



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

FORMER A-PLANT SITE, HOLLINS BROOK WAY, BURY
JD SPORTS CAMPUS HUB (TOTALLING 7,695sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: JD Sports Fashion plc

VERSION A: 17/05/2022

REFERENCE: 2012/0008/CIS/01

Former A-Plant Site, Hollins Brook Way, Bury

URN: 2012/0008/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/improvements required


This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure perimeter fencing to site and robust access control system to managed staff/visitor access and prevent unauthorised access, both during normal working hours and out-of-hours/at night.
- Control of access into/around the Hub & Creche Buildings.
- Secure enclosure of Creche external play areas & prevention of access to the roof of the single storey structure.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the south side of Pilsworth Road and to the west of Hollins Brook Way, in the Pilsworth area of south Bury.

The site was formerly in use as a plant hiring depot (A-Plant), who vacated the site in 2018. The buildings were demolished and cleared in 2019 and the site is currently enclosed with chain link/palisade fencing and mature trees/vegetation along its perimeter.




To the east and south-east of the site are 3 no. office buildings in use by JD Sports Fashion plc. The buildings are served by large surface parking areas surrounding them, enclosed with welded-wire mesh/palisade fencing, which are accessed via a barriered entry point (with security gatehouse) off Hollins Brook Way.

To the north of the site, on the opposite side of Pilsworth Road, is Pilsworth Road Industrial Estate – with a number of units along the street frontage that provide little in the way of direct overlooking/surveillance over the site.

To the west of the site is an apartment block (Beechwood Apartments) accessed off Pilsworth Road and large detached houses fronting onto The Croft.

There is open land to the south of the site, including Hollins Brook, waterbodies and grassland/woodland, which together form the Hollins Vale Local Nature Reserve. A Public right of way passes along the south-eastern boundary of the site, linking Hollins Brook Way to the nature reserve to the south.

Publicly accessible open land/pedestrian routes to the rear of buildings/sites can sometimes lead to nuisance and anti-social behaviour issues and can leave legitimate users intimidated/vulnerable, particularly if they are irregularly used or are used after dark. Adjacent sites/properties can also be vulnerable to unauthorised access, as they can provide easy access/escape routes that benefit from little/no natural surveillance.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st April 2021 to 31st March 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
<5	7	<5	30	5	<5	<5	6	5	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively low. However, the study area is primarily formed by large areas of open space and large scale commercial/industrial units – which lower the density of development within the locale and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 The majority of offences have occurred around/off the main arterial routes of Pilsworth Road and Croft Lane, as well as at the leisure facilities to the west of the site. Less serious wounding has been the highest recorded crime taking place, with public order offences and harassment being the most prevalent – particularly domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 As this CIS report relates to a proposed mixed-use scheme, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury educational facilities on Monday and Saturday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the late afternoon and into the evening/early hours of the morning. The opportunities for burglary often rise in the afternoon (at breaks and at the end of the school day), when large numbers of students are entering/leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents/carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target educational buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

Bury Education Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** At Bury educational facilities, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently by offenders:

- Offenders have prised open windows, have smashed the glazing within them or have targeted them when left insecure to gain unauthorised access.
- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.
- Shutters have been prised open by offenders.
- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements (and gained access through the roof itself or through high level rooflights/windows) or have penetrated through walls.


2.3 Theft (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.

Bury Educational Theft – Day Range




Bury Educational Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Bury peaks on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the normal school/college day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and staff leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, bags and coats are the most routinely stolen items, as well as I.T equipment.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Offices): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against office, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at office premises in Bury peaks on Friday.



2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified. Offenders also target office buildings during the day, when they are busy, as employees are likely to be distracted and offenders can often go about their business unnoticed/unchallenged.

2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points and MOs have been the occurred most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.5 Theft (Bury Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against office, recorded in the Bury area.



- 2.5.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Bury offices is greatest on Wednesday and Thursday and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours/staffing levels.
- 2.5.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking in the afternoon. During these times, many office workers will take breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out. Bags, purses/wallets and mobile phones were the most frequently stolen items.


2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area during 2018-2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday.
- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry





2.6.3 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.7 Theft (Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



2.7.1 **Day/ Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.





2.1.1 Day/Time Range: During the week, the risk of burglary at Greater Manchester community centres remains relatively consistent, with the exception of Tuesday – when it is slightly lower. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks in the early hours of the morning and during the early evening. At night, when it is dark and streets are quiet, offenders often perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected. During the early evening, community centres are likely to be at their busiest, meaning offenders posing as legitimate patrons can attempt to gain unauthorised access to restricted areas without being noticed.

2.1.2 Point of Entry: The following entry points and M.O.s have been the occurred most frequently:

- The majority of incidents have occurred through 'unknown' entry points, which is likely to have been where offenders posing as legitimate service users have gained entry to internal restricted areas by forcing doors, by tailgating or by targeting insecure doors unnoticed.
- Doors (particularly fire doors) have been forced open with bodily pressure/implements/tools or have been targeted when left insecure to gain access.
- Windows have also been prised open and targeted when insecure.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Shutters have been forced upwards/penetrated to gain access to the doors and windows behind them.

2.2 Theft (Greater Manchester Community Centres): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against community centres, recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day/Time Range:** Incidents of theft at Greater Manchester community centres peak on Monday and are lowest on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon/early evening. This aligns with the standard opening and closing times for many community centres, when more people attend them and, therefore, the opportunities for theft are greater. The most routinely targeted items are items of personal property belong to patrons and staff members, particularly laptops, mobile phones and handbags.

2.3 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.3.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Bury education premises, Bury offices, Greater Manchester sport facilities and Greater Manchester community centres office and premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Bury Education & Offices and GM Leisure & Community Centres:** Offenders have prised open windows, have smashed the glazing within them or have targeted them when left insecure to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- **Bury Education & Offices and GM Leisure & Community Centres:** Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

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- **Bury Education & GM Community Centres:** Shutters have been prised open by offenders.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (to LPS 1175 SR 1/2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

- **Bury Education:** Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements (and gained access through the roof itself or through high level rooflights/windows) or have penetrated through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any potentially accessible upper floor windows and rooflights should include laminated glazing and be to the same physical security standard as those at ground level. The construction of walls and any potentially accessible roof areas should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

- **Bury Offices and GM Leisure & Community Centres:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to office buildings are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.5). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

3.1.1 The proposed JD Sports Campus Hub scheme consists of the following buildings:

- **Hub Building** – a four-storey multi-use building that will incorporate a reception and atrium space, small café, gym/studio, JD staff shop/mock shop, a theatre/meeting rooms and plant/refuse stores at ground floor level. At first floor level, the building will feature a restaurant with external terrace, a library (with bookable meeting rooms), a boardroom and meeting rooms. The second and third floors of the building will be shell only, to allow for future office space.
- **Creche Building** – a part single/part two-storey building comprising of a reception/office, baby, waddler, toddler and pre-school rooms (for a total of 110 no. children of JD employees) with external play spaces and plant/refuse stores at ground level. The first floor of the building will house a manager's office, a staff room, changing facilities and a community/events space with external roof terrace.

3.1.2 The site will also include a multi-purpose all weather pitch (with small spectator area), a running track and staff and visitor parking areas surrounding the buildings, accessed via a widened Hollins Brook Way (fitted with access-control barriers adjacent to a new gatehouse, with a 24hr. security presence) and a new junction off Pilsworth Road to the north-west (also fitted with access-controlled barriers). Public use of the sports pitch and the first floor facilities above the creche will be pre-booked only, managed by JD.

3.1.3 A public right of way passes along Hollins Brook Way, along the south-eastern boundary of the site and links to the nature reserve to the south – this route will be maintained.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

3.2.1 The development will bring a currently vacant site back into use and provide additional activity and surveillance to the area during operational hours.

3.2.2 The site is directly adjacent to a number of office buildings in ownership of JD Sports, which already have established security protocols in place to manage legitimate access and prevent unauthorised access.

3.2.3 The site is capable of being enclosed within a secure perimeter fenceline, with a security presence/access controls at the entrances to the site off Hollins Brook Way and Pilsworth Road, preventing unauthorised access during operational hours and allowing the site to be secured out-of-hours.

3.2.4 The design of the buildings will feature no narrow/deep recesses within the building line, where partially hidden windows/doors could be vulnerable to attack unseen.

3.2.5 The proposed car parking areas will have spaces laid out in rows and few obstacles to views across them - protecting the parked vehicles and aiding surveillance opportunities.

3.2.6 The location of the main entrances to the site and to the buildings provide clear and direct routes for visitors. There will be a staffed reception within the entrance lobby of each building, allowing staff to greet/vet all visitors, manage access and overlook everyone entering/leaving the buildings.


3.2.7 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Points for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

General

- 3.3.1 The perimeter of the site should be enclosed with secure fencing to prevent unauthorised access, both during the day and outside of normal working hours (see illustration below and Section 4.6 for more information). The gatehouse adjacent to the access-controlled barriers on Hollins Brook Way should be staffed at all times – to control and monitor all access to and egress from the site. It is preferable for all access/egress to be via this staffed entry point. If the secondary access/egress point is required off Pilsworth Lane, it should be secured with access-controlled vehicle arm barriers (controlled by staff card/fob only) during the day and should be secured with gates outside of normal working hours (e.g. 6pm to 6am) - preventing pedestrian as well as vehicular access and meaning all site access/egress is via the security gatehouse out-of-hours.
- 3.3.2 Access to the visitor car park will be before the security barriers, off Hollins Brook Way. There should be a secondary fenceline between the visitor and staff parking areas to deter access between the two areas and funnel all visitors to the main entrance of the Hub building (again, see illustration below and Section 4.6). Outside of normal working hours/at night, the visitor car park should be secured with manual gates, preventing unauthorised access.



- 3.3.3 The existing open land/public right of way route to the south of the site could provide the means for offenders to gain access to and escape from the site without being noticed. It is highly recommended that the site is fully secured with vehicular gates out-of-house, to the south of the Hub building (see illustration above), to ensure that no one can bypass the staffed gatehouse on Hollins Brook Way when levels of activity/surveillance are likely to be lower. Should out-of-hours access be required, the gates should be operable remotely by gatehouse security staff and by staff card/fob. The eastern and southern frontages of the Hub building should be protected by anti-ram bollards to ensure the barriers on Hollins Brook Way cannot be bypassed and ensure the facades of the building outside of the secure perimeter fencing are protected.
- 3.3.4 Consideration should be given to hedging or dense, low-level planting to define and enclose the parking areas across the site, funnelling pedestrian movement along the dedicated pedestrian routes and discouraging pedestrian movement around/between parked vehicles, where damage can easily occur (both accidental and malicious).

Hub Building

- 3.3.5 The control and management of access into and around the building will be paramount to the security of the scheme (see Section 4.5 for more information). The reception desk adjacent to the main entrance of the building should be staffed at all times when the building is operational, allowing staff to have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building. All visitors should report to the reception desk for vetting by staff before gaining access through the turnstiles and to the rest of the building. A high, wide reception desk increases the distance between reception staff and any potential aggressive visitors and aids surveillance of all parts of the entrance lobby. The main entrance doors to the building should also be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if/when required to prevent unauthorised access (e.g. outside of normal working hours). If the building is to be open at any time without a

concierge staffing the reception desk, the entrance door should be secured and controlled by means of staff card/fob.

- 3.3.6 All individual office levels/suites, theatres/meeting rooms, the staff shop, the staff gym, the library and restaurant should all be fitted with solid-core doorsets, capable of being secured not in use. Access to all back-of-house plant/service/storage areas should also be fitted with auditable access controls (authorised personnel only), as should any staff locker/changing areas (see Section 4.5 for more information).

Creche Building

- 3.3.7 The external play areas for the creche should be securely enclosed to prevent unauthorised access, both during hours of operation and out-of-hours (see illustration above & Section 4.6 for more information). Any immediately adjacent existing trees or branches should also be removed or pruned where necessary to ensure they do not form a climbing aid over the boundaries.
- 3.3.8 Accessible roofs of education facilities (as well as community/leisure buildings) have been exploited by criminals across Bury/Greater Manchester to gain unauthorised access, particularly where there are single-storey elements, where eaves are lower or where building facades may be publicly accessible out-of-hours – making access easier. As much as possible, the design of the eaves should discourage climbing e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. and there should be no features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills, canopies below the level of the single storey eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. The balustrade to the first floor roof terrace should be fixed flush with the outer skin of the building below, leaving no steps/gaps that could provide a climbing aid. Any doors, windows/rooflights or glazing accessible from single-storey roof areas should be to the same physical security standards as those at ground floor level (see Sections 4.1/4.2/4.3) and, where possible, the construction of the roof itself should be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3). It is obviously preferable for the design of the building to deter access as much as possible, without the need for the installation of overt anti-climb security measures if problems are experienced.
- 3.3.9 The reception desk adjacent to the main entrance of the building should be staffed at all times when the creche is operational, to allow staff to vet those collecting children and prevent unauthorised access. The entrance lobby should be capable of working as an 'air lock' during operational hours, with internal doors controlled by reception or teaching staff (see Section 4.5). Parents/guardians should only be able to access the creche rooms when they are met/accompanied by members of staff.
- 3.3.10 Access to the first floor community/leisure facilities should be entirely separate from the creche. The building should be capable of being 'zoned', to prevent access to the creche when the first floor community/changing facilities are in use (and vice versa). The majority of thefts at leisure facilities occur when offenders gain access to changing rooms and target property belonging to other users. It is highly recommended that secure lockers are provided for sport facility users to store their possessions whilst taking part in activities and that users are encouraged to use them by staff. Staff should undertake regular inspections of any changing facilities/locker areas.
- 3.3.11 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 External Doors

- ☐ All external doors (including single leaf, double leaf and sliding doorsets) at ground and first floor levels must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. The main entrance to each of the buildings should include a multi-point electronic lock, permitted as part of the certification, capable of being operated via an electronic access control system (see Section 4.5 for more information).
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows, where possible, should be certificated BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any ground floor and first floor opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than just to perimeter columns.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All glazing at ground level and at first floor, accessible from single-storey elements or terraces (i.e. to doors, windows and rooflights), should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass) or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the buildings to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ There should be no features of the buildings (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, retaining walls, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids up to upper floor windows/terraces or onto the roof of single-storey elements. Any louvres to the buildings should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required to plant rooms (search for certified products at <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search>).
- ☐ The construction of the roof of any single-storey elements should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1 or STS 202 BR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh could be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space. Rooflights should be to the same physical security specification as the ground floor windows (see Section 4.2) and should incorporate laminated glazing (see above).
- ☐ The frontages of the Hub Building, outside of the secure perimeter fenceline, should be protected by anti-ram bollards (as described/illustrated within Section 3.3).

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ Comprehensive intruder alarm systems should be installed to cover each of the buildings, linked to contacts on all doors and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to the on-site security team or to an Alarm Receiving Centre).

4.5 Access Controls & Internal Security

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by staff swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads (as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed). The following barriers, gates and doors should operate on access control:
 - The vehicle arm-barriers/gates at the entrances to the site – operated remotely by the gatehouse security staff or by staff key-card.
 - The main entrance doorsets to the Hub Building and the Creche Building– capable of be operated remotely by reception staff or by staff key-card outside of normal working hours/when required.
 - The turnstiles/security barriers controlling access into the Hub Building off the reception lobby and the sliding doors off the Creche Building reception lobby - operated remotely by reception staff or by staff key-card.
 - Any internal doors needed to provide internal zoning and restrict access to other parts of the buildings when a portion of them is being used out-of-hours.
 - Internal doors to changing facilities and back-of-house rooms, plant areas or stores - operated by staff key-card.
 - Any doors to obvious risk areas (e.g. IT suites, stores for TV/audio equipment or other expensive/desirable equipment etc.).

The electric locking systems to be used throughout the buildings should be fully auditable (i.e. allowing the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Staff cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work and keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

- ☐ All internal doors/frames to individual rooms, offices, meeting rooms, theatres, staff rooms, stores and plant rooms should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied. The gym, staff shop, restaurant and each office suite/floor within the Hub Building community/events space within the Creche Building should also be capable of being secured when not in use.
- ☐ Any cash offices should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover.
- ☐ The use of the community/sports facilities within the site must be pre-booked and managed by JD Sports staff, with all non-staff/community access to the site controlled by gatehouse security staff.

4.6 Boundaries

- ☐ The whole site should be enclosed with 2100-2400mm high rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing or railings and gates (as illustrated within Section 3.3). Care should be taken to ensure that any boundaries formed by a combination of low walls and fencing should have panels that are fixed flush with the outer skin of the brickwork below, leaving no steps/gaps that would provide a climbing aid. Consideration should be given to any boundaries adjacent to the publicly accessible open space to the south of the site (which are potentially more exposed/vulnerable) being formed by 358 gauge welded-wire mesh fencing, with small apertures to deter scaling and cutting (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers).

- ☐ A secondary fenceline should be incorporated within the site (e.g. approx.. 1500-1800mm high), to separate the visitor's car park from the rest of the site. The external play areas to the sides/rear of the Creche Building should also be enclosed with 1800mm high railings or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing.
- ☐ Ideally, any automatic vehicular gates should be sliding (which are easier to secure and operate remotely). If this is not possible, any double automatic gates should overlap when closed and should be capable of being forced open. They should operate as quickly as is safely possible, in order to reduce the opportunities for tailgating/unauthorised access. Automatic vehicle arm-barriers and gates should be controlled on access and egress by gatehouse staff or via staff key-card/proximity reader (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out', with no automatic egress), so that criminals cannot gain access to the areas, attack the vehicles and escape. Any pedestrian gates should be self-closing/locking and any internal release button/mechanism should not be capable of being reached or operated from the public side of the fenceline.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates. There should be no centrally located horizontal bars to aid climbing and the gates should be located away from other climbing aids, such as low walls, street lights, trees etc. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through.
- ☐ The site boundary treatments should ideally be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary. Care should also be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible.



4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to all access roads and pedestrian routes within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.

- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all external facades of the buildings, the main entrance lobbies and circulation spaces of each building and all vehicle/cycle parking areas.*

- ☐ The CCTV system should be linked to the gatehouse and should be capable of being monitored on-site security team, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded. Consideration could also be given to a linked public address facility, to inform any offenders who attempt to gain unauthorised access, cause damage or nuisance/anti-social behaviour out-of-hours that have been detected on site, that they are being monitored/recorded and that the police have been called.

4.9 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Lockers should be provided for the use of the staff gym and the community facilities, ideally in highly visible areas to increase the chances of any offenders attempting to force open lockers being seen. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all users must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongs unattended in rooms or changing areas. Staff should undertake regular inspections of all changing facilities and the locker areas.
- ☐ Any cycle parking areas should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.
- ☐ Any bin/recycling stores should be a secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosure. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Internal Layout Guidance for Café, Restaurant & Staff Shop

The internal layout of the café/coffee, restaurant and staff shop within the Hub Building should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1 Café & Restaurant

- 5.1.1 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.1.2 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.3 Consideration should be given to high/wide service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable hatches that cannot be easily scaled).
- 5.1.4 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.1.5 All back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
- 5.1.6 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



5.2 Staff Shop

- 5.2.1 Careful consideration should be given to the location of pay points to ensure that staff have full surveillance over the entrance to the unit.
- 5.2.2 Internal aisles and product displays should be aligned to assist surveillance from pay points and avoid blind-spots. There should be no items of high-value displayed close to the entrance of the unit.
- 5.2.3 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any tills, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- 5.2.4 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

6 Management & Maintenance

6.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the site/buildings can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management, which should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of the site/buildings, including staff arrival and departure;
- Cash management within the premises;
- Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

6.1.2 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools, portable sports/gym equipment etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

6.1.3 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

7 Construction

7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
5 th April 2022	Maze Planning Solutions	Receipt of CIS instruction & plans
7 th April 2022	Maze Planning Solutions	Quote issued
8 th April 2022	Maze Planning Solutions	Confirmation of instruction/fee. Receipt of additional plans/info
11 th May 2022	Maze Planning Solutions	Receipt of Pre-application Document
17 th May 2022	Maze Planning Solutions	Email correspondence re: report completion & payment
19 th May 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
-	Location Plan	-	-
346.2	Pre-app Statement	09/03/22	-
11302-AEW-XX-SI-DR-A-0004	Proposed Site Plan	01/04/22	P03
11302-AEW-XX-SI-DR-A-0003	Proposed Zoning Plan	08/04/22	P02
11302-AEW-01-00-DR-A-0010	Hub Proposed Ground Floor Plan	01/04/22	P03
11302-AEW-01-01-DR-A-0011	Hub Proposed First Floor Plan	01/04/22	P03
11302-AEW-02-01-DR-A-0012	Hub Proposed Second Floor Plan	01/04/22	P03
11302-AEW-03-01-DR-A-0019	Hub Proposed Third Floor Plan	01/04/22	P02
11302-AEW-01-RF-DR-A-0013	Hub Proposed Roof Plan	01/04/22	P03
11302-AEW-02-00-DR-A-0020	Creche Proposed Ground Floor Plan	01/04/22	P04
11302-AEW-02-01-DR-A-0021	Creche Proposed First Floor Plan	01/04/22	P04
11302-AEW-02-RF-DR-A-0022	Creche Proposed Roof Plan	01/04/22	P04
11302-AEW-XX-XX-PP-A-008-S2-P03	Pre-application Document March 2022	09/03/22	P03

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk