



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Former Wheatfield Day Centre, Victoria Avenue
6 Apartments, 18 Houses and 6 Bungalows

For: **Onward Homes**

Version A: **13/06/22**

Ref: **2022/0224/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Former Wheatfield Day Centre, Victoria Avenue

2022/0224/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Boundary treatment to the side and rear of properties
- Effective street lighting
- Designated boundary treatment

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Bury Planning to require the inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located at the end of Victoria Avenue; leading from Bury New Road in Whitefield.

The area is a mix of low-rise residential properties with isolated pockets of industry and commercial uses.

Adjacent to the site entrance is the main access point for Whitefield Community Primary School.

The development site occupies land on the former Wheatfield Day Centre. The site & local landscape is undulating and contains dense foliage. The surrounding boundaries are shared with neighbouring residential properties and boundaries consist of timber fencing and railings.


The site has very good vehicle connections to Bury and the surrounding districts.

The site is served well by a number of public transport routes, with bus stops located on Bury New Road and a Metrolink tram stop at Bess 'O 'th Barn approx 650m due south.

Approx. 1.5km south is Prestwich town centre.

At the opposite end of Victoria Avenue is the Beehive Inn pub at the junction of Bury New Road.

To the immediate north of the site is a light industrial estate containing a variety of uses.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st May 2021 to 30th April 2022

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
33	<5	52	201	14	5	5	14	10	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is average for the Bury district, with less serious wounding, domestic burglary and criminal damage being the highest recorded offences taking place in the area. The proposed site is located in the area of Whitefield, with offences mostly occurring to the west of the proposed site, around/off Victoria Lane and Westminister Avenue. The offences which have occurred in the local area are common in residential areas.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have taken place throughout the residential estates, particularly to the north and west of the site. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have mostly commonly occurred during the commissioning of a domestic dispute, or incident between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage offences have occurred throughout the area, with hotspots occurring around Westminister Avenue and Coniston Avenue. Offences have occurred against dwellings and shops, whereby offenders have smashed glazing in front windows and using force to damage doors. Body work of vehicles have also been damaged, whereby bodily force has been used to remove wing mirrors and objects used in order to smash glazing.
- 2.1.4 Domestic burglary has occurred throughout the residential estates, particularly around/ off Malham Drive. Offenders have targeted doors of the properties using force to gain access and remove items from within, as well as exploiting insecure front doors.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed;
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.2.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key;
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing.
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and
- dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.2.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter dwellings, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.2.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development; and,
- access to rear gardens should be restricted with the installation of high fencing and locking gates.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Bury and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **30% higher** than Bury as a whole, **27% higher** than Greater Manchester and **30% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **14% lower** than Bury as a whole, **21% lower** than Greater Manchester and **51% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **16% higher** than Bury as a whole, **5% higher** than Greater Manchester and **28% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **30% lower** than Bury as a whole, **36% lower** than Greater Manchester and **23% lower** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday during the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Offenders often target properties in the early hours of the morning as it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors (both to the front and rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements, gain access to the garden shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday and Tuesday during the afternoon (12pm – 2pm) and early hours of the morning (12am – 1am). Offenders often target vehicles during these times as they are likely to be left unattended for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

3.1.1 This proposed development involves:

- clearance of any existing structures and vegetation
- construction of 6 apartment, 18 houses and 6 Bungalows
- setting out of road layout and
- parking for residents, visitors and public realm spaces.

3.1.2 The proposed houses, apartments and bungalows will be set out to front onto the new road, with front doors facing the road. Rear patio doors will open out onto the rear gardens of each house type. Front gardens will be more modest in size and will include a pathway, directly linking the proposed car parking spaces to the door of the house, and a bin store. Two parking spaces per house will be laid out in front of the house.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The design of the dwellings has been kept simple, with no front doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.2 The property types should have habitable room windows to their front elevations, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.3 The house types and apartments will be served by off-road parking spaces, allowing residents to secure/overlook their own vehicles and limiting opportunities to criminals.
- 3.2.4 The development will help to continue to repopulate this part of the area and add to the general activity throughout the day and at weekends.
- 3.2.5 The mix and size of properties will offer a broader range of individuals and families the opportunity to live within the fringes of Bury. A diverse resident population brings with it a likelihood of a level of activity around the development throughout the day, and a greater prospect of a more stable population as residents may be more likely to remain. Residents who remain for the long term are more likely to develop social ties with the area and with other long term residents who then have more of a vested interest in the maintenance and security of the development. Developments with greater social cohesion, and active management, tend to be less prone to the effects of crime and disorder.
- 3.2.6 There is sufficient 'critical mass', in terms of the numbers of, and size of, dwellings within the development to suggest that some of the dwellings will be occupied through the day and not leave dwellings isolated and vulnerable. The actual presence of residents or even visible signs of people present - cars on in parking spaces, lights on in the houses, external lighting on at entrance doors, for example - will help to deter offenders.
- 3.2.7 'Defensible space' is provided to the front and rear of all of the houses.
- 3.2.8 Private amenity space is provided within rear gardens, which can be appropriately secured with suitably high, boundary fencing.
- 3.2.9 The proposed residents' parking arrangements will facilitate the security of vehicles. Car parking provision where vehicles can be readily supervised by residents, is less likely to be targeted by offenders than cars parked on 'through-streets' or within ill-defined, communal parking areas.
- 3.2.10 Landscaping around the edges of the development will help to soften the appearance of the development and maintain the quality of the local environment. Well maintained environments tend to attract less crime and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.11 **Apartments:** Residential post - Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal staff to have access to internal areas of the residential blocks beyond the reception space. Mail boxes for

residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a 'through-the-wall' post box arrangement. Further design details of these ancillary spaces are to be developed.

- 3.2.12 **Apartments:** To minimise the risk of offender's tail-gating legitimate residents/visitors, the secondary doors into lobby entrance, residents' courtyard should also include access controls. Access controls will need to be used at the communal entrance to restrict entry into the development to residents and their authorised visitors.
- 3.2.13 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them; any parked vehicles will reduce unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rear of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.5). Any of the dwellings with a boundary to a pedestrian/vehicle route /pathway adjacent to the houses will leave them exposed to publicly accessible space and particularly vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen (already an M.O. utilised in this area – see Section 2.3). As such, these rear boundaries should be particularly robustly defined.
- 3.3.2 Any communal rear access alleyways should also be gated at their outermost point, in order to prevent access to where dwellings can be vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen and ensure that any offenders attempting to gain access can be clearly seen from the street.
- 3.3.3 Height of rear boundary fencing adjoining public space / footpaths. These boundaries should be 2.1m high – the top 300mm can be formed of trellis to improve natural surveillance (see section 4.5).
- 3.3.4 Bin storage – space should be identified within the enclosed rear gardens to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.3.5 Definition of front gardens. Definition of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.
- 3.3.6 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.
- 3.3.7 Communal facilities and amenity space. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour. It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ Front and rear doors to dwellings must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Front doors to properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- ☐ Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- ☐ Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Doors (Apartments)

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system - these features should be permitted under the scope of the security certification.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, WCL2, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Communal doors located within the corridors should include glazed elements to assist sight lines.
- ☐ Ground floor external French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012.
- ☐ Chain limiters to apartment entrance doors are recommended but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.3 Access Controls (Apartments)

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - Vehicular gates into / out of parking court
 - Communal entrance doors to apartments
 - Any Cycle store
 - Bin store

4.4 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.

-
- ☐ Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.5 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.6 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
- BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.7 Boundaries

- ☐ Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- ☐ Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- ☐ The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and/or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- ☐ Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
- A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- ☐ If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.
- ☐ Lighting in parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 lux with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing up floor windows.
- ☐ Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.
- ☐ There have been incidents involving metal theft from the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
29/04/22	Client	CIS instruction received
04/05/22	Client	Fee agreed
09/05/22	DfS	Invoice issued
19/05/22	DfS	Site visit
14/06/22	DfS	CIS complete

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
21059-PJA-00-ZZ-DR-A-0001	Site Location Plan	05/11/21	A
21059-PJA-00-ZZ-DR-A-1000	Proposed Site Plan	30/06/21	J
21059-PJA-00-ZZ-DR-A-1100	House Type A1 – 3B5P Houses – Plans	25/10/21	J
21059-PJA-A1-ZZ-DR-A-2100	House Type A1 – 3B5P Houses – Elevations	25/10/21	A
21059-PJA-A1-ZZ-DR-A-1103	House Type A2 – 3B5P Houses – Plans	25/10/21	A
21059-PJA-A2-ZZ-DR-A-2103	House Type A2 – 3B5P Houses – Elevations	25/10/21	A
21059-PJA-A3-ZZ-DR-A-1104	House Type A3 – 3B5P Houses – Plans	25/10/21	A
21059-PJA-A3-ZZ-DR-A-2104	House Type A3 – 3B5P Houses – Elevations	25/10/21	A
21059-PJA-A4-ZZ-DR-A-1105	House Type A4 – 3B5P Houses – Plans	11/03/21	A
21059-PJA-A4-ZZ-DR-A-2105	House Type A4 – 3B5P Houses – Elevations	11/03/22	
21059-PJA-A5-ZZ-DR-A-1106	House Type A5 – 3B5P Houses – Plans	11/03/22	
21059-PJA-A5-ZZ-DR-A-2106	House Type A5 – 3B5P Houses – Elevations	11/03/22	
21059-PJA-B1-ZZ-DR-A-1101	House Type B1 – 2B3P Maisonettes - Plans	22/10/21	A
21059-PJA-B1-ZZ-DR-A-2101	House Type B1 – 2B3P Maisonettes - Elevations	22/10/21	A
21059-PJA-C1-ZZ-DR-A-1102	House Type C1 – 2B3P Semi Bungalow - Plans	22/10/21	A
21059-PJA-C1-ZZ-DR-A-2102	House Type C1 – 2B3P Semi Bungalow - Elevations	22/10/21	A
21059-PJA-XX-XX-RP-A-9500	Design and Access Statement		B

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk