



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

MILLWOOD PRIMARY SPECIAL SCHOOL, SCHOOL STREET, RADCLIFFE, BURY
EXTENSION TO EXISTING PRIMARY SCHOOL

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Bury Council

VERSION A: 10/08/2023

REFERENCE: 2009/1263/CIS/02

Millwood Primary Special School, School Street, Radcliffe, Bury

URN: 2009/1263/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- The existing school perimeter fencing (as well as secondary fencelines/gates) should be retained and repaired where required. Screening panels should be added to the internal face of the existing fencing to the west (along the canal towpath) to impede views. Care should also be taken to ensure that any new or existing trees do not form a climbing aid over adjacent boundaries.
- Ideally, the deep recess between the existing school wing and the proposed extension should be designed-out to avoid the creation of a narrow, hidden space that could be exploited by criminals.
- Prevention of unauthorised access to the roof.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, we would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the north side of School Street, in the Radcliffe area of south-west Bury.

The site is currently occupied by Millwood Primary Special School, fronting towards a drop-off lane/car park accessed off School Street itself with landscaped play areas to the west and north of the site.

The surrounding area is primarily residential in nature, with pockets of industry and open space.






To the south of the site (on the opposite side of School Street) are residential properties providing direct overlooking over the site, as well as a base for the travelling community. To the north of the site is an industrial estate and to the east is vacant land, formerly occupied by a high school (demolished and cleared some years ago), which is due to be developed for residential use.

The western boundary of the site abuts the towpath along the Manchester, Bolton and Bury Canal – which sits at a lower ground level from the site itself and is separated by a narrow, heavy vegetated bank. The canal itself is no longer used by boats but provides a wetland habitat and is still used by pedestrians.

Canal and riverside routes can often be focal points for crime and disorder issues, as they usually benefit from limited levels of overlooking/surveillance and can provide the means to gain unauthorised access or cause damage to adjacent buildings/sites unseen.

A footbridge over the canal connects School Street with the open land on the western side of the canal and the residential estates beyond. The route is regularly used by locals to walk to/from Radcliffe town centre.

There is some evidence of disorder in the area, including graffiti to the bridge and damage to the school fenceline along the pedestrian route leading to the bridge.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

The data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st August 2022 to 31st July 2023.

2.1 Crime Summary


Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	12	48	261	10	10	5	8	15	<5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively high given the study area includes large areas of open space that are not densely populated and typically attract fewer crime and disorder incidents.
- 2.1.2 The most prevalent types of crime are less serious wounding and criminal damage, which have primarily taken place to the north and east of the site (around/off the main arterial route of Water Street (A665) and the residential streets around/off Chard Street). Assaults, harassment and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings, with offences often involving domestic disputes and incidents between known associates. Criminal damage offences have mostly occurred against vehicles and dwellings, with offenders damaging property within dwellings, using bodily pressure to smash/damage doors and personal property. Offenders have also used implements to damage/slash tyres of vehicles and damage vehicle body work.
- 2.1.3 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed school extension, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft. Offenders have targeted securely parked vehicles, removing keys from the person and making off with the vehicle.


2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at Bury educational facilities on Monday and Saturday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks in the late afternoon and into the evening/early hours of the morning. The opportunities for burglary often rise in the afternoon (at breaks and at the end of the school day), when large numbers of students are entering/leaving buildings, staff presence is likely to be lower and parents/carers enter school sites – providing anonymity to offenders. Offenders often target educational buildings at night when they are closed, it is dark, streets are typically quieter and they perceive a lower risk of being detected.

Bury Education Burglary – Point of Entry




2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** At Bury educational facilities, the following entry points and MOs have been utilised most frequently by offenders:

- Offenders have prised open windows, have smashed the glazing within them or have targeted them when left insecure to gain unauthorised access.
- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.
- Shutters have been prised open by offenders.
- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements (and gained access through the roof itself or through high level rooflights/windows) or have penetrated through walls.


2.3 Theft (Bury Educational Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against educational facilities, recorded in the Bury area 2018-2019.

Bury Educational Theft – Day Range



Bury Educational Theft – Time Range



2.3.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft at educational facilities in Bury peaks on Tuesday. During the day, the risk of theft peaks during the normal school/college day, with offences frequently taking place during breaks, when pupils and staff leave personal property in unlocked rooms, where they are accessible and vulnerable to theft. Mobile phones, bags and coats are the most routinely stolen items, as well as I.T equipment.

2.4 General Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Criminal damage to property
- Unauthorised access to buildings and private space
- Anti-social behaviour
- Loitering groups (particularly out-of-hours)
- Internal theft
- Theft of staff/pupil belongings
- Bullying
- Staff and pupil safety
- Acts of criminal damage during the construction period

2.5 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.5.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O.s used by offenders when targeting Bury education premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Offenders have prised open windows, have smashed the glazing within them or have targeted them when left insecure to gain unauthorised access.

Possible Solution - All windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 4.3). Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, external bars or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- Offenders have forced open doors using bodily pressure and implements/tools, smashed glazed panels within doors or targeted them when left insecure by staff.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV (see Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by staff, users or passers-by.

- Shutters have been prised open by offenders.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (to LPS 1175 SR 1/2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.

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- Offenders have climbed onto the roof of single-storey building elements (and gained access through the roof itself or through high level rooflights/windows) or have penetrated through walls.

Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any potentially accessible upper floor windows and rooflights should include laminated glazing and be to the same physical security standard as those at ground level. The construction of walls and any potentially accessible roof areas should also be robust enough to withstand penetration (see Section 4.3).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to erect a large single-storey extension to the southern wing of the existing Millwood Primary SEN School, as well as 20 no. additional parking spaces to the front of the existing school building.
- 3.1.2 The proposed extension will sit between the western elevation of the existing southern wing and the western boundary of the site with the canal towpath. The extension itself will include 7 no. additional classrooms (with supporting facilities), a multi-use hall, a library, food technology/sensory integration/rebound/light and dark/soft play rooms, staff room and offices and plant area. Each of the classrooms will have small external outdoor play spaces enclosed with low-level fencing and there will be a tree garden and new screen fencing along the western boundary.
- 3.1.3 The proposed 20 no. new parking spaces will be located to the south-east of the existing building (accessed through the existing automatic vehicular gates off School Street). 2 no. existing accessible parking spaces will be displaced to allow access to the new parking area and will be relocated into the area itself. A new cycle stand area and minibus drop-off/pick-up area are also proposed to the front of the existing school building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed extension will be located within the existing secure fencelines of the school, preventing unauthorised access during the school day, as well as at night/when the school is closed.
- 3.2.2 The proposed extension will benefit from limited levels of natural surveillance from the existing public footpath along the southern boundary of the site.
- 3.2.3 The proposed parking area will be partially overlooked from within the building itself and from the residential properties on the opposite side of School Street. The proposed car park will be laid out in straight rows, with few obstacles to views across them, aiding surveillance opportunities from within the building and from the street.
- 3.2.4 The proposed development may provide the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the extension and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Point for Further Consideration

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The existing site perimeter fenceline/gates and the secondary fencelines/gates preventing unauthorised access to external pupil areas during the school day should be retained. The damaged welded-wire mesh fencing panels abutting the footpath to the south of the site (which have been temporarily repaired/secured with heavy duty cable ties) should be replaced or fully repaired to ensure they are securely fixed to the post with anti-tamper fixings that cannot be easily removed. It is noted that new screening fencing is proposed to the western boundary of the site, along with a new tree garden. It is highly recommended that the existing fenceline is retained and screening panels are added on the internal face to impede views. The existing dense vegetation to the bank between the perimeter fenceline and the canal towpath should also be retained to deter access, damage and scaling. Care should also be taken to ensure that any new or existing trees do not form a climbing aid over adjacent boundaries - low branches should be pruned or removed where possible to prevent scaling. The proposed outdoors play spaces within the secure grounds of the school should be defined with 1200mm high railings and gates.

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- 3.3.2 Although it will be located within the secure grounds of the school, it is preferable for the deep recess between the existing school wing and the proposed extension (adjacent to the proposed Comms Room and Soft Play Room) to be designed-out, or at least reduced in depth, to avoid the creation of a narrow, hidden space that could be exploited by criminals to attack partially hidden doors and windows unseen.
- 3.3.3 Accessible roofs of school buildings have often been exploited by criminals across Greater Manchester to gain unauthorised access, particularly where there are single-storey elements, where eaves are lower or where buildings are publicly accessible out-of-hours – making access easier. Ideally, the eaves of single-storey extension should be now lower than the eaves of the existing school building. They should be designed to discourage climbing (e.g. with rounded/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc.) and there should be no features of the building or nearby hard/soft landscaping features that may provide climbing aids onto the roof (see Section 4.3). Any new rooflights should be to the same physical security standards as any new windows at ground floor level (see Sections 4.2/4.3).
- 3.3.4 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security recommendations for the scheme.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All new external doors (both single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Any new external escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ All internal doors/frames to classrooms (and supporting facilities), the multi-use hall, library, food technology/sensory integration/rebound/light and dark/soft play rooms, staff room, offices and stores should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a deadlock, so that the rooms can be secured when unoccupied.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Any new windows or rooflights should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2 where possible. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be fixed with a secure glazing retention system (e.g. with security glazing tape, with a dedicated security sealant/gasket or a secure mechanical fixing system from the glazing retention tests within the BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 standards)
- ☐ Any opening lights (escape requirements permitting) should be lockable and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Any new glazing (i.e. to doors, windows/curtain walling or rooflights) should incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the extension, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.
- ☐ As much as possible, there should be no features of the building (such as louvered features that could be used as a ladder, projecting window cills or brickwork features, canopies below the level of the single storey eaves, exposed rainwater down pipes etc.) or nearby hard/soft landscaping features (such as nearby boundaries, trees, lighting columns, handrails etc.) that may provide climbing aids onto the roof. Any louvres to the building should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid to reach roof areas. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required to plant areas (search for certified products at <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search>).
- ☐ The construction of any new potentially accessible areas of roof should also be carefully considered to prevent criminal intrusion. Certificated lightweight roof systems are available to LPS 1175 SR1 or STS 202 BR1. Alternatively, expanded metal or welded mesh could be incorporated between the skins of double-skinned roof coverings or within the roof space. Any rooflights should incorporate laminated glazing/polycarbonate and/or internally fixed security bars/grilles.

4.4 Alarm

- ☐ The monitored alarm system covering the existing school should be expanded to cover the proposed extension, linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors to rooms with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.5 Boundaries

- ☐ The existing perimeter welded-wire mesh fenceline/gates and the secondary fencelines/gates preventing unauthorised access to external pupil areas during the school day should be retained. The damaged fencing panels abutting the footpath to the south of the site should be replaced or fully repaired to ensure they are securely fixed to the post with anti-tamper fixings that cannot be easily removed.
- ☐ The existing perimeter fencing along the western boundary (along the canal towpath) should also be retained, with screening panels added on the internal face to impede views.
- ☐ The proposed outdoors play spaces within the secure grounds of the school should be defined with 1200mm high railings and gates.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Lighting to the new car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all new external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.

4.7 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *acceptable standard* that will allow for *identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *overview* and *recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: *all external facades of the extension and all vehicle/cycle parking areas*.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ In vulnerable locations, such as around entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.9 Other

- ☐ Any new cycle parking areas should be located where they can be overlooked from routinely occupied rooms and should include 'Sheffield' stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the school/extension must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the site. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.2 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter/graffiti removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls, CCTV etc.)
 - A weekly physical check of all perimeter fencing to check for evidence of breaches
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees
- 5.1.3 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, projectors, flat screen monitors/televisions, tools etc.) should be properly marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.4 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the site/building, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
20 th July 2023	ISG Ltd	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
24 th July 2023	ISG Ltd	Quote issued & request for additional info
26 th July 2023	ISG Ltd	Instruction to proceed
3 rd August 2023	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2128.26.205	Additional Car Parking Layout	05/07/23	P2
2128.26.301	Proposed Floor Plan	05/07/23	P9
2128.26.501	Proposed Sectional and Elevational Massing	25/05/23	P2

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk