



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

LAND OFF FLETCHER FOLD ROAD, BURY
INDEPENDENT LIVING SCHEME FOR OVER 55s
(40 no. APARTMENTS & 4 no. BUNGALOWS)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Bolton at Homes

VERSION A: 11/03/2024

REFERENCE: 2023/0563/CIS/01

Land off Fletcher Fold, Bury

URN: 2023/0563/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Measures should be incorporated to address the risks of the public footpath crossing through the site and along the southern boundary, including:
 - Separation of footpath and parking areas with low-level railings and defensive planting;
 - Symbolic barriers to bungalow and apartment block sites to discourage anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering;
 - Any branches or vegetation growing through or directly over the retained Palisade fencing should be removed or pruned; and
 - The existing dense vegetation along the 'private' side of the retained Palisade fenceline should be retained and supplemented with new defensive planting to further discourage unauthorised access.
- Replacement of any external patio doors to the ground floor apartments along the frontage of the apartment building with windows (which would be less vulnerable to being left insecure, being forced open or being damaged) or securely enclosure them within private terraces if they are to be provided.
- Protection to potentially vulnerable side boundary of Plot 1, which directly abuts the existing narrow footpath linking Fletcher Fold Road/Goshen Lane and Manchester Road.
- Robust control of access into the apartment building, including a secure system for the delivery of post/parcels.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies at the end of Fletcher Fold Road (a residential cul-de-sac) in south Bury. It is the former site of Millwood School, which was demolished and cleared in 2021, leaving areas of hard standing and scrub vegetation/mature trees. The ground level of the site falls away to the east and south.


To the north-east of the site is Goshen Lane – an unadopted route serving some residential dwellings (including the Grade II Listed The Manor House, The Crest and The Nook, as well as the gated scheme of Manor Gardens) and providing access to a pedestrian route linking to Scott Avenue and Goshen Sports Centre to the north-east.

To the north-west of the site is a narrow pedestrian route running between the site and along the side of the existing dwellings, which links Fields Fold Road/Goshen Lane to Manchester Road.

There is a public right of way running through the site, linking Fletcher Fold Road to the north to Millwood Court to the south-west and Meadoway (and Mill Reservoir) to the south-east. A large proportion of the narrow route runs between the southern boundary of the site (formed by 2100mm high Palisade fencing and some mature trees/vegetation) and the existing wooded area to the south (with chain link fencing and mature tree/vegetation along the route) – meaning it benefits from little/no direct overlooking or passive surveillance.

Given the pedestrian routes/links surrounding and running through it, the site is extremely permeable. Where numerous routes exist, this can dilute legitimate use and provide opportunities for offenders to exploit.

Where open land or routes run to the side and rear of buildings and dwellings, they can often lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and adjacent properties can be vulnerable to unauthorised access - as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance or direct overlooking. Secluded routes can also leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly after dark.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2023 to 29th February 2024.



2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
10	<5	12	92	7	<5	<5	<5	6	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is low for the Bury district, although the area does include large areas of open space and low-density industrial units that typically attract fewer crime and disorder issues. The majority of crime has occurred around/off Tennyson Avenue to the north and Tennyson Avenue to the north and around/off Wellfield Close/Britain Street to the west, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and domestic burglary the most commonly occurring.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area and have mostly consisted of assaults, harassment and public order offences. These have often taken place within dwellings during domestic disputes or between known associates. Criminal damage offences have mostly occurred to the north of the site, with offenders primarily smashing windows or damaging doors. Some incidents of youths causing damage on off-road vehicles and incidents of arson in woodland have also been reported.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to an independent living over 55s scheme, the more detailed analysis below will look at local residential burglary and vehicle crime, as well as crimes at Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes.


2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)

The rates below relate to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2023.




- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **32% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **33% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **32% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **35% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **41% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **13% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

Comparison of Criminal Damage Rates at Site (km), Bury and Greater Manchester



Comparison of Vehicle Crime Rates at Site (km), Bury and Greater Manchester




2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **54% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **58% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **49% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **19% lower** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **27% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **11% lower** than the rate for England & Wales.


2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Local Domestic Burglary – Day Range



Local Domestic Burglary – Time Range




Local Domestic Burglary – Point of Entry



- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday and is lowest on Wednesday and Saturday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the early hours of the morning, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.
- 2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:
- Secure doors and windows to the front and rear of properties have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements to gain entry.
 - Offenders have targeted insecure doors and windows to gain access without being noticed.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Wednesday and Saturday during the week, and during the early hours of the morning – when offenders often perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or identified. Vans and cars have been targeted (for theft of and theft from vehicle), primarily when parked on driveways of individual properties.

2.5 Care Home/Sheltered Scheme Burglary, Theft & Criminal Damage: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to burglary, theft and criminal damage offences within/against care homes/sheltered schemes, recorded across the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

- 2.5.1 In terms of care homes/sheltered schemes across Greater Manchester, the risk of burglary is concentrated in the late evening and the early hours of the morning. At these times, residents are likely to be asleep or in their rooms and staffing levels are likely to be lower, allowing criminals to operate without being detected. The majority of burglaries at Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes have occurred through doors to the front and the rear of premises and through rear windows. In a number of burglaries, force has not been required to gain entry - offenders have often exploited freely accessible areas and open bedroom windows/doors to steal property. Most miscellaneous thefts occur during the afternoon and the evening, when residents are likely to be out of their rooms for longer periods of time - leaving insecure rooms, items of personal property and cash vulnerable to theft unseen/unnoticed. Care homes/sheltered schemes have also suffered from incidents of criminal damage – particularly the smashing of external glazing in the evening.

2.6 General Risk Factors

2.6.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.7 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.7.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting residential properties/vehicles in the local area and Greater Manchester care homes/sheltered schemes are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Local Residential:** Doors and windows have been forced open or targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to the apartment block before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles (see Section 4.1), essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

- **Local Vehicle Crime:** Vehicles have been targeted when parked on driveways

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment buildings or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

-
- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Offenders with legitimate access, or appearing to be legitimate, stealing property from residents

Possible Solution – All external doors should be security-certified and there should be a secure access control system in place to vet legitimate visitors and prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.1). All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour, as well as encourage residents to store their personal valuables securely. Procedures should also be in place to control/manage access to those other than everyday visitors e.g. tradesmen, deliveries etc.

- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Theft of insecure property through open ground floor windows and burglary where access is gained through insecure windows/doors

Possible solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should be security-certified with key operated locks and opening restrictors (see Section 4.2). Any external patio doors to ground floor apartments/living spaces fronting onto the street/publicly accessible areas may be vulnerable to unauthorised access - either from bogus callers, being forced open or being left insecure - and it is recommended they are not incorporated into such schemes. Staff should try and encourage residents to be vigilant and to close and lock windows and doors to rooms which are not being used.

- **Greater Manchester Care Homes/Sheltered Schemes:** Incidents of criminal damage, where external glazing has been smashed.

Possible solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Any accessible residential windows at ground floor level should be protected by some defensible space, to define them as entirely separate from the street and protect them from unauthorised access, as well as damage, nuisance and anti-social behaviour.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 3 storey block of 40 no. 1 & 2 bed apartments and 4 no. 2 bed semi-detached bungalows for over 55s independent living, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The site will be accessed off Fletcher Fold Road and the public footpath running through the site will be retained (as will the Palisade fencing along it, to the south of the site). The apartment block will occupy the eastern portion of the site, fronting onto a communal parking area (comprising of 21 no. spaces) and towards the footpath beyond. The ground floor of the building itself will feature an entrance lobby, a communal lounge and furniture store, a scooter store and 11 no. apartments (each with their own external doorset/terrace area). The upper floors of the building will comprise of the remaining apartments, each with their own external balcony. The proposed bungalows will occupy the western portion of the site, also fronting towards the footpath, which will have enclosed private garden spaces and will be served by 2 no. off-road parking spaces each.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will bring a currently vacant site into use and provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The apartment block and bungalows will provide direct overlooking over part of the existing public footpath that crosses the site.
- 3.2.3 The main communal entrance for residents and visitors to the apartment block will be in a prominent position, well overlooked from the bungalows opposite.
- 3.2.4 Many of the proposed apartments will be provided above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively prevented.
- 3.2.5 The private gardens serving the apartment block and bungalows will be capable of being enclosed within secure perimeter fencelines, deterring unauthorised access to where hidden doors and windows could be vulnerable to attack unseen.
- 3.2.6 The buildings will have habitable room windows to their frontages, allowing for surveillance of and from dwellings, the parking areas and the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings, avoiding the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the developments are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Although the proposed development will provide additional overlooking to part of the existing public footpath crossing the site, it could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. It will be immediately adjacent to the parking areas serving the proposed apartment block and bungalows – which could leave the parked vehicles vulnerable to damage (both malicious and accidental) and attack (as the numerous surrounding footpath links could serve as easy access and escape routes for criminals to utilise unseen). The narrow southern portion of the footpath runs along the southern boundary of the site and benefits from little/no direct overlooking or passive surveillance, potentially leaving the boundary to the site exposed and vulnerable to unseen damage, scaling and penetration. It is highly recommended that the following measures are incorporated to address these risks:

- The northern portion of the footpath (passing between the parking areas) should be defined by low-level railings and defensive planting (i.e. low-level, densely branched shrubs), in order to clearly separate it from the parking areas, provide some protection to the parked vehicles and funnel pedestrian movement away from them (see opposite for illustration).
- There should be a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the bungalow and the apartment block sites (see opposite for illustration), formed by brick pillars and a change of road surface texture/colour etc, to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents - psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- The existing 2100mm high Palisade fencing along the southern boundary of the site, abutting the footpath, is to be retained. Although railings or welded-wire mesh fencing would be preferred (which can be harder to damage, scale and penetrate than Palisade fencing), it is acknowledged that the existing fenceline is good condition and its removal and replacement could cause damage to the existing mature trees and vegetation around it. If the existing fencing is retained, any branches or vegetation growing through or directly over it should be removed or pruned to ensure they do not form climbing aids over the boundary or cause damage to the fencing itself.



- It is highly recommended that any existing dense vegetation along the 'private' side of the Palisade fenceline is retained and supplemented with new defensive planting to further discourage unauthorised access over/through the fenceline to access to the rear of the building unseen.

3.3.2 The new boundary treatments to the apartment block and bungalows are vitally important to secure them, prevent unauthorised access to private spaces (where hidden doors/windows could be attacked unseen) and define defensible space to dwelling frontages. The communal landscaped garden areas to the sides and rear of the apartment building should be securely enclosed as private space to prevent unauthorised access with new 2100mm high railings and gates (see Section 4.5 for more information). As proposed, the ground floor apartments along the frontage of the block will have publicly accessible external patio doors providing access to individual terrace areas, which could be vulnerable to damage, being forced open or being left insecure. If attacked or left insecure, they could be used by offenders to gain unauthorised access to both the apartments themselves, as well as the whole building (by circumnavigating the access-controlled communal entrance). Ideally, any such patio doors along the public frontage of the building should be removed from the scheme and replaced with security-certified windows fitted with opening restrictors (see Section 4.2), which would be less vulnerable to forced unauthorised access, damage or being left insecure. If the ground floor terraces and doors must be provided, the doors themselves must be security-certified (see Section 4.1), incorporate laminated glazing (see Section 4.3) and enclosed within private terrace areas securely enclosed by railings or a balustrades to a minimum height of 1800mm. However, if any patio doors are replaced with windows, the building frontage should be defined by low-level railings and planting.

3.3.3 The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the bungalows should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space. Plot 1 will directly abut the existing narrow footpath linking Fletcher Fold Road/Goshen Lane and Manchester Road. This route is not well-

overlooked and could provide the means for offenders to gain unauthorised access to the rear of dwelling and escape unseen, as well as leaving it exposed to criminal damage. In addition to a particularly robust boundary definition (see Section 4.5 for more information), it is highly recommended that the boundary itself is protected by mature defensive planting to discourage access, damage and scaling. Care should also be taken to ensure that any changes in ground levels or adjacent trees do not inadvertently form climbing aids over the boundaries to private space.

- 3.3.4 The communal entrance the apartment block should ideally be formed by a hinged single-leaf, self-closing/locking, security-certified doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system (see Section 4.1). If the entrance has to be formed by a sliding doorset, it must also be security-certified (see Section 4.1) - with a multi-point locking system permitted as part of the security-certification (prevent sliding and lifting) and laminated glazing (see Section 4.2). There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the Block. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks), it is recommended that there is also a secure system for depositing parcels incorporated within a secure postal lobby (also see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.5 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents, visitors and staff.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

Apartment Building

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main communal entrance doorset to the building should ideally be a self-closing/locking, single-leaf hinged doorset compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. If the main entrance must be formed a self-closing/locking sliding doorset, it must also be certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification (preventing sliding or lifting), capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The main entrance should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system linked to each individual apartment (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ There should be a secure system for the delivery of post without needing to provide access to all floors of the block. Ideally, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. If not, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries to postboxes within a secure postal lobby without providing access to other areas/floors of the block. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). Consideration should also be given to a secure system for depositing parcels within the secure postal lobby, such as the smart parcel boxes used by the major internet shopping companies. All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ Any external communal doorsets to scooter stores or rear garden areas should be security-certified to one of the above standards, self-closing/locking doorsets secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, operated by resident key-fob only on access and egress.
- ☐ All individual internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any ground and first floor external patio doors to individual apartments must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Internal doors to any scooter store or plant rooms should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and an electrically operated lock controlled by resident/staff key-fob.

Bungalows

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any rear french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door. Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor windows should be certificated to BS PAS 24. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ All ground floor/potentially accessible first floor opening lights, escape requirements permitting, must be key-lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors not releasable from the outside, limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/potentially accessible first floor glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no other features of the buildings (such as projecting window cills, external balcony structures, projecting brickwork/cladding features, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby trees, lighting columns, boundary treatments, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows/balconies, onto roof areas or over boundaries.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Ideally, each apartment/bungalow should have an intruder alarm fitted to comply with BS EN 50131. Alarms should be linked to contacts on entrances, any ground floor/accessible external patio doors and PIR detectors covering all ground floor/accessible rooms with windows.
- ☐ If intruder alarms are not to be provided, there should at least be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur installed to each house and apartment, to allow future residents to connect an alarm if required.

4.5 Boundaries

Apartment Block

- ☐ The landscaped communal gardens to the sides and rear of the building should be enclosed with new 2100mm high railings/gates (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers) and retained Palisade fencing. Any railing panels must be fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and any level changes should not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and there should be no other adjacent climbing aids such as low walls, street lights, trees or street furniture/junction boxes etc.
- ☐ As described within Section 3.3, any branches or vegetation growing through or directly over the existing Palisade fencing to be retained should be removed or pruned to ensure they do not form climbing aids over the boundary or cause damage to the fencing itself. The existing dense vegetation along the 'private' side of the fenceline should also be retained and supplemented with new defensive planting to further discourage unauthorised access over/through the fenceline.
- ☐ Any gates to private space should also be 2100mm high, self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. The hinges should also not provide footholds and the gap at the bottom of the gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ If external terraces/patio doors to the ground floor apartments are to be provided along the public frontage of the building, they should be enclosed within private terraces by railings or balustrades to a minimum height of 1800mm. If they are replaced with windows (fitted with opening restrictors), the frontage of the block should be separated from the car park by low-level railings (to an approximate height of 1200mm) and planting.
- ☐ The external communal cycle and bin stores should be enclosed and secured as described within Section 4.9.
- ☐ The car park serving the building should be enclosed and defined as separate from the adjacent public footpath/Goshen Lane with 1200mm high railings and low-level defensive planting (i.e. low-level densely branched, thorny shrubs), which should be sufficiently mature/dense when planted (see Section 3.3 for

illustration). The design or any low railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.

- ☐ The car park should have a symbolic barrier at the entrance (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the parking area is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher (see opposite for example).

Bungalows

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the bungalows should generally be enclosed with close-boarded timber fencing to a height of 2100mm from external ground level. Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible space/routes should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side pedestrian gates to the private gardens should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.
- ☐ The exposed and potentially vulnerable side boundary to Plot 1 abutting the footpath to the north should be protected by some low-level defensive planting (i.e. densely branched, thorny shrubs) on its public side where possible, in order to deter damage, penetration and scaling. If this is absolutely unachievable, the boundary itself should be particularly robust - formed by 2100mm high (from external ground level) double-skinned close-boarded timber fencing, with no framing/horizontal elements on the public side of the fence that would create a climbing aid. Care should also be taken to ensure that any adjacent trees do not inadvertently form climbing aids over the boundary.
- ☐ The frontages and off-road parking spaces of the bungalows should be enclosed and defined as separate from the adjacent public footpaths with 1200mm high railings and low-level defensive planting (i.e. low-level densely branched, thorny shrubs), which should be sufficiently mature/dense when planted (see Section 3.3 for illustration). The design or any low railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ The access road to the bungalows should have a symbolic barrier at the entrance (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the parking area is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries (such as any existing walls, garages or proposed boundaries to private space) should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher (see above for example).



4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all access roads should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489). Lighting to all communal parking areas should display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of the apartment block and bungalows operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances to dwellings, parking areas and footpaths/communal areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ The communal cycle store serving the apartment block should be enclosed with 1800-2100mm high walls or railings, with a self-closing/locking, 'slam-to-lock', steel-framed gate (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key or fob operated from both sides). It should include 'Sheffield' style racks, or similar, that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ The external bin store should also be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and a self-closing and 'slam-to-lock' gate, which cannot be left unlocked when shut. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (e.g. access-controls, boundaries, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
26 th October 2023	Pozzoni	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
30 th October 2023	Pozzoni	Quote issued
13 th February 2024	Pozzoni	Confirmation of instruction & fee and receipt of pre-application package
26 th to 28 th February 2024	Pozzoni	Receipt of updated site plan & email correspondence re: pre-application comments from Council
7 th March 2024	Pozzoni	Telephone call following site visit to discuss pre-app comments & boundary treatments – CIS will cover issues discussed
11 th March 2024	Pozzoni	Email sent re: report completion & payment
22 nd March 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
6071_POZZ_XX_XX_DR_SK001	Existing Site Layout (SUPERSEDED)	-	-
6071_POZZ_XX_XX_DR_SK010	Proposed Site Layout Option 5 (SUPERSEDED)	-	-
6071_POZZ_XX_XX_DR_SK011	Indicative Massing Option 5 (SUPERSEDED)	-	-
6071-POZ-XX-XX-RP-A-1000- P01	Pre-application Design Statement	19/01/24	P01
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-AF-A-1900- P01	Pre-application Planning Walkthrough	11/01/24	P01
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1100- P02	Planning – Site Location Plan	08/02/24	P02
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1200- P03	Planning – Site Layout Plan (SUPERSEDED)	08/02/24	P03
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1200- P04	Planning – Site Layout Plan	27/02/24	P04
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1201- P02	Planning – Boundary Plan & Elevations	28/02/24	P02
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1210- P01	Planning – Apartments Floor & Roof Plans	19/01/24	P01
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1211-P01	Planning – Bungalow Floor & Roof Plan	19/01/24	P01
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1230- P01	Planning – Apartments Communal Facilities	19/01/24	P01
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1350- P01	Planning – Apartments Elevations	19/01/24	P01
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-DR-A-1351- P01	Planning – Bungalow Elevations	19/01/24	P01
6071-POZ-XX-ZZ-VS-A-1700- P01	Planning – Visuals	19/01/24	P01
02946E	Planning pre-application letter & validation checklist	19/02/24	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk