



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

137 The Rock

13 Apartments

For: **21 Living Limited**

Version A: **17/04/23**

Ref: **2023/0114/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

137 The Rock

2023/0114/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - No Design Changes Required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Residential access into the building.
- Access control of residential entrance.
- Secure waste storage unit

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition to meet Secured by Design certification is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site lies to the north of The Rock in Bury town centre.

The site is currently formed by a 2 storey building comprising of a vacant ground floor retail unit and two floors above.

The building is in a state of disrepair and redevelopment is required. The gated entrance to the inner courtyard is set back from the pavement and appears to be used as a toilet.


The building fronts onto The Rock - a busy vehicular and pedestrian route within the town centre. Just to the west of the site, the route becomes a pedestrianised shopping precinct.

The site is well connected to the public transport system. Bury bus station and tram stop are approx. 500m southwest of the site. There are a number of car parks and in close proximity are two multi-storey car parks.

The site is in the busy and popular district of the town centre. This area contains a mix of commercial businesses, retail uses, café/bars, restaurants, and a large residential development directly opposite. The night-time economy within this area is a popular destination across the week & weekend.

Over the last decade the town centre has undergone significant redevelopment as a retail destination with new purpose developments and the urban environment.

The Rock is part pedestrianised.



1 – View of site across The Rock.



2 – Recessed doors opposite.




3 – Evidence the site is used as a toilet.




7 – Recessed gated entrance into the site



6 – Pedestrianised retail area.



5 – View northeast along The Rock.



4 – View southwest along The Rock.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2022 to 28th February 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
10	28	96	719	96	60	12	27	23	12

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of town and city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Violence has taken place throughout the surrounding area, with a particular concentration to the south-west (around/off Haymarket Street and Market Street), where there is a high concentration of licensed premises and late night takeaways. Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of violence in the area, often taking place in the late evening and early hours of the morning at the weekend, when such premises are at their busiest.
- 2.1.3 The Rock is the main shopping area of Bury, with a high volume of retail and entertainment/licenced premises located along it. Theft offences have mostly occurred in/around these types of premises, where offenders have stolen insecure personal items (such as bags and mobile phones) and items belonging to the businesses.
- 2.1.4 Criminal damage offences have also been concentrated to the south-west of the site, with offenders primarily targeting businesses and vehicles (particularly smashing glazing).

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 **Local Residential:** Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.
- 2.2.2 Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access (see Section 4.1). The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.
- 2.2.3 **Local Residential:** Doors have been targeted (a common M.O. when apartments are burgled) and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (also see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.
- 2.2.4 **Local Residential:** Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Bury and Greater Manchester

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.




- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **6% lower** than Bury as a whole, **8% lower** than Greater Manchester and **6% lower** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **608% higher** than Bury as a whole, **550% higher** than Greater Manchester and **1141% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **410% higher** than Bury as a whole, **362% higher** than Greater Manchester and **461% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **297% higher** than Bury as a whole, **260%** than Greater Manchester and **337% higher** than England & Wales.


2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.


Burglary Dwelling – Day Range



Burglary Dwelling – Time Range



Burglary Dwelling – Point of Entry





2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Tuesday during the late afternoon (4:30pm – 5:30pm). The peak in offences during this time is likely when people have returned home from work and found that the property has been compromised. Offenders are likely to target properties during the day when they are unoccupied for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for the offender.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
- Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements, gain access to the garden shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Wednesday, Thursday and Friday during the afternoon and into the evening. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people park on streets and in car parks in the area for long periods of time, while working in the town centre, shopping or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within pay & display car parks within and around the edges of the town centre, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure car parks/basement parking facilities.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises the redevelopment of an existing building to accommodate 13 apartments, with associated cycle parking and amenity space.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The development will re-use of the existing buildings upper floors which has been vacant for some time and which has the opportunity for criminal and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.2 The new glazed elements of the building offer both surveillance opportunities and a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.3 The proposed development will bring additional activity and surveillance to the area, at varying times of the day and night.
- 3.2.4 The apartments will be provided well-above street level, reducing the potential impacts of noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The main elevation of the building fronting The Rock street will directly abut the back edge of the pavement – leaving the ground floor apartment windows fully exposed to the public realm and vulnerable to nuisance, damage and unauthorised access if left insecure or attacked – particularly late in the evening/at night when the takeaways along the adjacent parade are operational. This also reduces the level of privacy for occupants, who are likely to refrain from opening curtains/blinds, thus reducing the opportunities for natural surveillance. The addition of decorative planters to the windows are welcomed; providing an element of ownership and defensible space to this apartment. The windows themselves should be security-certified (see Section 4.2), include laminated glazing (see Section 4.3). If they must open, they should have only small, high-level opening lights fitted with opening restrictors and lockable operated locks.
- 3.3.2 The control of access into and around the premises is paramount to the security of the development. The ground floor entrance lobby must be covered by CCTV and recorded. At night, the main entrance doors should be secured and controlled by resident key card.
- 3.3.3 The entrance lobby into the building should be fitted with a security-certified door-set fitted with access controls (operated by guest keycards), to ensure that only guests who have already booked in and are staying at the premises can access the bedroom floors (see Section 4.1/4.5).
- 3.3.4 To minimise the risk of 'tail-gating' legitimate residents/visitors, the door connecting the entrance lobby to the stair/lift core should include access controls.
- 3.3.5 Any cycle storage for guests and staff should be located in secure enclosures within the building, with access restricted to genuine cyclists only. The cycle store should be covered by CCTV. The choice of stand should enable cyclists to secure their bikes in at least two places.
- 3.3.6 Arrangements for collection of refuse should not allow further access within the building, nor require bins to be left outside for prolonged periods.
- 3.3.7 The external communal area benefits from limited levels of natural surveillance and overlooking, particularly at night. As such, it could foster nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues across the day &

night. It is also highly recommended that the area is covered by a CCTV camera, to ensure there can be an immediate response to any incidents recorded.

3.3.8 The back-of-house areas should only be accessible to staff.

3.3.9 It is highly recommended that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors & Access Controls

- ☐ All external doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Security-certified louvered doorsets are available if required to the bin store (see www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search for SBD-compliant products).
- ☐ The main communal entrance to the building should front onto The Rock and should be security-certified (see above), single-leaf (which is easier to secure and operate remotely than double doors), self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The entrance should be controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set), so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access.
- ☐ Where possible, postal delivery arrangements should allow for external deposits and internal withdrawals by residents. Where this is not practical, there should be a 'secure lobby' arrangement, with a secondary communal door to the same security specification as the outer door, to allow for deliveries within a postal lobby without providing access to all floors of the building. The postboxes themselves should be certified to Door & Hardware Federation Technical Specification 009 (TS 009), with letter box apertures to a maximum size of 260mm x 40mm (incorporating anti-fishing measures). All other deliveries should be made directly to residents via the access control system.
- ☐ All internal apartment entrance doorsets must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, SPS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead. Chain limiters are recommended, but not generally essential.
- ☐ Any internal doorsets providing access to the bin or cycle stores should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and self-closing/locking, with 3 hinges and an electrically operated multi-point lock (e.g. Winkhaus AV2-E) controlled by resident key-fob. Further information relating to the cycle store can be found within Section 4.6.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any ground floor/accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 and should be non-opening. Any curtain walling panels should be securely fixed.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor glazing (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Internal walls between the residential portions of the building should either be of robust masonry construction or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack/penetration.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must also be provided to all external doors, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light, and fixtures must not be positioned where they may provide climbing aids up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.6 Other

- ☐ The residential cycle store should include stands that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be prepared to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of any residential development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Repairs to communal areas (access controls, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Litter/graffiti removal

Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
10/03/23	Paul Bulter Assoc.	CIS application received
22/03/23	Paul Bulter Assoc.	Client confirmation
17/04/23	DfS	Site visit
30/03/23	DfS	Invoice issued
05/04/23	DfS	Invoice paid
17/04/23	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
A750_P_11	Proposed Plans	Nov 22	
A750_P_102	Existing Plans	Nov 22	
A750_P_107	Existing Elevations and Section	Nov 22	
A750_P_120	Proposed Elevations	Nov 22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by **manual intervention***

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

*This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable **to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.***

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk