



## CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Former Police HQ, Irwell Street  
40-bed care home with associated parking

For: **CAIRNWELL DEVELOPMENTS**

Greater Manchester Police

Version A: **18/04/24**

design**for**security

Ref: **2024/0095/CIS/01**

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# Former Police HQ, Irwell Street

2024/0095/CIS/01

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Development Supported - No Design Changes Required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Access control of main entrance(s).
- Secure cycle & waste storage unit
- Boundary treatments

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

**Please note:** Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to meet Secured by Design certification is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.

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# 1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies to the west of Bury town centre; approx. 500m to the retail heart of the centre.

The site has been cleared and was the former HQ for Bury Police station.

The boundary to the site is secured and formed by metal wire fencing approx. 2.2m high.

Irwell Street is a residential road providing vehicle access to the Castle Leisure Centre car park and the nearby East Lancashire Railway.


The site is well connected to the public transport system. Bury bus station and tram stop are approx. 400m east of the site. There are a number of car parks in close proximity.

The site is in the busy and popular district of the town centre. This area contains a mix of commercial businesses, retail uses, café/bars, restaurants, and a large residential development directly opposite.


Directly beyond the southern boundary of the site is Jubilee Way a busy dual carriageway which circumvents the south of Bury town centre.

A public footpath leads off Irwell St and follows the dual carriageway with subway connections under Jubilee Way.

Over the last decade the town centre has undergone significant redevelopment as a retail destination with new purpose developments and the urban environment.




1 – View southeast across the site.



2 – View south along Irwell St towards Jubilee Way.



3 – View north along Irwell St.



7 – Rear of the leisure centre.



6 – Pedestrian subway under the Jubilee Way road.



5 – Footpath alongside the Jubilee Way.



4 – Existing residential houses facing the site.

## 2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1<sup>st</sup> April 2023 to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2024.

### 2.1 Crime Summary

| Recorded Crime within 500m of Site |                       |                 |                       |       |         |                  |                          |                        |               |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------|---------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| Domestic Burglary                  | Non-Domestic Burglary | Criminal Damage | Less Serious Wounding | Theft | Robbery | Serious Wounding | Theft from Motor Vehicle | Theft of Motor Vehicle | Bicycle Theft |
| 7                                  | 31                    | 95              | 619                   | 96    | 37      | 14               | 10                       | 12                     | 37            |

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of town and city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Violence has taken place throughout the surrounding area, with a particular concentration to the east (around/off Bolton Street and Market Place), where there is a high concentration of licensed premises and late night takeaways. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded violent offences, often taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning at the weekend, when such premises are at their busiest.
- 2.1.3 The Rock is the main shopping area of Bury, with a high volume of retail and entertainment/licenced premises located along it. Theft offences have mostly occurred in/around retail and entertainment/licenced premises within the town centre, where offenders have primarily stolen personal items belonging to customers, patrons and staff (such as bags and mobile phones), as well as items belonging to the businesses.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage offences have primarily been concentrated to the north and east of the site, with offenders targeting businesses and vehicles (particularly smashing glazing).

### 2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Local Residential:** Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.
- 2.2.2 Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to ‘airlock’ lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.
- 2.2.3 **Local Residential:** Doors have been targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- 2.2.4 **Local Residential:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

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



## 2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

## 2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Bury and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **8% higher** than Bury as a whole, **6% higher** than Greater Manchester and **8% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **911% higher** than Bury as a whole, **828% higher** than Greater Manchester and **1672% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **732% higher** than Bury as a whole, **653% higher** than Greater Manchester and **816% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **221% higher** than Bury as a whole, **191% higher** than Greater Manchester and **254% higher** than England & Wales.


## 2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Thursday and Sunday during the evening and early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties during the evenings and early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Entering apartment buildings by means of tailgating residents/ forcing entry and gaining access to communal areas.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

## 2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

*The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.*



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Wednesday and Friday during the late evening. Offenders often target vehicles during this time as they are likely to be left unattended and out of sight of the owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

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## 3 Layout Appraisal

### 3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 A Hybrid Planning Application. The proposed development comprises the redevelopment of an existing site to accommodate a 40-bed care home with associated parking, landscaping, and infrastructure (Full application). Outline application for a care home with all matters.

### 3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

*The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.*

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring additional legitimate activity to a currently vacant site. Redevelopment with housing and repopulation of the site should help to generate a sense of ownership and responsibility and improve informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.2 The elevation of the building facing the public realm is generally free of recesses or projections that could provide cover for criminal or antisocial activity.
- 3.2.3 The main pedestrian entrance to the building is located on the front of the property facing Irwell Road and is readily apparent on approaching the building from the public road.
- 3.2.4 The internal areas of the block appears to be generally free of obstacles, thus an intruder would find difficulty in hiding within the communal parts of the buildings. All communal doors within the corridors should include glazed elements to improve sight lines. Installation of mirrors should be considered to improve sight lines around blind corners in certain locations. The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at varying times of the day and night.
- 3.2.5 Many of the flats will have routinely occupied rooms overlooking the adjacent communal areas, which will help to increase natural surveillance of accessible areas around the block. Some of the residents' parking spaces can be overlooked from windows of routinely occupied rooms in the apartment blocks.
- 3.2.6 The development will result in the removal of an undeveloped site which might otherwise become a greater target for vandals and increasingly an eyesore. Such sites can attract further criminal behaviour, which may affect surrounding properties. For pedestrians in particular, passing such places on a daily basis, especially at night, can be very disconcerting.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

### 3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

*The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.*

- 3.3.1 Although the proposed development will provide additional overlooking to parts of the existing public realm around the site, it could provide opportunities for offenders to exploit. It will be immediately adjacent to the parking areas serving the proposed apartment block – which could leave the parked vehicles vulnerable to damage (both malicious and accidental) and attack (as the numerous surrounding footpath links could serve as easy access and escape routes for criminals to utilise unseen). The southern portion of the site benefits from little/no direct overlooking or passive surveillance, potentially leaving the boundary to the site exposed and vulnerable to unseen damage, scaling and penetration. It is highly recommended that the following measures are incorporated to address these risks:
- There should be appealing & defined low-level landscaping incorporating defensive planting (i.e. low-level, densely branched shrubs), in order to clearly separate it from the parking areas, provide some protection to the parked vehicles.
  - Garden spaces to the southern and eastern boundaries must be separated with 2.2m high fencing which will help to prevent unauthorised entry to the side & rear of the development.

- 
- Garden spaces to the western and northern boundaries must be separated with 1.8m high fencing and vehicle gate which will help to prevent unauthorised entry to the side & north of the development.
- 3.3.2 The communal entrance must be well lit, be fitted with security-certified doors and fitted with an electrically operated, multi-point lock, activated with a programmable fob. There should also be an audio-visual link to each apartment, so that residents can remotely allow *bona fide* visitors.
- 3.3.3 Access into the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the reception area only prior to providing access further into the building.
- 3.3.4 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns for the parking court should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation and parking arrangements for vehicles.
- 3.3.5 The communal entrance the apartment block should ideally be formed by a hinged single-leaf, self-closing/locking, security-certified doorset secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the security-certification, which is easier to secure and operate remotely via an access control system (see Section 4.1). If the entrance has to be formed by a sliding doorset, it must also be security-certified (see Section 4.1) - with a multi-point locking system permitted as part of the security-certification (prevent sliding and lifting) and laminated glazing (see Section 4.2). There should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that does not require access to all floors of the Block. Given the emerging trend of parcel thefts (particularly at apartment blocks), it is recommended that there is also a secure system for depositing parcels incorporated within a secure postal lobby (also see Section 4.1 for more information).
- 3.3.6 Cycle stores for residents are provided to the rear of the building. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see [www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com) for details).
- 3.3.7 Bin storage – A purpose-built storage space should be identified within the enclosed boundary to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the apartment building where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.3.8 Communal facilities, amenity and rear parking court. The robust management of such areas is essential to encourage active use and enjoyment, whilst making abuse less likely to occur. Poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
- 3.3.9 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retrofitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

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## 4 Physical Security

*The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.*

### 4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted for use under the security certification of the product. Any escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery. NOTE: Any escape-only doors have a Nurse call system.
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should be security-certified to one of the below standards, including a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. If the main entrance to the building is to be formed by sliding doors, the inner and outer sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+) and incorporate laminated glazing (see below). The entrance lobby should work as an 'airlock', with the secondary doors controlled remotely from the reception/admin office, once legitimate visitors have been greeted and vetted. There should also be an external audio access control system linked to the reception/admin office, to allow staff to remotely secure the external doors, vet callers and control access into the building if/when required (e.g. at night).
- ☐ The internal doors/frames providing access to any offices, kitchens, laundries, staff rooms and the hair salon (as well as general stores, plant areas etc.) should be solid-core and capable of being deadlocked to secure them when unoccupied. The drug stores should be fitted with a security-certified doorset and auditable access controls. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys and passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ French/double doors or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.

### 4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

### 4.3 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double-glazed unit may be toughened glass.

### 4.4 Alarm

- ☐ All ground floor external doors to communal areas should be fitted with alarm contacts, linked to the building intruder alarm system, to alert staff if anyone attempts to gain unauthorised access. Escape only doors should be alarmed 24/7 and should be signed as such to deter casual use.

### 4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The eastern and southern boundaries of the site should be enclosed and defined as private space by 2200mm high weld mesh fencing, railings or close-boarded timber fencing (with a masonry/solid base). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of walls and railings should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Care should also be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to any posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. Any pedestrian gates to private space should be self-closing and 'slam to lock' (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, key/fob operated from both sides), which cannot be left unlocked when shut. If a panic mechanism is required on the internal face of the gate for emergency egress purposes, it should be fitted so that it cannot be reached / operated from the external

face of the gate. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates to avoid the creation of footholds.

- ☐ The frontage of the site should be enclosed/demarcated by low-level railings to an approximate height of 1200mm. Any existing/proposed vegetation along Irwell Street must not impede views of/from the site (see Section 4.8).
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

## 4.6 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all parking areas within the site, in accordance with SLL LG09.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external communal doors.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

## 4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

**Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

**Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the main entrance lobby, internal/external circulation areas and all parking areas](#).

## 4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to. New planting between the resident units and the parking bays can increase in height to 1.4m to reduce the effect of car headlights shining into residents rooms.

- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

## 4.9 Other

- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ The cycle parking area should be well-overlooked from the buildings and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/downloads>.
- ☐ There should be no features of the building (such as projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows.

## 5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
  - Litter removal
  - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
  - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

## 6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

## 7 Useful References

### 7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications

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and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

## A Contact register

| Date     | Contact With   | Summary of Contact       |
|----------|----------------|--------------------------|
| 14/03/24 | Iceni Projects | CIS application received |
| 10/03/24 | Iceni Projects | Client confirmation      |
| 11/04/24 | DfS            | Site visit               |
| 10/03/24 | DfS            | Invoice issued           |
| 26/03/24 | Iceni Projects | Invoice paid             |
| 18/04/24 | DfS            | CIS completed            |
|          |                |                          |

## B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

| Drawing No.                       | Drawing Title                | Date | Rev |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|------|-----|
| IRWEL-WBA-NB-00-DR-A-PL_100-P5 -  | Proposed Ground Floor Plan   |      |     |
| IRWEL-WBA-NB-01-DR-A-PL_101- P5 - | Proposed First Floor Plan    |      |     |
| IRWEL-WBA-NB-02-DR-A-PL_102-P5 -  | Proposed Second Floor Plan   |      |     |
| IRWEL-WBA-NB-RF-DR-A-PL_103-P3-   | Proposed Roof Plan           |      |     |
| IRWEL-WBA-SI-ZZ-DR-A-PL-001-P1 -  | Site Location Plan           |      |     |
| IRWEL-WBA-SI-ZZ-DR-A-PL-002- P1 - | Existing Site Plan with Topo |      |     |
| IRWEL-WBA-SI-ZZ-DR-A-PL-003-P14-  | Proposed Site Plan           |      |     |
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PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

## C CIS Version History

| Version | Revisions Made | Date |
|---------|----------------|------|
| A       |                |      |
|         |                |      |

## D Glossary

### Burglary Resistance Standards

#### BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*A performance standard for doorsets and windows, which certifies that a particular doorset is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.*

#### BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

*An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.*

#### ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

*The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:*

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

#### LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.*

#### STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

#### STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

#### EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

*A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.*

### Commonly Used Acronyms

#### CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

#### CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

#### CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

#### INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

#### PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

#### LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

#### UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

### Useful Websites

#### Design for Security

[www.designforsecurity.org](http://www.designforsecurity.org)

#### Secured by Design

[www.securedbydesign.com](http://www.securedbydesign.com)

#### RIBA Product Selector

[www.ribaproductselector.com](http://www.ribaproductselector.com)

#### LPCB – Red Book Live

[www.redbooklive.com](http://www.redbooklive.com)

#### Crime Reduction (Home Office)

[www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)

#### DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

[www.designagainstcrime.org](http://www.designagainstcrime.org)

#### Building for Life

[www.buildingforlife.org](http://www.buildingforlife.org)

#### CLG (Communities and Local Government)

[www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)