CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Prestwich Town Centre

Mixed use development

For: **Prestwich Regeneration LLP Joint Venture Partnership**

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Version A: **06/10/23**

Ref: **2023/0286/CIS/01**

Prestwich Town Centre

2023/0286/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The overall masterplan layout is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more depth within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed when developing detailed proposals for future development, and these include:-

- Access & maintenance
- Landscaping design and features
- Quality of public spaces to complement planned developments & vice versa
- Public realm located in activity nodes to promote passive surveillance
- Street lighting
- Streetscape furniture and landscaping

The proposed masterplan has been assessed in its entirety and understands that individual plots will come forward for development in due course. Our recommendations within the document cover the wider remit of the proposal. Further Crime Impact Statement reports will be required for each development plots as and when required. However, we recommend that Design for Security is consulted during the early stages of design development to embed the security and safety requirements.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the overall strategy for development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police; Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added requiring the development to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located in Prestwich Town Centre in Bury. The site is bounded in part by Bury New Rd, Rectory Lane form the boundary east and south and Fairfax Rd divides the site, with the north of Fairfax Rd being an unsecured surface grade car park. The south of Fairfax Rd containing a library, shop units, NHS heath centre and a further surface grade car park.

The northern car park displays signs of graffiti, street drinks, drug use and drug paraphernalia. This car park shares a boundary with the Metrolink line consisting of a weld mesh fence. The Metrolink side is made up of a steep embankment with dense self-seeded vegetation. There is clear evidence of fly tipping, drug use and drug paraphernalia which has emanated from the car park side. On the west side of the north car park the boundary is formed with a masonry wall which forms the rear garden wall to a number of residential properties and the perimeter wall of a church.

The Bury Line of the Metrolink runs along the east boundary with the Prestwich Stop in the immediate vicinity. There are 2 bridges on the Metrolink line with passageways under the metro line, the first is Fairfax Rd which is a road for vehicles and pedestrian. The other is a pedestrian only path. These connect the village centre, Metrolink and residential district to the east. Both show signs of graffiti.

Rectory Lane to the south currently has limited natural surveillance from the current development. To the south of Rectory Lane is St Mary's C of E primary school and social housing flats to the southeast (currently under repair).


1 – View down the main pedestrian concourse.

2 – View down the main pedestrian concourse.


3 – View of the underpass


7 – Entrance of service yard road denoted with change in surface material.


6 – View south along Bury New Rd.


5 – Road and service yard.


4 – Main courtyard containing a monument.

Produced by Greater Manchester Police

Bury New Road is a busy arterial road into M/cr city centre from the Junction 17 of the M60. The road combines a mix of commercial/retail/leisure/residential uses which provide high levels of activity throughout the day & evening. Bury New Road is heavily used for bus services for the city centre.

There are several well-established residential buildings within the vicinity, developed over the last 15 years.

Parts of the town centre area are partially pedestrianized. Several buildings provide commercial/retail ground floor uses, some with external seating areas onto the pedestrianized streets supporting the revitalization of the area.

Parking is in high demand within the area, partly due to the proximity to the Metrolink stop and the high density of dwellings in the area, together with limited on-street parking.


9 – View of church and residential boundary wall with graffiti.


8 – View from surface car park showing the boundary wall with church.


7 – View of surface car park.


6 – View west along Fairfax Rd.


5 – Fairfax Rd passing under the Metrolink Line.


4 – View of the NHS centre at the intersection of Rectory Ln & Fairfax Rd.




1 – View of the underpass.


2 – View of the back of the Library.


3 – View of the surface car park at the rear od the Library.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2022 to 31st August 2023.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
29	18	35	229	68	17	<5	21	14	<5

2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is average for the Bury division, with less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage having been the highest recorded offences taking place. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a higher concentration of crime and disorder issues. Whilst the offences are occurring throughout the local area there is a hotspot of offences occurring at the retail outlets on the south of the proposed site, and another hotspot at the restaurants further to the south of the site along Bury New Road.

2.1.2 Less serious woundings have been taking place throughout the local area, particularly at the two hotspots mentioned above as well as at a smaller hotspot around Prestwich tram stop. Assaults and harassment offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings offences taking place. with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most commonly reported

2.1.3 The majority of theft offences have occurred in the retail outlets and restaurants throughout the local area with offenders targeting items and bags left unattended on tabletops and benches. There has also been cases of items and objects being removed from gardens in the residential neighbourhoods around the site, as well as offenders using pickpocketing and distraction methods in order to obtain items stored on the person.

2.1.4 Criminal damage against vehicles and dwellings has accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place in the local area. Offenders have primarily used objects and bodily pressure to smash the glazing in windows of vehicles and the external doors of properties. There have also been some cases of arson offences, whereby offenders have set items and bins alight.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 **Existing crime patterns:** In and around the site, the levels of the following crime types are average rates for Greater Manchester. Below are associated crime types within and around the site boundary with further detailed examples of common M.O's:

- Miscellaneous theft (frequently occurring in shops or in cafes / bars where customers leave property unattended).
- Less serious wounding (much of this kind of disorder is alcohol-related).
- Theft of pedal cycles (most of these crimes occur where bikes have been left in public areas, either locked to fencing or cycle stands).
- Criminal damage (the principal targets have been parked vehicles).
- Personal robbery (a large proportion of victims have lost mobile phones, purses, handbags, and electronic devices).

2.2.2 **Residential:** Offenders posing as residents to gain access to restricted areas

To minimise the risk of offenders tailgating through communal doors:

- external entry doors should be self-closing and lock securely upon closure – use PAS24 rated doors with locking system tested as part of the doorset
- install a secondary set of secure doors, also self-closing and self-locking
- install lifts that are operated by a fob or card access control system

- install CCTV in the lobby
- employ a concierge
- apartment doors should be self-closing with a thumb turn lock on the inner side that meets fire regulations, with clear, yet discreet, permanent instructions on the door to inform the resident that the door is not secure until the lock is turned.

2.2.3 **Commercial:** Theft of personal property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from the premises:

- access control systems should be employed to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering buildings, especially offices and staff rooms, where sensitive information, expensive equipment, or staff belongings may be stored
- overt signage can also assist in deterring casual entry
- Include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers or lockable drawers.

2.2.4 **Retail:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

To minimise the risk of offenders gaining access to staff only areas:

- access control systems should be considered to secure sensitive areas of the premises – e.g. staff rest room, kitchen, office and store room
- staff should be required to wear an appropriate form of clearly visible ID and/or a company uniform
- all doors separating public areas from staff only areas should be monitored by CCTV
- Small, valuables lockers should be provided for staff to secure their personal effects within a secure room.

2.2.5 **All uses:** Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open.
- 'recess-free' entrances should be installed so that entrance doors are visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street'. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed.
- All external entrance doors should be illuminated with dusk til dawn light. Light suggests a property may be occupied and may deter offenders from targeting a premise. Lighting will also support CCTV systems and highlight the actions of an offender, increasing the chance of a crime being witnessed.
- CCTV should be considered to record activity within and around exterior of the building.

2.2.6 **All uses:** Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows or to reduce the risk of criminal damage to glazing:

- glazing to doors and windows should include laminate glass, which is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open an unlocked window or to climb through
- where feasible, ground floor window frames should be certified to the PAS 24 standard, fitted with key operated locks and opening restrictors

shutters to particularly vulnerable openings should be powder coated, perforated and be certified to LPS 1175 security rating 1 and installed internally.

2.3 Residential Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Risk Factors – Offices

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Risk Factors – Leisure

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Other theft from premises
- Theft of / from parked cars
- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Cash robbery / attacks on vending machines
- Controlled access (staff / user only)
- Safety of children
- Loitering groups
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Robbery
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings / private space

2.7 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Bury and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2017.

Comparison of Burglary Dwelling Rates at Site (Km), Bury, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Wounding Rates at Site (Km), Bury, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (Km), Bury, and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (Km), Bury, and Greater Manchester



2.7.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **11% higher** than Bury as a whole, **8% higher** than Greater Manchester and **11% higher** than England & Wales.

2.7.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **9% lower** than Bury as a whole, **16% lower** than Greater Manchester and **60% higher** than England & Wales.

2.7.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **25% lower** than Bury as a whole, **32% lower** than Greater Manchester and **17% lower** than England & Wales.

2.7.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **13% higher** than Bury as a whole, **2% higher** than Greater Manchester and **24% higher** than England & Wales.

2.8 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

Burglary dwelling – Day Range



Burglary dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry



2.8.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Thursday at midnight (00:00-01:00). Offenders often target properties in the evening when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.8.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
- In cases where the point of entry has been recorded as "unknown", it is likely that the offenders have targeted insecure windows and doors.
- Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors or tailgating residents and gaining access to the communal areas.

2.9 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against office, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.

Bury Office Burglary – Day Range



Bury Office Burglary – Time Range



Bury Office Burglary – Point of Entry



2.9.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary at office premises in Bury peaks on Friday/during the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified. Offenders also target office buildings during the day, when they are busy, as employees are likely to be distracted and offenders can often go about their business unnoticed/unchallenged.

2.9.2 Point of Entry: In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been the occurred most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.10 Theft (Bury Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against office, recorded in the Bury area.

Bury Office Theft – Day Range



Bury Office Theft – Time Range



2.10.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of theft at Bury offices is greatest on Wednesday and Thursday and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking in the afternoon. During these times, many office workers will take breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Bags, purses/wallets and mobile phones were the most frequently stolen items.

2.11 Non-Domestic Burglary (Retail Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail premises, recorded in the Bury area during 2018-2019.

Burglary Other – Day Range



Burglary Other – Time Range



Burglary Other – Point of Entry



2.11.1 Day/Time Range: The risk of burglary at retail premises in Bury peaks on a Monday, Thursday and Sunday during the late evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target businesses during this time as they are often closed, with no staff presence, and la reduced volume of footfall within the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught.

2.11.2 Point of Entry: In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open shutters using tools in order to gain access to windows and doors.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors/ tailgating staff in order to access restricted areas.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows.

2.12 Theft (Retail Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail premises, recorded in the Bury area during 2018 - 2019.

Misc Theft – Day Range



Misc Theft – Time Range



Day/Time Range: The risk of theft from retail premises in Bury peaks on a Thursday during the morning and into the afternoon, peaking between 1pm – 3pm. Offenders have removed items belonging to the business as well as personal belongings of employees (mostly bags and mobile phones). Offenders have gained access to staff rooms by means of insecure entry points. Offenders have also used pick pocketing techniques in order to remove mobile phones, purses and money of customers

2.13 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

GM Community Centre Burglary – Day Range



GM Community Centre Burglary – Time Range



GM Community Centre Burglary – Point of Entry



2.13.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester community centres remains relatively consistent, with the exception of Tuesday – when it is slightly lower. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the early hours of the morning and during the early evening. At night, when it is dark and streets are quiet, offenders often perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the early evening, community centres are likely to be at their busiest, meaning offenders posing as legitimate patrons can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.13.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and M.O.s have been the occurred most frequently:

- The majority of incidents have occurred through 'unknown' entry points, which is likely to have been where offenders posing as legitimate service users have gained entry to internal restricted areas by forcing doors, by tailgating or by targeting insecure doors unnoticed.
- Doors (particularly fire doors) have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements/tools or have been targeted when left insecure to gain access.
- Windows have also been prised open and targeted when insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Shutters have been forced upwards/penetrated to gain access to the doors and windows behind them.

2.14 Theft (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

Greater Manchester Community Centre Theft – Day Range



Greater Manchester Community Centre Theft – Time Range



2.14.1 Day/Time Range: Incidents of theft at Greater Manchester community centres peak on Monday and are lowest on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon/early evening. This aligns with the standard opening and closing times for many community centres, when more people attend them and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. The most routinely targeted items are items of personal property belong to patrons and staff members, particularly laptops, mobile phones and handbags.

2.15 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

Vehicle Crime – Day Range



Vehicle Crime – Time Range



Day/Time Range: The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday at midday (12:00-13:00). Offenders often target vehicles at this time during the working week when they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 Hybrid Application formed of two components:

3.1.2 The **detailed component**, proposing the demolition of existing buildings, and the erection of a mixed use development comprising community, retail and commercial floorspace alongside a multi storey car park.

3.1.3 The **outline component**, proposing the erection of a mixed-use development comprising residential, retail and commercial uses.

3.1.4 This masterplan is a long-term proposal that provides a well-designed layout to guide future growth and development. The proposed plan seeks to make connections between buildings, social settings, and their surrounding environments.

3.1.5 The site covers a wide area encompassing numerous use typologies. Within and around the site are several transport links and public routes and connections; these links provide the opportunity which will embed and connect communities around the site.

3.1.6

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The proposed masterplan seeks to create a connected community through enhancing existing routes and links across the public realm; in doing so this will allow economic growth for the area through the proposed development and forged new links. New development will encourage emerging new businesses and communities to develop within and around the proposed site thus supporting the future development and growth of the site.

3.2.2 The redevelopment of the sites will remove buildings and redevelop public realm spaces which have been a generator of criminal activity.

3.2.3 Each of the building plots should provide good levels of ground floor activity; in-turn the building uses will offer good levels of activity and natural surveillance of the adjacent community space and public realm.

3.2.4 The main public realm circulation routes are obvious, leading people directly to where they need to go. The proposals are intended to integrate with surrounding circulation routes.

3.2.5 The redevelopment of the area will provide an interesting and diverse use; offering opportunity for employment, interesting and safer public realm with a chance to create an exciting destination.

3.2.6 The new shared surface road layouts, pedestrian routes and connections will create an interesting landscape opportunity across the Masterplan. The hard & soft landscaping will help to generate a sense of place, pride and ownership in the community and create new links to existing neighbourhoods.

3.2.7 The proposed development will result in an increase in footfall in the area, improving vitality across the wider area, providing additional natural surveillance, which can help promote a greater sense of safety on the street.

3.2.8 The recognised approach to creating a safer public realm and cycle corridors supports an environment in which people want to live, work and visit.

3.2.9 The public realm of the proposal is permeable, allowing pedestrian movement to be concentrated on the newly created boulevards and spaces between development blocks. Building use activities are strategically placed to animate new streetscapes and open public spaces. Communal residential and commercial facilities are also well located helping to promote activity and surveillance across new vistas.

3.2.10 Security measure carefully incorporated into the environment and building design can ensure that buildings and the environment is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime or safety. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include

security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Public Realm influences over crime patterns.

3.3.1 Features of the physical environment can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

3.3.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- being located on well-trafficked streets and overlooked by routinely occupied buildings. The site is subject to surveillance by local businesses and residents as well as passers-by on foot and in cars. The casual observations by residents and passers-by may deter some offenders.
- the site is well connected to neighbouring districts via public transport or the road network. Pedestrian routes are generally busy during the daytime; particularly that they pass from Bury New Road to the Tram stop or Fairfax Road to Heys Road;
- The town centre includes commercial spaces, community and leisure uses with largely 'active' frontages and regular pedestrian flows, especially during the working day.

3.3.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder and the fear of crime, these include:

- A development in this location, is very likely to attract the interest of criminals should they become aware of it whilst going about their everyday activities. Opportunists, criminal damage to buildings, theft and bicycle crime are all likely to affect a development on this site.
- Any vacant buildings and/or plots of vacant land in the vicinity of the site sometimes attract those intent on criminal damage (e.g. smashing glazing and graffiti), burglary and theft (particularly metals).
- A site wide management strategy should work in tandem with existing and new community and business uses. Any door staff at leisure uses should be present to monitor queues and keep them flowing when appropriate, as patrons enter and leave the premises.

3.3.4 The design and layout of the public realm surrounding the blocks should be carefully considered. It should not include any hard/soft landscaping features that may impede surveillance opportunities or foster nuisance, anti-social behaviour or misuse. The following issues should be addressed with the public realm/landscaping strategy (also see Section 4.7):

- The proposed public realm features and any changes in ground levels, with step/ramp features to accommodate them. Such features can sometimes impede surveillance opportunities and provide features that can be mis-used. These features, as well as benches and any other hard landscaping features, should be designed to deter and withstand any such treatment and to maximise surveillance opportunities of/from them.
- Public realm furniture items should be robust to sustain constant daily use and form part of the management and maintenance regime. Damaged features which are not tended to over a period can lead to further decline and respect for the area.
- In particular, the potential to foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues at night. The central public realm area will benefit from levels of footfall, activity and will rely on passive surveillance from the commercial and residential properties overlooking this area. The area must be well-lit and

designed to maximise surveillance opportunities and eliminate hiding places. Any windows or doors adjacent to these areas may also need additional protection.

3.3.5 Any cycle parking areas located throughout the public realm area should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied areas.

3.3.6 The long-term redevelopment of the area should seek to address and remove the concealment and shelter provided by structures and improve visual links between spaces, green spaces, buildings, and adjacent streets / premises.

3.3.7 The development of the public realm space would encourage further significant pedestrian footfall in the area, with people spending longer in the area, rather than it simply being passed through as part of a journey from A to B. The aspirations of the plans also seek to extend the use of this space beyond event times.

3.3.8 Engagement at the very early RIBA stages has previously proven to afford those involved in the development the opportunity to 'build-in' protective measures, which often results in more aesthetically pleasing, cost-effective measures in the long-run

3.4 Considerations and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

3.4.1 The layout appears generally free of obstacles to vision allowing people to see and be seen within the area and maintains sight lines across the site. Planting and street furniture has been aligned to avoid creating potential hiding places and avoids blocking sight lines. However, the choice of trees and other plant species should allow some visible permeability through the canopies and foliage so that people cannot be concealed within the public spaces.

3.4.2 Street furniture and landscape features should be used to prevent unwanted parking or access onto pedestrian only surfaces. It should be very clear in which spaces, or on which streets, vehicle parking is authorised.

3.4.3 The junctions between newly formed traffic free/controlled pedestrianised zones and existing traffic roads should be carefully considered. Maintenance of newly installed control measure (rising bollards, lighting, gates, and all access control features), should be incorporated into the management & maintenance procedures.

3.4.4 The principal entrances should be in prominent positions, which are readily apparent from the street. Approaches to the buildings for pedestrians are along routes that have good sightlines.

3.4.5 When considering the positions and density of tree planting the design team should be cognisant of the need to allow casual supervision of space from the adjacent premises and improve the spread of lighting and CCTV coverage.

3.4.6 Lighting should provide good visual guidance and orientation, and support visibility for pedestrians, cyclists as well as for motorists. Due to the poor spread of light, bollard lighting is not encouraged.

3.4.7 As the proposed public spaces and plots are developed consideration needs to be given towards external lighting. The proposals are to incorporate a lighting scheme that will distribute illumination evenly around the space without areas of shadowing or pooling and work coherently with the wider security requirements of the site such as CCTV.

3.4.8 Consideration should be given to the waste collection, storage, and disposal arrangements for the various types of premises fronting the upgraded public realm. It is not acceptable for bins to be left on the street for extended periods where they can block sight lines, provide potential hiding places and targets for arson or criminal damage.

3.4.9 Public cycle parking should be included in areas of greatest activity. It should be located where it does not obstruct circulation yet is well overlooked from surrounding buildings and by-passing pedestrians, and, ideally, monitored by CCTV.

3.4.10 Consideration for safe bicycle storage should be embedded within the landscape design. Short-stay cycle parking stands should be located where they can be readily observed. The location of cycle stores within proposed buildings should consider the position, inherent physical security and safety of cyclists using the facility.

3.4.11 Future developments should exploit the public realm, ensuring that there are active edges to the streetscape which can help to increase the accessibility of such spaces to user groups who may feel more vulnerable in such spaces and who are of lower mobility. The greater the use of these spaces the less likely they will be populated by those acting anti-socially.

3.4.12 Consider the creation of a *'Friends of'* and *'Local business'* groups, to support the management and maintenance of the public realm.

3.4.13 As and when building plots and sites within the masterplan come forward for development, we recommend the engagement of Design for Security involvement at the earliest opportunity during design development.

3.4.14 It is essential that all the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.

☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.

☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.

☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead.

☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.

☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

☐ If an alarm is installed, then it should comply with either:

- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
- BS 6799 for wireless systems

☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:

- Main Entrance doors
- Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies

- Bin stores
- Cycle stores
- Staff-only areas
- Communal garden

4.6 CCTV

☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.

☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Main entrances, foyer, stairs, lift lobbies, landings, cycle stores, bin store entrances.

4.7 Other

☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.

☐ Any externally mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.

☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.

☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Physical security (none-residential)

All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.

5.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection, the minimum certification required is:
  - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
  - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

5.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. Additional fuse spurs should be incorporated into each apartment to allow residents the option of installing a private alarm for their property.

5.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric keypads. The following doors should operate on access control:
  - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
  - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
  - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g., storage / server / locker rooms)
  - Cycle store

5.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

- ☐ Dusk ‘til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce ‘white’ light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high- and low-pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

5.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g., trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images, then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are ‘Overview’ and ‘Recognition’, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
22/08/2023	Asteer Planning LLP	CIS instruction received
23/08/2023	Asteer Planning LLP	Fee / authorisation confirmed
21/09/2023	JM Architects	Design presentation
26/09/2023	DfS	Site visit
04/09/2023	GMP	Invoice issued
06/10/2023	GMP	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
207-JMA-MP-00-DR-A-001200	Ground Floor GA Plan	01/06/23	
207-JMA-MP-01-DR-A-001201	1st Floor GA Plan	01/06/23	
207-JMA-MP-02-DR-A-001202	2nd Floor GA Plan	01/06/23	
207-JMA-MP-RF-DR-A-001204	Roof Plan GA Plan	01/06/23	
207-JMA-MP-XX-DR-A-252201	Aerial View	01/06/23	
207-JMA-MP-XX-DR-A-252202	Aerial View	01/06/23	
207-JMA-MP-XX-DR-A-252203	Aerial View	01/06/23	
207-JMA-MP-XX-DR-A-252204	Aerial View	01/06/23	
207-JMA-MP-XX-DR-A-252205	Aerial View	01/06/23	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999
General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012
General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)
Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

a) Resistance of glazing

b) Performance of hardware

c) Resistance to static loading

d) Resistance to dynamic loading

e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)
Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012
Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011
Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT
Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS
Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT
Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)
A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)
A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.
UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)
The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security
www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design
www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector
www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live
www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre
www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life
www.buildingforlife.org
CLG (Communities and Local Government)
www.communities.gov.uk