



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

JD SPORTS CAMPUS HUB, HOLLINS BROOK WAY, PILSWORTH, BURY
COMMERCIAL BUILDING, MULTI-USE SPORTS PITCH, INTERNAL SITE ROADS
& ASSOCIATED PARKING (PHASE 2)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: AVID

VERSION A: 30/09/2024

REFERENCE: 2012/0008/CIS/02

JD Sports Campus Hub, Hollins Brook Way, Pilsworth, Bury

URN: 2012/0008/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure perimeter fencing to site and robust access control system to managed staff/visitor access and prevent unauthorised access, both during normal working hours and out-of-hours/at night. An additional fenceline/gates are recommended to the south of the building, in order to fully secure site perimeter out-of-hours and prevent unseen access and escape to/from the adjacent right of way/open land.
- Control of access into/around the Hub Building.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the south side of Pilsworth Road and to the west of Hollins Brook Way, in the Pilsworth area of south Bury.

The site was formerly in use as a plant hiring depot (A-Plant), who vacated the site in 2018. The buildings were demolished and cleared in 2019. The eastern portion of the site has recently been developed to form a tarmacked car park, with a gated/barriered entrance off Pilsworth Road (as part of Phase 1 of the redevelopment). The eastern portion of the site (Phase 2) is currently enclosed with chain link fencing and timber hoardings along the street frontage.

To the east and south-east of the site are 3 no. office buildings in use by JD Sports Fashion plc. The buildings are served by large surface parking areas surrounding them, enclosed with welded-wire mesh/palisade fencing, which are accessed via a barriered entry point (with security gatehouse) off Hollins Brook Way.


To the north of the site, on the opposite side of Pilsworth Road, is Pilsworth Road Industrial Estate – with a number of units along the street frontage that provide little in the way of direct overlooking/surveillance over the site.

Beyond additional business/industrial units to the north-east is Park Sixty Six – a retail park, including a number of drive-thru units (including KFC, Costa & McDonalds).

To the west of the site is an apartment block (Beechwood Apartments) accessed off Pilsworth Road and large detached houses fronting onto The Croft.

There is open land to the south of the site, including Hollins Brook, waterbodies and grassland/woodland, which together form the Hollins Vale Local Nature Reserve. A Public right of way passes along the south-eastern boundary of the site, linking Hollins Brook Way to the nature reserve to the south.

Publicly accessible open land/pedestrian routes to the rear of buildings/sites can sometimes lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly if they are irregularly used or are used after dark. Adjacent sites/properties can also be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime Summary

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 1000m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
14	10	34	169	21	6	7	12	9	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall volume of crime in the local area is relatively low for the Bury division. The surrounding area includes large areas of open space, which are not densely populated and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 The most prevalent types of crime in the local area have been less serious wounding and criminal damage, which have primarily occurred at the nearby retail park and within the residential neighbourhoods in the wider surrounding area. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have accounted for the majority of less serious woundings, which have mostly involved disputes between known associates or neighbours, as well as some cases of domestic violence. Criminal damage offences have been committed by offenders using objects to damage the glazing within the windows of cars and dwellings, as well as causing damage to the bodywork of cars, vans and buses.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS report relates to a proposed office building with ancillary restaurant and sport facilities, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at office premises in Bury peaks on Friday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified. Offenders also target office buildings during the day, when they are busy, as employees are likely to be distracted and offenders can often go about their business unnoticed/unchallenged.

Bury Office Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been the occurred most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.


2.3 Theft (Bury Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against office, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.

Bury Office Theft – Day Range



Bury Office Theft – Time Range




2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Bury offices is greatest on Wednesday and Thursday and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels.

2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking in the afternoon. During these times, many office workers will take breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Bags, purses/wallets and mobile phones were the most frequently stolen items.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Café/Restaurants): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurant/café premises, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury café/restaurant premises is greater over the weekend (Saturday to Monday) than during the rest of the week.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are closed and the areas in which cafes/restaurants are typically based are quiet – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being detected.
- 2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders when targeting Wigan restaurants/cafes:
- Doors have been forced open using bodily pressure, tools and implements.
 - Windows have also been prised open by offenders to gain entry.
 - Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to force entry.
 - Offenders have penetrated through walls to access unauthorised access.

2.5 Theft (Bury Restaurants/Cafes): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurant/cafe, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at cafes/restaurants in the Bury area peaks at weekend, when premises are likely to be at their busiest.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft at Bury cafes/restaurants rises in the afternoon and into the evening/early hours of the morning. Offenders are likely to target premises to commit theft during these periods, when they are often busier and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Theft of property belonging to staff has also occurred, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to back-of-house areas unnoticed.


2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Leisure/Sports Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon / early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry





2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.7 Theft (GM Leisure/Sports Premises): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.8 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site between 1st September 2023 to 31st August 2024.



2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Saturday. During the day, the risk increases in the early afternoon.

2.8.2 Vehicles parked on streets or within open communal parking areas, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of dwellings, within garages or within secure parking facilities.

2.9 General Risk Factors

2.9.1 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.9.2 **Cafes/Restaurants:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises

- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.9.3 **Sports Facilities:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Theft of user/staff belongings
- Other theft from premises
- Theft of/from parked cars
- Controlled Access (staff/user only)
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Arson
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Safety of children
- Cash robbery/attacks on vending machines
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.10 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.10.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Bury offices, Bury Café/Restaurants and Greater Manchester sport facilities are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

Bury Offices, Bury Cafes/Restaurants & GM Sports Facilities: Secure doors and windows have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools.

Possible Solution - All external doors and accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1 & 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors and windows are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

- **Bury Offices, Bury Cafes/Restaurants & GM Sports Facilities:** Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. Fully height glazed street frontages should ideally be protected by bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features to prevent ramming. In vulnerable locations, shutters or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection. Any damage arising from vandalism should be repaired quickly in order to maintain a culture of care and respect, as a lack of maintenance can often attract further abuse.

- **Bury Cafes/Restaurants:** Offenders have penetrated through walls to access unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - The construction of any potential accessible areas of roof, all external walls and any internal walls between premises or uses should be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

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- **Bury Offices, Bury Cafes/Restaurants and GM Sports Facilities:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to office buildings are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.5). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

In cafes/restaurants, there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.5).

Typically thefts occur at sports facilities when customers leave property unattended in communal areas, in changing rooms or in unsecured lockers whilst taking part in activities, returning to find property missing. The main entrance to premises should be staffed at all times and there should be secure lockers for the use of patrons, with clear signage to encourage their use. Lockers should ideally be located where they can be well-overlooked and where potential offenders are more likely to be witnessed.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 Phase 1 of the development included a creche building (yet to be constructed), car parking and highway improvement works. Phase 2 includes a 3 storey hub building for the wider JD campus, comprising of a restaurant, a gym and recreation facilities, training environments and collaborative working spaces, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The proposed building will feature two wings joined by a central atrium and will front towards Hollins Brook Way. A visitor parking area (comprising of 20 no. spaces) will be located to the north of the building, with staff parking spread across the site within Phase 1 and with an additional 42 no. spaces to the north-west of the building – accessed via ANPR security barriers on Hollins Brook Way and on the Phase 1 access point off Pilsworth Road. A multi-purpose all weather games area and a padel tennis court will be located to the west/rear of the building. The public right of way passing along Hollins Brook Way and along the south-eastern boundary of the site, linking to the adjacent nature reserve to the south, will be retained.
- 3.1.3 The building itself will feature a main entrance lobby/reception area (as well as a rear entrance), a central breakout area, a kitchen and restaurant (with outdoor seating), a lecture theatre, meeting rooms and a meeting suite, a 24 hour staffed security hub/office and plant area at ground floor level. At first floor level, the building will house a gym (with W/Cs and showers) and office space with meeting rooms and breakout spaces, with additional office space/meeting rooms/breakout spaces at second floor level.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal


The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The development will bring a currently vacant site back into use and provide additional activity and surveillance to the area during operational hours.
- 3.2.2 The site is directly adjacent to a number of office buildings in ownership of JD Sports, which already have established security protocols in place to manage legitimate access and prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.2.3 The site is capable of being enclosed within a secure perimeter fenceline, with a security presence/access controls at the entrances to the site off Hollins Brook Way and Pilsworth Road, preventing unauthorised access during operational hours and allowing the site to be secured out-of-hours.
- 3.2.4 The design of the building will feature no narrow/deep recesses within the building line, where partially hidden windows/doors could be vulnerable to attack unseen.
- 3.2.5 The proposed car parking areas will have spaces laid out in rows and few obstacles to views across them - protecting the parked vehicles and aiding surveillance opportunities.
- 3.2.6 The location of the main entrances to the site and to the building provide clear and direct routes for visitors. There will be a staffed reception within the entrance lobby of the building, allowing staff to greet/vet all visitors, manage access and overlook everyone entering/leaving the building during normal working hours. A 24/7 staffed security hub will be located at the north-eastern corner of the building to allow staff to overlook/control access to the site at all times, deter crime and disorder from occurring and respond to any incidents experienced.
- 3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The perimeter of the site should be enclosed with secure fencing to prevent unauthorised access, both during the day and outside of normal working hours (see illustration below and Section 4.6 for more information). The security hub adjacent to the access-controlled barriers on Hollins Brook Way should be staffed at all times – to control and monitor all access to and egress from the site. It is preferable for all access/egress to be via this staffed entry point. The secondary access/egress point off Pilsworth Lane should be secured with access-controlled vehicle arm-barriers (controlled by ANPR for staff only access) during the day and should be secured with gates outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm to 6am) - preventing unauthorised pedestrian as well as vehicular access and meaning all site access/egress is via the security hub out-of-hours.
- 3.3.2 Access and egress to/from the visitor car park will be through vehicle arm-barriers managed via the adjacent security hub. There should be a secondary fenceline/barrier between the visitor and staff parking areas to deter access between the two areas and funnel all visitors to the main entrance of the building (again, see illustration below and Section 4.6). At night/when the building is closed, the visitor car park should be secured with manual gates, preventing unauthorised access.
- 3.3.3 The existing open land/public right of way route to the south of the site could provide the means for offenders to gain access to and escape from the site without being noticed. It is highly recommended that the site perimeter is fully secured with an additional fenceline and vehicular gates to the south of the building out-of-hours (see illustration below for example placement), to ensure that the right of way to the south is still accessible, but that no one can bypass the staffed security hub on Hollins Brook Way and access the rear of the building/site unseen when levels of activity and surveillance are lower.



- 3.3.4 The control and management of access into and around the building will be paramount to the security of the scheme (see Section 4.5 for more information). The reception desk adjacent to the main entrance of the building should be staffed at all times when the building is operational, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building. All visitors should report to the reception desk for vetting by staff before gaining access through the turnstiles and to the rest of the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. The main entrance doors to the building should also be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required to prevent unauthorised access (e.g. outside of normal working hours). The rear entrance doors and the external gym entrance door should be secured and controlled by means of staff card/fob only. Access controls should be incorporated to all individual office levels/suites, the lecture theatre, meeting rooms/suites and the staff gym to prevent unauthorised access when required and allow the building to be 'zoned' – preventing unauthorised access to areas/floors of the building that are not being used when other parts of the building are. Access to all back-of-house plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only) and all individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied (see Section 4.5 for more information).

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- 3.3.5 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 External Doors

- ☐ All external doors (including single leaf, double leaf and sliding doorsets) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. The main entrance to the building (as well as the rear entrance and the dedicated gym entrance) should include a multi-point electronic lock, permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (see Section 4.5 for more information).
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor/accessible glazing should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass) or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the proposed building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack. Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms (search for certified products at <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search>).
- ☐ The glazed frontages of the building outside of the secure perimeter fenceline should be protected by bollards or similar hard/soft landscaping features to deter vehicular access.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the building when closed, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to the on-site security team or to an Alarm Receiving Centre).

4.5 Access Controls & Internal Security


- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads (as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed). The following barriers, gates and doors should operate on access control:
 - The vehicle arm-barriers at the entrances to the site – operated remotely by security hub staff or by ANPR.
 - Any pedestrian gates to the site perimeter – operated remotely by security hub staff or by staff key-card/fob.

- The external main entrance doorset – capable of be operated remotely by reception staff or by staff key-card outside of normal working hours/when required.
- The external rear entrance doorset and the external/internal gym entrance doorsets - operated by staff key-card/fob.
- The turnstiles/security barriers off the reception lobby - operated remotely by reception staff or by staff key-card/fob.
- Any internal doors needed to provide internal zoning and restrict access to other areas/floors of the building when a portion of it is being used out-of-hours.
- Internal doors to changing facilities and back-of-house rooms, plant areas or stores - operated by staff key-card/fob.
- Any doors to obvious risk areas (e.g. kitchens, IT suites, stores for TV/audio equipment or other expensive/desirable equipment etc.) – operated by staff key-card/fob.

- ☐ The electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff key-cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.
- ☐ All internal doors/frames to individual rooms, offices, meeting rooms, lecture theatres, staff rooms, stores and plant rooms should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.
- ☐ Any cash offices should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover.
- ☐ The use of the community/sports facilities within the site must be pre-booked and managed by JD Sports staff, with all non-staff/community access to the site controlled by security hub staff.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The whole site should be enclosed with 1800-2400mm high rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing or railings and gates (as illustrated within Section 3.3). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of low walls and fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Consideration should be given to any boundaries adjacent to the publicly accessible open space to the south of the site (which are potentially more exposed/vulnerable) being formed by 358 gauge welded-wire mesh fencing, with small apertures to deter scaling and cutting (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). A secondary fenceline/security barrier should be incorporated within the site to separate the visitor's car park from the rest of the site.
- ☐ Automatic vehicle arm-barriers and pedestrian gates should be controlled on access and egress by security hub staff, by ANPR or via staff key-card/fob (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out', with no automatic egress), so that criminals cannot gain access to the areas, attack the vehicles and escape. They should operate as quickly as is safely possible, in order to reduce the opportunities for tailgating/unauthorised access. Any pedestrian gates should be self-closing/locking and any internal release button/mechanism should not be capable of being reached or operated from the public side of the fenceline.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



- ☐ The site boundary treatments should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible.
- ☐ The proposed multi-use games area and padel tennis court should be enclosed with 2400-3000mm high welded-wire mesh fencing and lockable gates (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers), to prevent unauthorised access out-of-hours and ensure all access/use of the courts is managed via the existing building when they are operational.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all access roads and pedestrian routes within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an **acceptable standard** that will allow for **identification** of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are **overview** and **recognition**, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **all external facades of the building (including all external entrances), the main entrance lobby and circulation spaces of the building and all vehicle/cycle parking areas.**

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- ☐ The CCTV system should be linked to the security hub office and should be capable of being monitored on-site security team, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded. Consideration could also be given to a linked public address facility, to inform any offenders who attempt to gain unauthorised access, cause damage or nuisance/anti-social behaviour out-of-hours that have been detected on site, that they are being monitored/recorded and that the police have been called.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ Consideration should be given to low-level hedging or dense, low-level planting to define and enclose the parking areas across the site, funnelling pedestrian movement along the dedicated pedestrian routes and discouraging pedestrian movement around/between parked vehicles, where damage can easily occur (both accidental and malicious).
- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.


4.10 Other

- ☐ Lockers should be provided for the use of the staff gym, ideally in highly visible areas to increase the chances of any offenders attempting to force open lockers being seen. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in rooms or changing areas. Staff should undertake regular inspections of all changing facilities and the locker areas.
- ☐ Any cycle parking areas should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms and should include cycle lockers or 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.
- ☐ Any bin/recycling stores should be a secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosure. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Internal Layout Guidance for Restaurant

The internal layout of the restaurant within the Hub Building should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

- 5.1.1 The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff.
- 5.1.2 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.3 Consideration should be given to high/wide service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 5.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.1.5 All back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 5.1.6 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.7 Any external seating areas serving the premises should adhere to the following good practice principles, in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and disorder:
 - Any external seating areas should be clearly defined as separate from any adjacent pedestrian footways/parking areas by screens, barriers or planters.
 - Tables and chairs, as well as any removable canopies, heaters or screens/barriers should be stored within the premises out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted out-of-hours.
 - Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with Chelsea Clips (see above) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
 - The layout of any external tables/chairs should be configured so that, as much as possible, they are not located directly adjacent to barriers where it would be easy reach over and steal any items of value. All external seating areas should be capable of being clearly overlooked from internal staff positions.

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- The success of any external seating areas is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the site/buildings can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management, which should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the site/building, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises;
- Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

6.1.2 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable sports/gym equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28 th August 2024	Enabl	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
28 th August 2024	Enabl	Quote issued & request for additional info
29 th August 2024	Enabl	Receipt of D&A Statement. Boundary treatment plan to follow
30 th August 2024	Enabl	Confirmation of instruction/fee
6 th September 2024	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment
12 th September 2024	Enabl	Email correspondence re: timescales
23 rd to 26 th September 2024	Enabl	Email correspondence re: timescales

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
13247-AEW-01-00-DR-A-0510	GA Plan - Ground Floor	23/08/24	P05
13247-AEW-01-01-DR-A-0511	GA Plan - First Floor	23/08/24	P05
13247-AEW-01-02-DR-A-0512	GA Plan - Second Floor	23/08/24	P05
13247-AEW-01-03-DR-A-0514	GA Plan - Roof Level	23/08/24	P05
13247-AEW-01-XX-DR-A-0520	GA Elevations Sheet 1	23/08/24	P05
13247-AEW-01-XX-DR-A-0521	GA Elevations Sheet 2	23/08/24	P05
13247-AEW-01-XX-DR-A-0530	GA Sections AA, BB	23/08/24	P02
13247-AEW-01-XX-DR-A-0531	GA Sections CC, DD	10/07/24	P02
13247-AEW-B1-XX-DR-A-0560	Aerial Perspective 01	23/08/24	P01
13247-AEW-B1-XX-DR-A-0561	Aerial Perspective 02	23/08/24	P01
13247-AEW-XX-SI-DR-A-0502	Proposed Site Plan	23/08/24	P03
13247-AEW-XX-XX-RP-A-0500	Design and Access Statement	Sept '24	P03

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk