straight corridors, thus simplifying surveillance and removing potential pinch points or secluded spaces.
- 3.2.8 The design and layout of internal and external spaces appears to be capable being zoned, so that people are guided appropriately to where they need to go and prevented from accessing other areas. The access controls and the alarm system should be adaptable so that during any community events involving the public, the unused areas of the school building can still be secured. The access controls must be designed to ensure that the school and day-care centre can operate independently without compromising the security of either facility.
- 3.2.9 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Screening / privacy. The play areas should not be easily overlooked from adjacent premises, and measures should be included to provide appropriate privacy screening in order to reduce this potential.
- 3.3.2 Bin store. Bin stores located within the public realm are frequent targets for theft / criminal damage, and they can provide cover for other criminal and antisocial behaviour. If they cannot be located within the school building, it is advised that they should be located behind a secure fence line. Entry to the bin

store should be access-controlled. Loose bins should not be left out in communal areas or on the street for prolonged periods or overnight. A strategy should be developed to allow refuse collection without compromising the security of the site.

- 3.3.3 Cycle parking. Long-stay provision for staff (and children) should preferably be provided within a secure room within the building. External structures can be prone to criminal damage and are more vulnerable to theft unless positioned within a secure boundary line. Any short stay cycle parking should be located where it can be easily overlooked from inside the building and covered by CCTV.
- 3.3.4 Community use. Use of parts of the school by the wider community may require access to parts of the building at times when other areas are empty, often in the evenings. The design and layout of internal and external spaces should be capable of zoning, so that people are guided along safe routes to where they need to go and prevented from accessing other areas.
- 3.3.5 Lockers should be provided so that pupils can secure personal property as required.
- 3.3.6 Staff should be provided with a secure area to store personal belongings (i.e. lockers) within a secure area of the school building which is restricted to staff, such as the staff room.
- 3.3.7 Consideration should be given to the provision of secure storerooms / cages (with reinforced walls and security-certified door / gates), where expensive I.T. equipment could be stored out-of-hours. Any such valuable items should not be easy to remove and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system.
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All internal doors / frames to offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a 5 lever mortise deadlock (to BS 3621 / EN 12209), so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any shutters to protect ground floor openings must integrally-mounted and be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Roof construction

- ☐ Lightweight roofing systems must be certified to a minimum of:
 - LPS 1175: issue 5 or above, SR1
 - STS 202: Issue 1 or above, BR1

4.5 Curtain Walling

- ☐ Secured by Design recognises four distinct types of glazed wall systems. These are:
 - Large glazed units connected by 'spider clamp' system.
 - Glazed units directly retained within a framing system (usually aluminium)
 - Framed windows installed within a separate framing system.
 - Framed windows connected to other framed windows to create a window wall.
- ☐ Glazed curtain walling must be installed using a secure glazing retention system. The method of retaining glass must include one or more of the following:
 - Security glazing tape

- Dedicated security sealant or gasket
- A secure mechanical fixing system (Evidence will be required to prove the system is secure. This may be achieved by utilising the specific glazing retention test within PAS 24:2012 or by indicative test on the retention system to LPS 1175: Issue 7, SR1 or STS 202: Issue 3, BR1)

☐ Framed windows (3 and 4 above) used within the construction of a window wall must be certified to one of the following requirements:

- BS PAS 24:2016
- STS 204 Issue 3: 2012
- LPS 1175 Issue 7:2010 Security Rating 1

4.6 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:

- Main entrance doors
- Internal doors off entrance lobby
- Doors separating internal zones within the buildings

4.7 Alarms

☐ The intruder alarm should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

☐ It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.8 Boundaries

☐ New secure boundary treatments should generally be 2400mm high and of welded wire mesh construction.

☐ There should be minimal ground clearance beneath the fence, to reduce the potential for crawling in to secure areas.

☐ The site boundary treatment should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should be taken to ensure that fence panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.

☐ Where applicable secondary / internal fence lines may be lower, e.g. 1800 to 2100mm.

☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

☐ All vehicular and pedestrian gates should also be 2400mm high. There should be no centrally-located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be positioned away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of All boundary fencing should be reviewed to ensure that it provides a consistent level of security around the site.



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- ☐ Fencing separating the site frontage from secure areas should be a minimum of 2.1m high.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.10 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.11 CCTV

- ☐ CCTV Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances & lobbies](#), [building perimeter](#), [cycle parking](#).

4.12 Other

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors / televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the building. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.
- ☐ Signage and orientation. Routes leading to and from various facilities in and around the site should be obvious to site users and visitors. Disorientation can provide legitimacy for an offender to be present in a restricted area. Clear signage should be provided throughout the site which will help to direct people to where they need to go, and discourage entry to restricted areas.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to a protective coating applied to any areas that may be vulnerable to graffiti (such as large expanses of blank walls and inside toilets) - applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- ☐ Car parking - Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The designer must ensure that this report is included within the BIM management model so that all parties are aware of the requirements for construction and management.
- 5.1.2 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the development must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff and residents should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.3 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
 - Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to security features (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV, alarms, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and CCTV is not impaired.
 - Ensure that the site management is for which the building / site was designed able to cope with the remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
 - Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
07/08/2023	Tetra Tech	CIS instruction received
07/08/2023	Tetra Tech	Fee / authorisation confirmed
21/08/2023	DfS	Site visit
15/08/2023	GMP	Invoice issued
31/08/2023	GMP	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	FS 1013-AHR-XX-ZZ-D-A-3001 - Elevations	8/2023	
	FS0588-ELL-ZZ- GF-DR-W- 00101 C01GroundFloorPlan	8/2023	
	FS0588-ELL-ZZ- 01-DR-W- 00102 C02FirstFloorLayout	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-EX-ZZ-D-L-0001-Whole Site Plan	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-EX-ZZ-D-L-0103-Temps Site Location Plan-P01	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-EX-ZZ-D-L-0106-Demolition Plan-P01	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-ZZ-ZZ-D-L-0101-Temps Whole Site Plan	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-ZZ-ZZ-D-L-0103-Temps Fencing Arrangement	8/2023	
	FS1013-VS-XX-XX-D-H-0001 Proposed access road P02	8/2023	
	FS1013-VS-XX-XX-D-H-1001 Temps access road	8/2023	
	Red Line Boundary	8/2023	
	FS0588-ELL-ZZ- ZZ-DR-W- 00301 P11ExternalElevations	8/2023	
	FS1013-AHR-XX-00-D-A-2001 - Ground Floor and Sports	8/2023	
	FS1013-AHR-XX-01-D-A-2002_P06 - First Floor	8/2023	
	FS1013-AHR-XX-02-D-A-2003 - Second Floor	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-ZZ-ZZ-D-L-0012-Fencing General Arrangement	8/2023	
	FS1013-VS-XX-XX-D-H-0001 PROPOSED ACCESS ROAD P02	8/2023	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk