



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Star Academy Radcliffe
Temporary Educational Buildings

For: **Morgan Snidall**

Version A: **29/08/23**

Ref: **2022/0391/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

Star Academy Radcliffe

2022/0391/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported with minor security additions advised

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found acceptable and if submitted to the local planning department in its current form we will support the application.

The redevelopment of the site for the use as a school is welcomed. The proposed building is well located and presents no significant issues from a crime prevention perspective. To improve the overall security of the building and wider site, a number of recommendations are included, as follows:

- Security rated external doors, window frames and laminate glazing should be used.
- All elevations of the building to be illuminated with low intensity lighting from dusk-til-dawn.
- CCTV and intruder alarm systems are installed.
- Review the perimeter fencing, particularly in remote areas to ensure the wider site remains secure.

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police will recommend that Bury Planning be minded to approve the application.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is situated off Spring Lane in the Radcliffe district of Bury, approx. 4km south west from Bury town centre.

The area is mixed with a combination of industrial, commercial, retail and residential uses. However, the prominence along Spring Lane in this area is predominately residential. The local residential stock is a mix social housing and private ownership.

The prominent housing type in the area is Edwardian terrace housing.

Within the local estates there are a small number of community facilities; leisure centre, social clubs and places of worship.



Public transport for the area is supported by a local bus service with bus stops on Spring Lane.

Directly opposite the site, to the immediate south of the site is Radcliffe Metrolink tram stop with a large 'Park n' Ride' multi-storey car park.

The tram line embankment runs to the east of the site, connecting M/cr city centre to Bury. An existing palisade fence controls the boundary between the site and the embankment.

To the northwest of the site, beyond the existing recreational boundary are wide expanses of green space and Manchester, Bolton & Bury canal.

Main residential car parking within the area is contained on-road.



7 – View north along M/cr, Bolton & Bury canal.



6 – View towards development site from the public footpath.



5 View south east along the public footpath.



1 – View towards development site from Spring Lane.



2 – View towards the Park & Ride MSCP



3 – Nearby off-licence on Spring Lane.



4 – View towards development site from the public footpath.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2022 to 31st July 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	8	51	304	23	9	5	13	14	7

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime is average for the Bury district with less serious wounding and criminal damage having been the highest recorded offences taking place over the last 12 months. These types of crime are typical for locations situated close to town centres where there is often a concentration of retail and licensed premises leading to a higher frequency of crime and disorder issues. The majority of offences have occurred at a couple of hotspots situated throughout the local area, in the residential neighbourhoods to the south of the proposed site around Haworth Close, at Butterworth Street to the east, and at the junction of Water Street and Spring Lane to the west.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has been the most prevalent offence occurring in the local area, and has primarily taken place at the hotspots above as well as at a smaller hotspot around Radcliffe tram stop. Assaults, public order offences and harassment have been the highest recorded less serious wounding offences occurring in the area, with domestic disputes and incidents between known associates most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Criminal damage against properties has accounted for the majority of the criminal damage occurring in the area, with offences against vehicles also occurring. Offenders have mainly used objects to damage the external doors and windows of properties, as well as glazing in vehicle windows. There have also been cases of offenders vandalising walls using graffiti.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements / tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor / accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.2 Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements and gained access through the roof itself or through high level roof-lights / windows.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas are not accessible, for example with the use of high-level / overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard / soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles / bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration.

- 2.2.3 Where the point of entry is unknown / legitimate, this is likely to have been when offenders have gained access to insecure rooms / areas unnoticed, before targeting equipment (such as laptops, media / musical equipment, tools etc.).

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the school. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely, with signage included to remind pupils and staff to remain vigilant.

- 2.2.4 Theft of insecure property belonging to students and staff, as well as school equipment

Possible Solution – As above, areas restricted to staff and officials should operate using an access control system to restrict entry. Codes / fobs should be regularly updated so that only those currently with legitimate purpose should be able to gain entry to these areas. Legitimate users should be encouraged not to allow strangers to tailgate them into restricted areas of the buildings. Facilities should be provided for pupils and staff to store their belongings securely whilst at the premises.

- 2.2.5 Posing as legitimate students / visitors enter restricted areas by means of insecure doors.

Possible Solution – here should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that visitors to the building are vetted and / or met and escorted before being allowed access to all areas. The reception should be staffed at all times whilst the building is open and all visitors should report to reception for vetting before gaining further access into the college. All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. Students should also be encouraged to keep items of value with them or store them securely.

- 2.2.6 Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular community access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Staff, pupil and parent safety
- Acts of aggression
- Criminal damage to property
- Burglary
- Theft of school property, and of pupil and staff personal belongings
- Bicycle theft
- Theft of, and from, vehicles
- Arson
- Antisocial behaviour
- Acts of criminal damage, and theft of plant and machinery, during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary within educational facilities in the Bury area peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the late evening (5pm – 10pm). Offenders often target premises at this time when employees and students are unlikely to be present, it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Broken glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows.
- Posing as a legitimate student/ visitor and entering restricted areas.
- Forcing open shutters in order to access windows and doors located beneath.

2.5 Theft (Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in the Bury area peaks on a Tuesday during the morning and into the evening (9am – 6pm), peaking in the afternoon (12pm – 1:30pm). Offenders have targeted insecure bags, stored under tables, removing mobile phones and headphones. Offenders have also targeted expensive I.T equipment stored within the school.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Monday at midnight and in the morning. Offenders often target vehicles at night and in the morning when it is dark and they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods time, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the construction of a Temporary building for a period of approximately 1 year.
- 3.1.2 The temporary school accommodation is only intended to be used for circa 150 pupils for a temporary period of 2 school terms (Sept 2024 to April 2025).

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The site will sit within a coordinated, controlled and organised temporary school boundary that is already securely enclosed with high fencing and gates to prevent unauthorised access at night/when closed.
- 3.2.2 The development will bring greater levels of activity and surveillance to the site, particularly during the day.
- 3.2.3 The principle elevation of the building will be overlooked from the proposed parking area and will be capable of being overlooked from the main road.
- 3.2.4 The proposed buildings will have a simple footprint that will provide few potential places of concealment and will also be sufficiently tall enough to make unauthorised access to the roof difficult.
- 3.2.5 The existing boundary fencing is relatively new and forms an effective secure perimeter to the site. The grounds are subdivided into distinct zones to allow control of access, which is particularly useful when the grounds are used by the wider community.
- 3.2.6 The internal layout appears to be free of any potential pinch points or spaces where students could be cornered. The corridors / stairwells should provide sufficient circulation space to cope with the anticipated numbers of students, avoiding potential for bumps and collisions that can lead to more serious behavioural issues.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The position of the temporary facilities, external storage and cycle parking areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:-
 - Potential to block sight lines and create hiding places
 - Potential to obscure CCTV and lighting
 - Potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit / entry over boundary fencing.
 - Their potential to obscure damage to fence line

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ The main entrance door to the building should include a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via staff key-fob. It should also be capable of being controlled remotely by staff, to ensure any visitors are vetted or are greeted/escorted before being allowed access into the building.
- ☐ Internal doors/frames to any offices, stores etc. should be robust/solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should ideally be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any opening lights should be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Any glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ If any of the existing boundaries of the site are to be replaced, it should be formed by 2400mm high rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and lockable vehicular gates – see illustration. Care should be taken to ensure that fencing panels are fixed securely to the posts (with anti-tamper fixings) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees etc.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Boundary treatments should be subject to regular inspections and maintenance in order to detect any potential weak points or any signs of damage or attack.



4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all parking/servicing areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.

- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/shutters.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance to the building, all external facades and all servicing/parking areas](#).

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances and parking areas, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow unimpeded surveillance and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.8 Other

- ☐ The position of ancillary structures, parked trailers and any external storage areas should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
 - Their potential to block sight lines and create hiding places.
 - Their potential to obscure CCTV and lighting.

- Their potential to create climbing aids that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
- Their potential to obscure damage to fence lines.
- Any proposed lighting columns, street furniture, tree/shrub planting etc. within or external to the site perimeter should also be reviewed in relation to the above issues.
- There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
07/08/2023	Tetra Tech	CIS instruction received
07/08/2023	Tetra Tech	Fee / authorisation confirmed
21/08/2023	DfS	Site visit
15/08/2023	GMP	Invoice issued
29/08/2023	GMP	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	FS 1013-AHR-XX-ZZ-D-A-3001 - Elevations	8/2023	
	FS0588-ELL-ZZ- GF-DR-W- 00101 C01GroundFloorPlan	8/2023	
	FS0588-ELL-ZZ- 01-DR-W- 00102 C02FirstFloorLayout	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-EX-ZZ-D-L-0001-Whole Site Plan	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-EX-ZZ-D-L-0103-Temps Site Location Plan-P01	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-EX-ZZ-D-L-0106-Demolition Plan-P01	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-ZZ-ZZ-D-L-0101-Temps Whole Site Plan	8/2023	
	FS1013-ALA-ZZ-ZZ-D-L-0103-Temps Fencing Arrangement	8/2023	
	FS1013-VS-XX-XX-D-H-0001 PROPOSED ACCESS ROAD P02	8/2023	
	FS1013-VS-XX-XX-D-H-1001 TEMPS ACCESS ROAD	8/2023	
	Red Line Boundary	8/2023	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk