



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT: PRELIMINARY

Scobell Street, Walshaw, Bury

An outline planning application for up to 280 dwellings providing a mix of family and affordable housing. Access only to be determined at this stage, all other matters to be reserved.

For: **WAIN ESTATES (LAND) LTD**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **16/08/24**

design**for**security

Ref: **2012/0251/CIS/02**

SCOBELL STREET, WALSHAW, BURY

2012/0251/CIS/02

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' has been created to accompany outline planning applications where layout is not considered (i.e. the proposal is only at the 'red line' stage). This part of the process will provide your design team with the contextual crime information, and site-specific design considerations needed to develop the layout and appearance of the proposal.

Reserved Matters Applications

Reserved matters applications, where layout is to be considered, will require a full Crime Impact Statement, which will appraise the design and layout of the developed proposals. Please contact us when work commences on the layout of the scheme for us to develop your preliminary report into a full Crime Impact Statement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

I have no objection in principle to the development of this site for residential uses. However, the considerations and general recommendations within Section 3.2 of this report should be addressed when the design team develop more detailed proposals.

A full CIS report should be prepared when the design of the scheme or phases of the scheme have progressed, and an assessment of the details and specifications can be made. This is most productive well in advance of any full/reserved matters planning applications, so that any subsequent alterations do not cause delay to the submission.

Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The development site is situated on land which has been redundant for some time. The site is off Scobell St and Church Street in Walshaw district of Bury.

The site is bounded by Scobell Street to the north and Church Street to the west. To the immediate southern boundary of the site is further green fields and Stables Country Club.

The land contains a mixture of self-seeded trees & foliage with significant level changes in the landscape.

The site has very good vehicle connections to Bury, Bolton and Ramsbottom town centres.


The site can be served by bus routes on Church St and Bury Road (B6213).

There are a number of primary and secondary schools and community sports facilities within a 2km radius of the site.

The proposed site is approx. 3km north from Bury Town Centre.

The surrounding area of the site is a mix of farmland with developed residential areas.

The majority of properties within the area contain off-street parking however on-street car parking is dominant along Scobell St & Church St.



1 – Site viewed from Church St.



2 – View East along Scobell St.



3 – Existing properties on Scobell St.




4 – View towards Church St across the proposed site.



7 – View south along Church St adjacent to Christ Church school.



6 – View west along Collins St.



5 – Existing properties on Church St overlooking the site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The following information has been produced to give an insight into the types and volume of, crime experienced across Greater Manchester and Bury. Particular attention is paid to the area surrounding Scobell Street and to crimes which research shows can be affected by the built environment. All data is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2023 and 31st July 2024.

2.1 Crime Overview

Recorded Crime within 1000m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
24	<5	42	203	10	6	<5	21	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the past 12 months has been average for the Bury division, with less serious wounding, criminal damage and domestic burglary having been most commonly reported. These offences have been occurring in the residential neighbourhoods surrounding the site, at locations along Bury Road, and at a large hotspot of offences around the junction of Tottington Road with Dorning Street.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding offences have taken place at the locations above, particularly at the hotspot around the junction of Tottington Road with Dorning Street where there is a small grove that offenders can hide in. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the most reported less serious woundings taking place, with the majority of incidents involving disputes between known associates and neighbours, as well as cases of domestic violence.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against vehicles have accounted for the majority of criminal damage offences taking place. Offenders in most targeted vehicles parked in the streets throughout the local area by using objects to smash the glazing and damage the bodywork of cars. Offenders have also targeted both residential and retail properties by damaging the windows and external doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- 2.1.4 Domestic burglary offences have also occurred throughout the residential areas surrounding the site. Offenders have in most used implements in order to gain access to properties via secure doors and windows.

2.2 Common Local/Use Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.2.1 Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools.

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24 security standard - PAS 24 rated doors are very difficult to force open.
- front doors should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the 'street' rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions may be witnessed.
- side or rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high fencing and locking gates so that rear doors are only accessible to residents; and,
- secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided wherever possible as such routes can facilitate offender access to rear gardens, as well as attract anti-social behaviours such as graffiti, fly-tipping or damage to fencing.

2.2.2 Doors have been targeted when left insecure.

To minimise the risk of 'walk-in' burglaries:

- front doors should be fitted with a fixed handle or a 'split spindle', so that the only way in is with a key.
- communal entrance doors to apartments should be self-closing and lock automatically upon closing.

-
- defensible space should be provided between dwellings and the 'street', i.e. a small front garden enclosed with a 1000mm high fence. A degree of separation between public and private space can act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are then less willing to cross from public to clearly defined private space. Such boundary definition can also reduce the risk of criminal damage to property; and
 - dusk-to-dawn lighting should be fitted to all external doors. Light suggests a dwelling is occupied and highlights the actions of intruders.

2.2.3 Windows have been prised open by offenders.

To minimise the risk of prising windows open:

- all ground floor windows should include key operated locks and opening restrictors; and,
- access to the rear of the dwellings should be controlled by the erection of robust boundaries and locking gates. Pedestrian routes alongside the rear boundaries should be avoided. As a means to break and enter dwellings, offenders are more likely to target windows on secluded side or rear elevations.

2.2.4 Glazing in rear doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

To minimise the risk of offender smashing glazing in doors and windows:

- laminate glass should be fitted to all external doors and to all windows on the ground floor of the development; and,
- access to rear gardens should be restricted with the installation of high fencing and locking gates.





2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison (Residential)

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **44% lower** than Bury as a whole, **45% lower** than Greater Manchester and **44% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **118% higher** than Bury as a whole, **100% higher** than Greater Manchester and **281% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **97% higher** than Bury as a whole, **78% higher** than Greater Manchester and **117% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **4% lower** than Bury as a whole, **13% lower** than Greater Manchester and **6% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Burglary: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to burglary committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on Sunday in the just before midnight (23:00-00:00). Offenders tend to target dwellings late at night when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving them the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- In cases where the entry point has been recorded as 'unknown', it is likely that the offenders have exploited insecure windows or doors.
- Using bodily pressure or implements in order to force open secure windows and doors.
- Smashed glazing in the windows and doors.

3 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the



- 3.1.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest on Tuesday around midday (12:00-13:00) and in the evening (21:00-22:00). Offenders often target vehicles in the evening and during the day in the working week when they are often left unattended for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for offenders.

4 Design Considerations

4.1 Proposed Development

- 4.1.1 An outline planning application for up to 280 dwellings providing a mix of family and affordable housing.

4.2 Recommendations

- 4.2.1 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them; any parked vehicles will prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rear of the houses should be defined as private space and adequately secured to prevent unauthorised access. Any of the dwellings with a boundary to a pedestrian/vehicle route /pathway adjacent to the houses will leave them exposed to publicly accessible space and particularly vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen. As such, these rear boundaries should be particularly robustly defined.
- 4.2.2 Any communal rear access alleyways should also be gated at their outermost point, in order to prevent access to where dwellings can be vulnerable to unauthorised access unseen and ensure that any offenders attempting to gain access can be clearly seen from the street.
- 4.2.3 Height of rear boundary fencing adjoining public space / footpaths. These boundaries should be 1.8m high – the top 300mm can be formed of trellis to improve natural surveillance (see section 4.5).
- 4.2.4 Bin storage – space should be identified within the enclosed rear gardens to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 4.2.5 Definition of front gardens. Definition of frontage. Front and side garden boundaries should be well-defined to indicate ownership, using low walls, railings, planting and / or surface materials, and discourage intruders from approaching the dwellings and parked vehicles, or taking short cuts.
- 4.2.6 It is important to formalise the proposed pedestrian links between the locations and the footpath adjacent to the new development. A gate / 'A' frame / 'kissing' gates or chicane post arrangement should be incorporated at this location to remove or slow down the opportunity for motorbikes. An obstacle at this location also forces cyclists to dismount and slowing down opportunists from escaping quickly from one area to another.
- 4.2.7 The creation of a shared surface/'home-zone' design for the street, rather than a standard engineering solution will emphasise 'territoriality', promote 'ownership' of the 'street' amongst residents, and encourage play/socialising in the street – all of which adds to the overall supervision of the public spaces and deters crime. .
- 4.2.8 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for larger vehicles.

5 Useful References

5.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
19/07/24	Client	Application received
19/07/24	Client	Client confirmation
22/07/24	GMP	Invoice issued
07/08/24	DfS	Site visit
16/08/24	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
12221-FPCR-XX-XX-DR-A-0002	Framework Plan (Link Road Overlay 20.5m Option)		
DWG01	Site Boundary (Wain Estates)		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS 202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk