



# CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Stand Golf Club, Ashbourne Grove  
Residential Development and New Golf Clubhouse

FOR: WESTSHIELD LTD.

VERSION B: 6<sup>th</sup> October 2025

REFERENCE: 2024/0255/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police  
**designforsecurity**

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# Stand Gold Club, Ashbourne Grove

2024/0255/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development supported with recommendations

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

#### Retirement Apartments

- The door to the mobility scooter store should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. It should also operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Bicycle racks should allow both wheels and the frame to be secured
- A secure mail delivery system should be supplied, to allow delivery without access to the whole building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks).

#### Houses

- The parking spaces for plots no. 1-3, 10, 14, 15, 34-37 & 44 cannot be easily viewed from the dwellings due to their position at the side of the house. It is highly recommended that these spaces are illuminated to a high standard.

#### Clubhouse

- The perimeter of the building is easily accessible and could potentially generate loitering, particularly in areas which are not well overlooked. It is highly recommended that the perimeter of the buildings is illuminated with dusk-till-dawn lighting to deter antisocial, and criminal behaviour.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated into the proposed scope of work where appropriate, we would be happy to support the development.

GMP will seek the inclusion of a planning condition requiring the residential development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

Matthew Granelli

**Consultant**

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

# 1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The proposed sites are to the north east and the south of Stand Golf club.

The site is located in the Whitefield area of Bury. The boundaries of the plot to the north of the golf course (Site A) are formed by the rear boundaries of the dwellings and a mature hedge to the east. The southern boundary falls with the existing golf course. The north west boundary is formed by trees and shared with a public foot path.

The boundaries of the plot to the south of the gold course (Site B) are formed by a mature hedge row to the south west. While the others fall within the existing golf course.

The site is currently a mixture of unused land to the south and the existing golf course club house and part of the course to the north. The surrounding properties in the area are predominantly residential.



## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> March 2024 to 28<sup>th</sup> February 2025.

### Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 1000m of Site

| Domestic Burglary | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 28                | 7                     | 51              | 235                   | 26    | <5      | <5               | 9                        | 7                      | 5             |

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been above average for the Bury division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and domestic burglary having been most reported offences. The majority of these offences have occurred in the residential neighbourhoods to the northwest of the proposed site around the junction of Stand Lane with Hollinhurst Road. There has also been a small hotspot of offences to the east around Bury New Road and to the south at the junction of Stand Lane with Ringley Road.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place at all the locations mentioned above, where assaults, public order and harassment offences have been most reported. These incidents have mainly involved disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 The majority of criminal damage offences have occurred to the north/west of the site, whereby offenders have targeted vehicles parked throughout the residential neighbourhoods by using implements to dent or scratch the bodywork and smash the glazing in the windows. There have also been cases of offenders damaging fences and the external doors and windows of dwellings, which have mainly happened during disputes.
- 2.1.4 Domestic burglary offences have also occurred throughout the residential areas surrounding the site. Offenders have in most used implements in order to gain access to properties via secure doors and windows.

## 2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors or have been targeted when left insecure by residents.

*Possible Solution - All external doors and windows should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.*

*Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. All private spaces to the sides/rear of dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime (see Section 4.7).*

- 2.2.2 Smashed glazing in windows or doors.

*Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.*

- 2.2.3 Shutters have been prised open to target doors/windows behind them.

*Possible Solution – All shutters should be certified to the relevant security standards (see section 4).*

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- 2.2.4 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas to steal property.

*Possible Solution - There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work and access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls.*

## 2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:





- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

## 2.4 Risk Factors – Leisure Centres

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Uncontrolled access
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

## 2.5 Crime Rate Comparison




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **45% lower** than Bury as a whole, **46% lower** than Greater Manchester and **45% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **52% lower** than Bury as a whole, **56% lower** than Greater Manchester and **16% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **43% lower** than Bury as a whole, **49% lower** than Greater Manchester and **38% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **71% lower** than Bury as a whole, **74% lower** than Greater Manchester and **68% lower** than England & Wales.

## 2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.




2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary is highest on Saturday in the evening (20:00-21:00). Offenders often target dwellings at this time when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:


- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown' it is likely that the offender has exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements to force open secure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.

## 2.7 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Leisure/Sports Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon / early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.





- 2.7.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

## 2.8 Theft (GM Leisure/Sports Premises): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas

## 2.9 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on Friday in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders often target vehicles at these times when they tend to be left unattended and out of sight of the owners for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The development will be across two sites on the existing Stand golf course. Site A will see the demolition of the existing club house to make way for housing and apartments. Site B will be used for the development of the new club house.
- 3.1.2 Each of the houses will be served by two in-curtilage space to the property. There will be 30 no. space to the apartment building.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proportion of the proposed houses will front onto the proposed access road, allowing for clear views off/between dwellings and parked vehicles.
- 3.2.3 The houses will have habitable room windows to their front, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The footprint of the buildings has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.5 The proposed houses will be served by in-curtilage parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.6 The houses will be set back from the street with well-defined front gardens, providing a defensible space buffer between the public footway and the front of the houses.
- 3.2.7 Driveways are generally positioned where they can be overlooked from within the dwelling. The layout of the development allows residents can easily view other resident's parked vehicles allowing for mutual surveillance opportunities.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

#### **Retirement Apartments**

- 3.3.1 The door to the mobility scooter store should be security-certified and be self-closing and self-locking. It should also operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Any bicycle racks should allow both wheels and the frame to be secured.
- 3.3.2 Consideration should be given to resisting the access to the side and rear of the apartment to residents only via the use of a secure fence line and gates.
- 3.3.3 Any ground floor / accessible apartment windows and patio doors should be afforded defensible space either with a low boundary or with shrubbery - to prevent would be offenders, or those antisocially minded, from easily accessing ground floor windows and door.
- 3.3.4 External access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.5 A secure mail delivery system should be supplied, to allow delivery without access to the whole building. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks).
- 3.3.6 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.

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- 3.3.7 There should be a secondary access-controlled door into the circulation cores of the building to reduce the potential for tailgating. It is recommended that access control is provided to individual floors to further restrict access.

#### **Houses**

- 3.3.8 The parking spaces for plots no. 1-3, 10, 14, 15, 34-37 & 44 cannot be easily viewed from the dwellings due to their position at the side of the house. It is highly recommended that these spaces are illuminated to a high standard.
- 3.3.9 Boundaries adjacent publicly accessible open space should have a strip of defensible planting to protect rear boundaries.
- 3.3.10 Front gardens should be well defined with a low boundary treatment or low-level planting (i.e. to an approximate height of 1000mm).
- 3.3.11 Consideration should be given to a symbolic barrier to entry at the entrance to the development, such as a change of surface texture/colour, or brick pillars, which can convey the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.
- 3.3.12 The proposed access road should be illuminated to adoptable standard, to reduce the potential for crime and fear of crime.

#### **Clubhouse**

- 3.3.13 The perimeter of the building is easily accessible and could potentially generate loitering, particularly in areas which are not well overlooked. It is highly recommended that the perimeter of the buildings is illuminated with dusk-till-dawn lighting to deter antisocial, and criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.14 Landscaping should be carefully considered so that good sightlines can be maintained throughout the site and to facilitate natural/passive surveillance from the surrounding areas. Shrubbery should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall now lower than 2000mm.
- 3.3.15 The proposed cycle store should be restricted to genuine users. It should also operate on an access control system, operated with a key card/fob.
- 3.3.16 Landscaping to the front of the building should be designed so that the main entrance can be seen from the public highway, to allow for surveillance opportunities and deter misuse of the main entrance area by those antisocially minded.
- 3.3.17 Secure lockers must also be provided for all users and all back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible, with a secure area for staff to also store their belongings whilst at work.
- 3.3.18 Car parking areas and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high standard and in accordance with BS 5489.
- 3.3.19 Cash should not be kept on the premises overnight or stored in an insurance rated safe. Regular banking should be carried out to minimise the amount of cash on site at any one time.
- 3.3.20 The building should be covered with a monitored intruder alarm.
- 3.3.21 The development should have a comprehensive CCTV system covering both the external and internal areas of the building.
- 3.3.22 Consideration should be given to a symbolic barrier to entry at the entrance to the development, such as a change of surface texture/colour, or brick pillars, which can convey the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate reason from entering.

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## 4 Physical Security (Residential)

*In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.*

### 4.1 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access into the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access into the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access into the building.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The post-boxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). The Royal Mail should be allowed access to the lobby to allow for deliveries to the building. Consideration should also be given to a secure system for depositing parcels within a secure area, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Construction of internal walls surrounding internal apartment entrance doors (600mm either side of the door set) should incorporate a resilient layer to reduce the risk of anyone breaking through the wall to access the locking mechanism. The resilient layer should be timber (minimum thickness of 9mm) or expanded metal.

### 4.2 Doors (Dwellings)

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, STS 202 or LPS 2081 SRB.
- ☐ Any external French/double doors or sliding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

### 4.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR A, STS 204, or STS 222.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm. Windows can be fully openable from the inside to allow ventilation of the dwellings in accordance with Approved Document O but the window restrictor must reengage when the window is closed.

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## 4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

## 4.5 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:
  - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
  - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors into garages) and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

## 4.6 Access Control (Apartments)

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
  - Communal entrances
  - Parcel room
  - Refuse store
  - Staff only areas
  - Bicycle store
  - Circulation cores

## 4.7 Mobility Scooter / Bicycle Parking Areas (Apartments)

- ☐ Doors into the Mobility Scooter / cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, LPS 1175 SR2, LPS 2081 SR B, or STS 222, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners).
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

## 4.8 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries adjacent publicly accessible open space should have a strip of defensible planting to protect rear boundaries.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Gates into the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:

- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
- A key operable deadlock

## 4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).

## 4.10 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

## 4.11 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas.
- ☐ Any rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

# 5 Physical Security (Non-residential)

## 5.1 External Security

- ☐ External doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should ideally be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns. Ideally, any glazed system should be non-opening. If opening panels must be provided, they should be above 2400mm high and should be fitted with opening restrictors to prevent unauthorised access.
- ☐ Glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any ground floor glazed elevations of the building should be protected by anti-ram bollards (to LPS 1246 or BS PAS 68) or re-enforced steel risers, or other vehicle mitigation such as planters and street furniture, to deter against ram-raid type attacks.
- ☐ If shutters are to be installed, they should be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required) and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Ideally, any shutters should have shutter-boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building – where they would be less vulnerable to attack and less visually intrusive.

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- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the buildings, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

## 5.2 Internal Security

- ☐ The main entrances should be staffed at all times in the absence of physical access control measures (i.e. turnstiles).
- ☐ To mitigate the risk of theft, lockers should be provided for the club users. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all visitors must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in changing areas. Staff should undertake regular inspections of all areas of the building, including changing facilities and the locker areas.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Any cash office should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a door set certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any counter areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods.
- ☐ Internal access doors/frames to all other back-of-house areas and equipment stores should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

## 5.3 Alarms

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover both buildings, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder).

## 5.4 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be installed on areas that are staffed at certain times or days (Pro Shop, Swing Room, Function Room) to allow the areas to be secured while the main club is open.
- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - Main entrances into the buildings (if Reception is not staffed)
  - Staff only rooms (Offices, Cleaners' Store, Plant Room, Cellar, Buggy Store, Roof Access)

## 5.5 Lighting & Car Park

- ☐ Dusk till dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/lobbies. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.
- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%. Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments.
- ☐ The surface of the car park should be even tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.

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## 5.6 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV system should include cameras capable of identifying all vehicle and pedestrian movements into and around the site. Cameras should also be capable of monitor all building entrances and elevations.
- ☐ The CCTV system should be monitored by an appropriate security company and, ideally, include a public address system, allowing monitoring staff to issue an audible warning to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response generated.

## 5.7 Boundaries

- ☐ The boundary along Sherbourne St should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Existing site boundaries around the remainder of the site should be inspected for any damage and replaced or repaired where necessary. Replacement boundaries should be in keeping with the existing boundaries or to the specification below.
- ☐ Secure boundary treatments should generally be 2100mm high and of welded wire mesh construction. It is recommended that a 358-type fence panel is used in higher risk situations.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that any new panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and any gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, lighting columns, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Perimeter fencing (where exposed) should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The position of any ancillary structures (e.g. bin stores) and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
  - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
  - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.
  - Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
  - Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.

Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.

- ☐ Gates should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
  - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
  - A key operable deadlock
- ☐ Double gates should have lockable (or externally inaccessible) drop bolts to each leaf.
- ☐ The frontages of the site should be secured with bollards and retractable bollards/vehicle barriers at the vehicular entrances to the customer car parks/display areas, in order to prevent theft of vehicles and unauthorised vehicles getting close to the buildings out-of-hours.

## 5.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is

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in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.

- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots, as such features can encourage loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

## 5.9 Other

- ☐ Any cycle parking area should incorporate 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, in a highly visible location. Cyclists should be encouraged to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar and, therefore, a design of cycle stand that enables this method of locking is recommended (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>
- ☐ Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only areas.
- ☐ Staff should have clear views of changing facilities and W/Cs to monitor their use. Public toilets themselves can give rise to crime and anti-social behaviour issues and the following issues should be considered:
  - Avoid areas where items such as drug paraphernalia can be hidden (e.g. suspended ceilings). Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work, etc. should be used. Services where possible should be accessed from outside the facility.
  - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
  - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening. This will aid gaining access to collapsed persons. Opaque panels can be used to great effect to ensure no persons are collapsed inside, whilst preserving privacy. This measure discourages drug taking and facilitates staff checks. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 20 centimetres from the floor and to reduce the top height.
  - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
  - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karabiner style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.

- 5.9.1 Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

## 6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of the building, including staff arrival and departure.
  - Cash management within the premises.
  - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs).
  - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods).
  - Details of staff security training.

- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc.
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter, etc. and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable, and up to date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures, and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

- 6.1.2 All high value equipment (e.g. high value portable sporting equipment, computers, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 6.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house areas.
- 6.1.4 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

## 7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 8 Useful References

### 8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date     | Contact With    | Summary of Contact      |
|----------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 24/02/25 | Paddock Johnson | CIS Application         |
| 24/02/25 | DFS             | CIS Fee Proposal        |
| 26/02/25 | Paddock Johnson | CIS Confirmation        |
| 28/02/25 | DFS             | Site Visit              |
| 29/05/25 | Paddock Johnson | Drawings Issued         |
| 01/10/25 | Paddock Johnson | Revised Drawings Issued |
|          |                 |                         |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.                 | Drawing Title                                            | Date | Rev |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------|-----|
| 23036-PJA-00-ZZ-DR-A-1000   | Overall Site- Location Plan                              |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-01-ZZ-DR-A-2400   | Apartment Section A-A                                    |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AP-00-DR-A-2001-A | Ground Floor Plan                                        |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AP-01-DR-A-2002-A | First Floor Plan                                         |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AP-02-DR-A-2003-A | Second Floor Plan                                        |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AP-03-DR-A-2004-A | Third Floor Plan                                         |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AP-L1-DR-A-2000-A | Lower Ground Floor Plan                                  |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AP-RF-DR-A-2005-A | Roof Plan                                                |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AP-ZZ-DR-A-2200-B | Elevations 1 of 2                                        |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AP-ZZ-DR-A-2201-B | Elevations 2 of 2                                        |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-01-ZZ-DR-A-1410   | Illustrative Street Scenes                               |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A1-ZZ-DR-A-2000-A | Block A1 – Floor Plans – 2B4P – Plots 20-21              |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A1-ZZ-DR-A-2200-A | Block A1 – Elevations – 2B4P – Plots 20-21               |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A2-ZZ-DR-A-2000-A | Block A2 – Floor Plans – 2B4P – Plots 44-45              |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A2-ZZ-DR-A-2200-A | Block A2 – Elevations – 2B4P – Plots 44-45               |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A3-ZZ-DR-A-2000-A | Block A3 – Floor Plans – 2B4P – Plots 11, 12, 13         |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A3-ZZ-DR-A-2200-A | Block A3 – Elevations – 2B4P – Plots 11, 12, 13          |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A4-ZZ-DR-A-2000-B | Block A4 – Floor Plans – 2B4P – Plots 9-10               |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A4-ZZ-DR-A-2200-C | Block A4 – Elevations – 2B4P – Plots 9-10                |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A5-ZZ-DR-A-2000-A | Block A5 – Floor Plans – 2B4P – Plots 16-17              |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-A5-ZZ-DR-A-2200-A | Block A5 – Elevations – 2B4P – Plots 16-17               |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AB-ZZ-DR-A-2000-A | Block AB – Floor Plans – 2B4P & 3B6P – Plots 38-41       |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-AB-ZZ-DR-A-2200-C | Block AB – Elevations – 2B4P & 3B6P – Plots 38-41        |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-B1-ZZ-DR-A-2000-C | Block B1 – Floor Plans – 3B5P – Plots 1-2, 30-31 & 42-43 |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-B1-ZZ-DR-A-2200-C | Block B1 – Elevations – 3B5P – Plots 1-2, 30-31 & 42-43  |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-B2-ZZ-DR-A-2000-A | Block B2 – Floor Plans – 3B6P – Plots 23, 25, 27         |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-B2-ZZ-DR-A-2200-A | Block B2 – Elevations – 3B6P – Plots 23, 25, 27          |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-B3-ZZ-DR-A-2000-B | Block B3 – Floor Plans – 3B5P – Plots 18-19              |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-B3-ZZ-DR-A-2200-B | Block B3 – Elevations – 3B5P – Plots 18-19               |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-B4-ZZ-DR-A-2000-B | Block B4 – Floor Plans – 3B5P – Plots 7-8                |      |     |
| 23036-PJA-B4-ZZ-DR-A-2200-C | Block B4 – Elevations – 3B5P – Plots 7-8                 |      |     |

|                             |                                                            |  |  |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|
| 23036-PJA-B5-ZZ-DR-A-2000-B | Block B5 – Floor Plans – 3B5P – Plots 14-15, 34-35 & 36-37 |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-B5-ZZ-DR-A-2200-B | Block B5 – Elevations – 3B5P – Plots 14-15, 34-35 & 36-37  |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-B6-ZZ-DR-A-2000-B | Block B6 – Floor Plans – 3B5P – Plots 3-4                  |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-B6-ZZ-DR-A-2200-B | Block B6 – Elevations – 3B5P – Plots 3-4                   |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-B7-ZZ-DR-A-2000   | Block B7 – Floor Plans – 3B5P – Plots 5-6 & 32-33          |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-B7-ZZ-DR-A-2200   | Block B7 – Elevations – 3B5P – Plots 5-6 & 32-33           |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-C1-ZZ-DR-A-2000-B | Block C1 – Floor Plans – 4B6P – Plots 22, 24, 26, 28 & 29  |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-C1-ZZ-DR-A-2200-B | Block C1 – Elevations – 4B6P – Plots 22, 24, 26, 28 & 29   |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-01-ZZ-DR-A-1200-E | Proposed Site Plan Housing Mix – Site A                    |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-01-ZZ-DR-A-1202   | Boundary Treatment Plan – Site A                           |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-CH-ZZ-DR-A-2000-  | Proposed Floor Plans                                       |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-CH-ZZ-DR-A-2200-  | Proposed Elevations                                        |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-02-ZZ-DR-A-1205-D | Proposed Site Layout – Site B Full Extents                 |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-XX-XX-PP-A-9502-A | Community Consultation Boards                              |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-XX-XX-PP-A-9503   | Presentation Slides                                        |  |  |
| 23036-PJA-XX-XX-RP-A-9500   | Design and Access Statement                                |  |  |

**PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.**

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made                                            | Date     |
|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| A       | -                                                         | 18/06/25 |
| B       | CIS updated in line with revised drawings issued 01/10/25 |          |