



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

STATION WORKS, BURY ROAD, RADCLIFFE
RESIDENTIAL (10 no. APARTMENTS & 20 no. HOUSES)

FOR: Paul Cook Developments (Whitehaven) Ltd.

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 18/11/2022

designforsecurity

REFERENCE: 2022/0485/CIS/01

Station Works, Bury Road, Radcliffe

URN: 2022/0485/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- General boundary treatments to adequately secure private space and define defensible space to protect residential windows and parked vehicles, including:
 - Particularly robust rear boundaries to Plots 1 to 8, which abut the parking/service area serving the adjacent industrial site;
 - Gating of access path between Plots 10 & 11 at outermost point to improve surveillance;
 - Enclosure/gating of industrial/watercourse maintenance access routes to the side/rear of Plots 8 to 13 to prevent unauthorised access; and
 - Definition/enclosure of communal car park serving the apartment block, including a symbolic barrier at the vehicular entrance and secure enclosure of the communal bin and cycle stores.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the eastern side of Bury Road and to the south of Newbridge Close, to the north-east of Radcliffe district centre.

The site was formerly occupied by a large industrial warehouse, which has been demolished, leaving a large area of hard standing (currently in use as a commercial parking area) and scrub vegetation enclosed with low walls/railings and herras fencing to the Bury Road frontage and timber fencing along Newbridge Close.


To the south of the site is part two-storey brick/part single-storey corrugated metal clad building occupied by an engineering company. There is also a long, narrow, double-height corrugated metal clad industrial warehouse building along the eastern perimeter of the site. Both of these buildings are accessed off Bury Road and are served by the hard standing parking area along the southern perimeter of the site

Newbridge Lane, to the north of the site, passes over a small brook running along part of the north-eastern boundary of the site – currently formed by a low retaining wall with some scrub vegetation/trees along the bank of the brook. Newbridge Close itself serves a number of three/four-storey blocks of apartments, surrounding by communal areas of parking.

Bury Road is a busy route with vehicular traffic and pedestrian footfall, meaning the site benefits from good levels of passive surveillance from this direction.

On the opposite side of Bury Road from the site is a petrol station, a car servicing garage, a number of former industrial buildings in use as retail spaces, a small apartment block and terraced residential housing, which provide direct overlooking over the site.

Much of the surrounding areas to the south and east of the site are formed by terraced residential streets. Terraced properties often front directly onto the street, meaning their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space – leaving windows/doors exposed to nuisance, anti-social behaviour, unauthorised access (if left insecure) and attack. Residents vehicles must be parked on street as they cannot be parked within the curtilage of the dwellings – leaving them exposed to damage/attack. Rear communal alleyways can also leave terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access and many of them across Greater Manchester have been fitted with communal alleygates as a result.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2021 – 30th September 2022.





2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
23	7	37	172	31	9	8	22	20	<5

- 2.1.1 The general rate of crime in the local area is just above average for the Bury division. The most prevalent types of recorded crime have been less serious wounding (particularly assaults, harassment and public order offences), criminal damage (primarily to vehicles and dwellings) and vehicle crime (including theft of motorcycles and smashing vehicle windows to steal items). The majority of recorded crime has taken places on the streets to the east and south (around/off Spring Lane) and around the Radcliffe Metrolink stop.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed residential development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on local residential burglary and local vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparison (Local Area)


The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2021.



- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **45% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **42% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **45% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **22% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **12% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **115% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **32% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **20% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **45% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area **96% higher** than the rate for Bury as a whole, **78% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester and **116% higher** than the rate for England & Wales.

2.3 Local Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Wednesday/Thursday and Saturday/Sunday.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks late at night, during the early hours of the morning and around midday. Offenders often target residential properties at night when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the day, residents are more likely to be away from home (at work or otherwise), meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed.

2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.
- Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.
- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Windows have also been targeted when left insecure, but to a lesser extent.

2.4 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on Wednesday and Thursday.

2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks late at night, when it is dark, streets are quiet and offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

2.4.3 Vehicles parked on streets or within open communal parking areas, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked on in-curtilage driveways, in garages or within secure parking facilities.

2.5 General Risk Factors

2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting local dwellings and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors have been targeted most frequently and have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles (also see Section 4.1), essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

All individual apartments should also be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset, to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. There should be no balconies that would be publicly accessible from street level.

- Offenders have exploited insecure communal entrances or have tailgated into apartment buildings behind genuine visitors/residents to gain access unnoticed.

Possible Solution – A robust access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to apartment blocks before allowing them access. The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to ‘airlock’ lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed.

- Glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- Windows have also been targeted when left insecure, but to a lesser extent.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the ‘street’ can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties (see Section 4.5). Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour. Unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries (also see Section 4.5) and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible.

- Vehicles have been targeted for theft of, theft from and criminal damage when parked on-street or within open car parks

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that any resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartments or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured with automatic gates/shutters to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a 2 storey block of 10 no. apartments and 20 no. 2 storey semi-detached houses, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The scheme will be accessed off Bury Road and all of the houses will front onto the new access road, with enclosed rear garden spaces and off-road parking driveways in front of them for 1-2 vehicles. The apartments will each have their own dedicated external entrance and will front towards a communal parking area (comprising of 14 no. spaces and including enclosed communal cycle and bin stores) and back onto Bury Road.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will provide additional activity, surveillance and overlooking to the area at all times of the day and night.
- 3.2.2 The proposed houses and apartment block will front towards the proposed access road and each other, allowing for clear views of/between existing and proposed dwellings.
- 3.2.3 The houses and apartments will have habitable room windows to their street frontages, maximising surveillance opportunities over the street, parked vehicles and between dwellings.
- 3.2.4 The footprint of the buildings has been kept simple, with no doors hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack).
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the dwellings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

Houses

- 3.3.1 The boundary treatments to the houses are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The private rear garden spaces of the houses should be defined and secured with 2100mm high walls/close-boarded timber fencing (see Section 4.5 for more information), in order to prevent unauthorised access. Care should also be taken to ensure ground level changes do not inadvertently facilitate scaling boundaries or leave large gaps underneath the fencing panels/gates. The front elevations of houses should be protected by some defensible space, creating garden areas/driveways that are clearly defined as separate from the adjacent public highway and each other, in ownership/control of the residents themselves (also see Section 4.5 for more information).
- 3.3.2 Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of low retaining walls (along the watercourse to the north-east of the site) and close-boarded timber fencing should have fencing panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Any immediately adjacent existing tree branches should also be removed or pruned where necessary to ensure they do not form a climbing aid over the boundaries to private space.
- 3.3.3 The rear boundaries to Plots 1 to 8 will directly abut the parking/service area serving the adjacent industrial site. It is highly recommended that these boundaries are formed by a more robust boundary treatment, formed by 2100mm high double-skinned close-boarded timber fencing or a combination of 2100mm high close-boarded timber fencing and welded-wire mesh fencing.

- 3.3.4 The narrow access path between Plots 10 and 11 should be gated at its outermost point, in order to ensure anyone attempting to gain unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings can be clearly seen from the street.
- 3.3.5 The industrial building maintenance passageway running to the side/rear of Plots 8-12 and the watercourse maintenance access to the side/rear of Plots 12 & 13 must be securely enclosed and gated to ensure they are not publicly accessible, which could leave the hidden rear boundaries of the adjacent dwellings vulnerable to damage or scaling unseen. They should be secured with 2100mm high railings or rigid panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and exposed hinges or large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.



Apartments

- 3.3.6 The 'rear' elevation of the apartment block, along the Bury Road frontage, should be formed by low walls and railings above to a total height of 1200-1400mm high, in order to provide defensible space to the ground floor residential windows. This boundary treatment should be continued along the Bury Road frontage of the front garden/driveway of Plot 20, to ensure all vehicular and pedestrian access and egress to/from the site is via the formal access road to the south-west. The ground floor windows to the frontage of the apartment building (along the car park) should be protected by some defensible space, defined by low-level dense planting or hedging.
- 3.3.7 The communal car park serving the apartment block should be enclosed with low-level railings and planting (see Section 4.5) to define it as in ownership/control of the residents and to deter pedestrian through-access around/between parked vehicles (where damage can easily occur – both accidentally and maliciously). There should be a symbolic barrier at the entrance (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the area beyond is private and discouraging anyone without a purpose from entering. The cycle or bin stores within the car park should also be securely enclosed to prevent theft or mis-use (again, see Section 4.5).
- 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in residents and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ The front and rear doors to the houses must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2. Any external french/double doors, sliding doors or bi-folding doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24. The front entrance doors to the apartments must also be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Front doors to the properties should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key. Full instructions should be provided to residents to ensure that they understand that the key must be used to fully lock/secure the door.
- ☐ Front doors should also have either fixed sidelights or door viewers. Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential. Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ All ground floor and potentially accessible first floor windows (i.e. above any single-storey elements) should be certificated to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor opening lights must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All ground floor and any potentially accessible first floor glazing (i.e. above any single-storey elements) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as projecting brickwork/cladding features, projecting window cills, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby lighting columns, trees, handrails, street furniture etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper level windows or over boundaries to private space.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Each house and apartment should have an intruder alarm to comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems; or
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems.

Alarms should be linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors should cover any accessible rooms with windows.

4.5 Boundaries

Houses

- ☐ The sides (including gables up to/as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses should generally be enclosed with 2100mm high walls or robust close-boarded timber fencing (with the top 300mm consisting of robust integral trellis if required). Boundaries to private space that are adjacent to publicly accessible open space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base. Any side pedestrian gates to the private spaces of houses should also be 2100mm high and should be fitted with either a pad-lockable bolt (to the mid-point of the internal face) or a key operable deadlock. Sub-divisional rear boundaries should be 1500-1800mm high.

- ☐ The rear boundaries of Plots 13 & 14 (along the adjacent watercourse) and Plots 1 to 8 (along the adjacent industrial site) should be particularly robustly defined as described within Section 3.3. The industrial/watercourse maintenance access routes to the side/rear of Plots 8 to 13 should also be secured enclosed/gated to prevent unauthorised access to the rear of dwellings, as described within Section 3.3
- ☐ The front gardens/driveways of houses should be protected by some defensible space, demarcated and segregated by low-level railings, timber picket fencing and/or dense hedging erected to/maintained to an approximate height of 1200mm.
- ☐ Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels/sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.

Apartment Block

- ☐ The 'rear' elevation of the apartment block along Bury Road (as well as the Bury Road frontage of the front garden/driveway of Plot 20) should be formed by low walls and railings above to a total height of 1200-1400mm high. The design of any low walls/railings should be carefully considered to discourage comfortably sitting on or leaning against them – which could potentially cause nuisance and intimidation to residents.
- ☐ The car park serving the apartment block should be enclosed with low-level railings and planting (approximately 1200mm high) to define it as separate from the street and deter pedestrian from cutting-through the car park. It is highly recommended that there is a symbolic barrier at the entrance to the car park (e.g. brick pillars, change of road surface texture/colour etc.) to encourage a feeling of territoriality among the residents, psychologically giving the impression that the parking area is private and discouraging anyone without a legitimate purpose from entering.
- ☐ The external communal cycle store serving the apartment block should be defined by 2100mm high railings with a self-closing, 'slam to lock' gate (i.e. an automatic deadlocking mortice latch, fob operated from both sides). Similarly, the external communal bin store serving apartments should be enclosed with 2100mm high walls, railings or fire-resistant close-boarded timber fencing and a self-closing, 'slam to lock' gate. See Section 4.8 for more information on the communal cycle and bin stores.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to all access roads/footpaths should be to adoptable standards (to comply with BS 5489). Lighting to all communal parking areas should display an average lux level of 10, with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ External lighting must be provided to the front and rear doors of all houses and the front doors of the apartments, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED or metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations such as around dwelling entrances/frontages, around parking areas and along pedestrian routes, low planting should not exceed 1200mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people, dwellings and vehicles (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

-
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.8 Other

- ☐ Ideally, meter cupboards should be remotely read or located to the fronts of houses/apartments only and not in the private areas, in order to deter bogus callers.
- ☐ The secure communal cycle store serving the apartment block should include cycle lockers or 'Sheffield' style racks (that allow residents to lock both wheels and the crossbar to a stand, rather than just the crossbar) or cycle storage lockers. For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: www.designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/.
- ☐ A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (such as boundaries, lighting, signage etc.)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings. Low-level defensive planting beds can be used to great effect to funnel pedestrians away from vulnerable areas (such as gable walls, boundaries to private space or parking bays).

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
27 th September 2022	Jenkins Design Services	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
28 th September 2022	Jenkins Design Services	Quote issued & request for additional information
28 th September 2022	Jenkins Design Services	Confirmation of instruction/fee & receipt of additional information
11 th November 2022	Jenkins Design Services	Email correspondence re: timescales & payment
18 th to 21 st November 2022	Jenkins Design Services	Email correspondence re: report completion & payment
24 th November 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
SI-00-DR-A-0800	Site Location Plan	20/01/21	-
22049-JDS-S1-00-DR-A-0002	Proposed Site Plan	22/08/22	H
22049-JDS-S1-XX-DR-A-1004	Proposed Site Boundary Conditions	27/09/22	-
22049-JDS-B5-XX-DR-A-0601	House Type E Proposed Plans, Sections and Elevations	23/09/22	-
22049-JDS-B4-XX-DR-A-0601	House Type D Proposed Plans, Sections and Elevations	23/09/22	-
22049-JDS-B3-XX-DR-A-0601	House Type C Proposed Plans, Sections and Elevations	23/09/22	-
22049-JDS-B2-XX-DR-A-0601	House Type B Proposed Plans, Sections and Elevations	23/09/22	-
22049-JDS-B1-XX-DR-A-0601	House Type A Proposed Plans, Sections and Elevations	23/09/22	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk